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 This thesis examines the effects of bank mergers on acquiring banks' 
default risk and on their contributions to systemic risk using an international 
merger sample, covering the period between 1998 and 2015. Furthermore, it 
investigates whether the changes in acquirers’ default risk after acquisitions have 
impacts on banking firms’ stockholders (idiosyncratic risk); or whether they 
spread to other banks (systemic risk) and all listed firms (systematic risk). Also, 
this thesis extends the established literature by providing original evidence on the 
determinants of these merger-related changes in acquiring banks' default risk, 
systemic risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk of shareholders.  
An ongoing debate in the literature is whether or not bank mergers help to 
lower bidders’ default risk. Using Distance to Default methodology from Vallascas 
and Hagendorff (2011), this thesis brings robust evidence that bank mergers 
reduce the default risk of bidders. The results also show that not all forms of 
diversification exert an equal effect on the reduction of bidders' default risk. 
Product diversification is found to reduce bidding banks' default risk meanwhile 
geographic diversification does not have a statistically significant relationship to 
the reduction in default risk of acquiring banks. 
Additionally, this thesis extends the debate regarding the effects of bank 
mergers on bidders’ contribution to systemic risk. Employing Marginal Expected 
Shortfall from Acharya et al., (2017) and ∆CoVaR from Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2016), the findings suggest that bank mergers, on average, do not impact on 
acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk. However, product-diversifying 




acquirers only. It also transpires that with deals financed by cash only, the 
acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk increases. 
Finally, this thesis investigates the impact of the changes in default risk on 
changes in systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk following mergers, 
using the empirical framework as in Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013). The 
results from this thesis suggest that, during a pre-merger period (without M&As), 
the risk of default on any individual bank does not only affect this bank’s 
stockholders, but also extends to other banks in the banking system, causing the 
banking industry to become fragile and volatile. Furthermore, when the effects of 
bank mergers are taken into consideration, the changes in acquirers’ default risk 
have direct positive impacts on the changes in their’ own idiosyncratic risk. It is 
significant to note that bank mergers are proven to reduce the default risk of 
acquiring banks earlier in this study. Therefore, it is concluded that the reduction 
in acquirers’ default risk following a merger, also results in the reduction of their 
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Default risk The potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to 
meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999, p.1)  
Idiosyncratic risk 
(specific-risk) 
Specific to each asset or firm. It represents the remaining 
part of an asset's volatility that is not correlated to the market 
Merger and 
Acquisition 
A general term describes the consolidation of firms or assets 
via various types of financial transactions 







 The risk of being affected by general market movements. 
For instance, an increase in interest rates will cause some 
new issued bonds to increase in value, whilst causing some 
company stocks to fall in price, as investors perceive 
executive teams to be cutting back on spending. It 
represents the part of a firm or an asset’s volatility that is 




Financial institutions ‘whose disorderly failure, because of 
their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, 
would cause significant disruption to the wider financial 
system and economic activity (The Financial Stability Board, 
2010)  
Systemic risk The risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or 
institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) 
either (x) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or 
(y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in substantial financial-market price volatility (which 
price volatility may well reflect increases in the cost of capital 
or decreases in its availability (Schwarcz, 2008, p.198)  
Too big to fail Commonly a large institution, involved with distinctive 
regulations from the government to prevent bankruptcy 
during its existence. It may also entail a unique bankruptcy 
system compared to the conventional bankruptcy processes 
that other institutions exercise within the industry, at least 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Since the 1990s, successive waves of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
driven by globalisation and deregulation, have reshaped the world banking 
industry. Consolidation activities have not only broadened banking institutions' 
scale and scope but have also resulted in a remarkable surge in concentration 
levels in almost every banking market. The main reasons for a banking firm to 
engage in an acquisition activity include: the possible reduction of idiosyncratic 
risk, diversification of loan portfolio, the bank’s assets and its operations that 
would result in higher capital buffers, lowered cash flow variability and thus 
decreased default risk (see Koerniadi et al., 2015; Weiß et al., 2014).  
Lately, this combined process has been granted additional stimulus by the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009, after regulators highlighted the role of M&As 
as a tool in which to avoid banking firms’ failures and costly bailouts for the 
governments themselves. (Group of Thirty, 2009). The fundamental notion was 
that via an acquisition, a healthy bank acquires a troubled bank, protecting the 
economy from the full cost of the distressed bank’s failure. This resolution was 
favoured because the government did not have to bail out the troubled banks 
using public funds, which would have been more expensive and greatly 
unpopular with the public (White and Yorulmazer, 2014). Several most prominent 
and renowned cases of such mergers include the Bank of America's acquisition 
of Merrill Lynch, Wells Fargo's merger with Wachovia, Lloyds TSB and Halifax 
Bank of Scotland. Numerous Governments considered the endurance of such 
very large consolidated banks as associated with the welfare of the whole 




the primary issue were that troubled banks were too systemically important to fail, 
then the resolution of an acquisition would simply lead to an even larger and 
riskier banking firm (because of its increased interconnectedness with other 
financial firms through direct exposures in the banking system). As such, a 
merger could even destabilise the banking system. Hence, the global financial 
crisis 2007-09 demonstrates a genuinely striking tension between whether bank 
mergers add stabilising or destabilising effects to the stability of the banking 
system. It also revives the broader controversies around this topic in academic 
literature on 1) how strong the degree of interconnectedness between banking 
firms is, 2) how directly idiosyncratic shocks can transform into systemic crises in 
the banking industry, 3) the relationship between bank concentration and 
systemic risk, 4) safety net subsidies and their impact on financial stability and 5) 
the effects of bank M&As on the different types of risks (e.g. default risk, 
systematic risk, credit risk, total risk).  
Given all the debates to date, some gaps emerge within literature. First, 
most papers study changes in the different types of acquirers’ risks following a 
merger on a country or continent level, for instance: Europe (Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2011), Japan (Harada and Ito, 2011), Pakistan (Afzal and Mirza, 
2012) and cross-border mergers between U.S. acquirers and international targets 
(Koerniadi et al., 2015). To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has 
examined the implication of bank M&As activity on the different types of bank 
risks in a global sample. An international setting allows for an experiment with 
rich variation in the indication and level of changes in bidders' risks witnessed 
across deals; thereby possibly yielding impressive results. Accordingly, this study 




implications of bank mergers using an international sample. Another interesting 
point to highlight is that the sample in this study contains both domestic and 
cross-border deals,1 in addition to focusing and activity-diversifying mergers2. 
Indeed, since the 1980s banking deregulations have been gradually introduced 
across countries globally, including the UK, US, Europe, Japan, Canada and 
China, allowing banks to merge internationally and permitting them to acquire 
other kinds of financial institutions, including security companies, insurance firms 
and investment banks. These developments in cross-border mergers, as well as 
activity-diversifying mergers, may offer substantial diversification benefits, and 
thus, may yield exciting findings on the influence of M&As on different types of 
banking risks. Accordingly, it enables the author to give valuable suggestions to 
banking supervisors and policymakers worldwide regarding the impact of 
different types of M&As on the stability of the combined firms as well as the 
banking system.  
Second, this is the first study to shed light on the effect of individual bank 
default risk on systemic, systematic and idiosyncratic risks under the context of 
M&As. It is broadly recognised within the extant M&A literature that consolidation 
activities change the risk profiles of acquirers, especially the risks of large banking 
firms whose liquidity or credit problems might influence many other banks (Casu 
et al., 2015; Laeven et al., 2016; Weiß et al., 2014). When the risk of a 
                                                 
1 Domestic merger: M&As deal where acquirer and target are in the same country. 
Cross-border merger: M&As deal where acquirer and target are from different 
countries. These are two types of geographic diversification. 
2 Focusing merger: where acquirer and target are both banks. Activity-diversifying 
merger: where acquirer is a bank and target can be non-bank financial firms such 
as insurance company, securities company, financial services company. These 





consolidated institution is greater than before the merger, it increases the 
possibility that the bank may default or become illiquid prior to settling all of its 
payment duties. Furthermore, it exposes other banks straight to risks as payees, 
or indirectly via adding to stock market problems or panic runs. As a result, in the 
banking sector, default risk can also become systematic when the default of a 
single institution impacts, not only the bank itself but spills over to other either 
financial or non-financial firms. However, there are also banking firms that their 
failures do not affect other institutions; in that case, default risk is considered to 
be idiosyncratic and can be diversified away by investors (a more detailed 
explanation can be found in section 7.2.2.1). Existing evidence on the 
relationships between these banking risks is mostly mixed: Denis & Denis (1995) 
and Vassalou & Xing (2004) find that default risk is mainly associated with 
aggregate factors. This, in turn, indicates that bankruptcy risk could be positively 
related to systematic risk. On the contrary, Asquith & Gertner (1994) and Dichev 
(1998) propose that default risks are mainly related to idiosyncratic elements. 
Fiordelisi & Marqués-Ibañez (2013), on the other hand, assert that for listed 
banking firms, individual banks' default risk increases the systemic and 
systematic risks in their sample of European listed commercial banks. Therefore, 
a study that examines the relationships between default risk and other risks, 
taking M&As into consideration, is missing and may reveal interesting results as 
well as policy implications. If individual default risk positively influences 
systematic risk and systemic risk of the banking system, then banking regulators 
may consider using a macroprudential framework. For instance, a merger 




merger approval process. Furthermore, the new combined entity may be required 
to set aside extra capital buffers to cope with unexpected shocks.  
In addition, this study adds to original evidence in literature for the 
determinants of the changes in acquirers’ default risk and systemic risk following 
a merger. Those shreds of evidence will benefit bank managers by proposing the 
ways in which they should manage and minimise their risks when engaging in 
M&A activity, both nationally and internationally. This evidence can also assist 
banking supervisors in imposing appropriate control, and in monitoring the 
process of bank M&A deals, in order to minimise banking risk. As a reminder, this 
supervisory control is crucial because the interconnected nature of the banking 
industry deems it more vulnerable to systemic risk. In other words, the failure of 
one single bank can cause cascading collapse, which may, in turn, bankrupt the 
whole system. 
Broadening and deepening understanding of the effects of M&As on 
banking risks is extremely important, especially in the context of the global 
financial crisis 2007-09, where taxpayers’ dollars were used as government 
bailouts to rescue the TBTFs. Therefore, these gaps and the lengthy debates in 
the literature above serve as the motivation for this study to shed light on the 
effects of bank M&As on acquiring banks’ default risk and the contribution to 
systemic risk. Moreover, it aims to provide original evidence on the determinants 
of these merger-related changes in acquiring banks' default risk and systemic 
risk. Finally, this study contributes to the extant literature (Fiordelisi and Marqués-
Ibañez, 2013) by exploring whether the changes in default risk affect acquirers’ 
systematic risk, systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk, following a bank merger. The 




research questions of this study will be discussed following by an outline of the 
whole study. Next, it summarises the findings and contributions of this study, 





1.2 Study Objectives and Research Questions 
The overall aim of this study is first to examine the effects of bank mergers 
on acquiring banks' default risk and its contribution to systemic risk, covering the 
period between 1998 and 2015. Moreover, it investigates whether the changes 
in acquirers’ default risk following a merger have an impact on banking firms’ 
stockholders (idiosyncratic risk); or whether it extends to other banks (systemic 
risk) and all listed companies (systematic risk). To achieve these objectives, this 
study is divided into three empirical chapters. 
Chapter 5 examines the effects of M&As on acquiring banks’ default risk. 
In addition, the sample is broken into different deal types, such as geographic 
diversification (domestic versus cross-border mergers) and product 
diversification (focusing versus activity-diversifying deals), in order to examine 
the changes in acquirers’ default risk by deal type. Furthermore, this chapter 
studies the influence of deal and acquirers’ characteristics, as well as country 
controls, on the changes in default risk of acquirers’ post-merger, via a 
multivariate analysis.  
Next, Chapter 6 focuses on the effects of M&As on acquiring banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk. The sample is divided into five sub-samples, 
featuring deal value (high, medium and low deal value), geographic diversification 
(domestic versus cross-border), acquirer profitability (high, medium and low 
profitability), concentration (high, medium and low concentration) and markets 
(emerging and developed markets). Following this, the influence of acquirers and 
deal’s characteristics and country controls on acquirers’ contributions to systemic 




Finally, Chapter 7 investigates the impact of the changes in default risk on 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk, using the empirical 
framework as in Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013). First, systematic risk and 
idiosyncratic risk of acquirers are measured under the same estimated time frame 
as the two previous empirical chapters, in order to provide consistency in 
comparing the relationships among these risks. Next, the analysis of such 
impacts will be based on firstly, the pre-merger period and secondly, the 
difference between post-merger and pre-merger period, in order to achieve 
further conclusion on how these impacts change, with or without M&As. 
To achieve these objectives, this study examines the most comprehensive 
sample of international bank M&As in order to tackle the following questions:  
Empirical Chapter 5: The Effects of Bank M&A on Bidders’ Default Risk: 
a. To what extent bank M&As affect acquiring banks’ default risk post-merger 
compared to pre-merger period? 
b. Which characteristics of acquirers’ pre-merger and/or deal characteristics 
affect merger-related changes in the acquirers’ default risk? 
c. Which macro-environment factors of acquirers’ home countries influence 
the merger-related changes in the acquirers’ default risk? 
Empirical chapter 6: The effects of bank M&A on bidders’ contribution to 
systemic risk: 
d. To what extent bank M&As cause changes in the acquirers’ contribution 
to systemic risk? 
e. What are the determinants of merger-related changes to the acquirers’ 




Empirical chapter 7: Is Default Risk Systematic, Idiosyncratic or Systemic 
in the Context of Bank Mergers? 
f. Does the increase (decrease) in bank default risk (∆default risk) is 
associated with the increase (decrease) in acquirers’ contribution to systemic 
risk (∆MES)3 following a merger? 
f. Which factors affect acquirers’ ∆MES with and without a merger? 
g. Does the increase (decrease) in bank default risk (∆default risk) is 
associated with the increase (decrease) in acquirers’ systematic risk (∆beta) 
after a merger?  
i. Which factors affect acquirers’ ∆beta with and without a merger? 
j. Does the increase (decrease) in bank default risk (∆default risk) is 
associated with the increase (decrease) in acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk 
(∆idiosyncratic risk) following a merger?  
k. Which factors affect acquirers’ ∆idiosyncratic risk with and without a 
merger? 
  
                                                 





1.3 Study Findings and Contributions 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of bank M&As on bidders’ default risk. 
Overall, this chapter finds that bank mergers reduce the default risk of bidders. 
This finding also adheres to the presumption gained from literature that the 
diversification of assets between two merging institutions, which are imperfectly 
correlated, should, without countervailing movement from management of 
acquirers, lead to a reduction in the default risk for the combined firm, both 
theoretically (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984) and empirically (Emmons et 
al., 2004; Koerniadi et al., 2015; van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009). Therefore, the 
first Hypothesis 5.1 of this chapter, which predicts that M&As reduce the default 
risk of acquirers, is supported. Also, the results produced in this chapter show 
that not all forms of diversification exert an equal effect on the reduction of 
bidders' default risk. Product diversification is found to pose a positive effect on 
bidding banks' default risk (lower risk), which is in line with the broader literature 
regarding the diversification benefits of reducing bank default risk, as 
demonstrated by van Lelyveld & Knot, 2009 and Wall et al., 2007. Thereby, the 
second Hypothesis 5.2 is supported. Conversely, geographic diversification does 
not have a statistically significant relationship to the reduction in default risk for 
acquiring banks; therefore, the third Hypothesis 5.3 is rejected. Finally, the status 
of target, deal size, return on asset ratio (ROA), leverage and political stability, 
included as control variables, are all found to play different roles in explaining the 
changes in bidders’ default risk.  
Motivated by the results from Chapter 5, in which mergers contribute to 
the reduction in bidders’ default risk, Chapter 6 examines the effects of bank 




produce the same risk-reducing effects. First, the findings suggest that M&As, on 
average, do not impact on acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk. This 
result significantly contradicts  existing literature, which tends to find that mergers 
increase the bidder’s contribution to systemic risk (Molyneux et al., 2014; 
Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). The first Hypothesis 
6.1 of this chapter, which predicts that mergers generate a systemic risk-reducing 
effect on acquiring banks, is therefore rejected. Furthermore, payment method 
and product diversification are hypothesised to be potential determinants that 
have impact on the changes in bidding banks' contribution to systemic risk. 
Indeed, the results show that product-diversifying deals lead to a reduction in 
acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk for non-US acquirers only. This finding is 
a major contribution to literature as it proves that diversification adds to the 
stabilising effect of a bank merger. The finding is consistent with arguments that 
M&As activity broadens the scope of diversification in individual firms, thus, 
reducing each institution's idiosyncratic risk, which results in the reduction of the 
probability of default for individual firms and also promotes financial soundness 
(De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002). Therefore, the second Hypothesis 6.2 of this 
chapter, which projects that product diversification does bring risk-reducing 
benefits for banks, cannot be rejected. 
 It also transpires that with deals financed by cash only, the acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk will increase. These findings are in line with the 
notion that deals which are fully paid for in cash are expected to raise acquiring 
banks' default risk as acquirers replace safe liquid assets (cash) with riskier 
balance sheets of set targets, thereby increasing acquirers' contributions to 




chapter cannot be rejected. In addition, other controlled variables determining the 
reduction in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk include a concentrated 
banking system (HHI) and a stable political environment. In contrast, the factors 
that contribute to the increase in systemic risk include private targets, a small 
relative deal size to acquirers’ value and TBTF motive. One of the reasons why 
TBTF motive is one of the contributing factors for the increase in systemic risk is 
that when a bank is in trouble, they have more motive to engage in M&A activities 
to become too systemically important to fail and may possibly obtain the 
government's safety net to avoid failure. The presence of these public guarantees 
can lead to moral hazard problems that encourages the larger banks' 
managements to involve in high-risk consolidations which, in turn, may make the 
whole banking system instable (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). With respect to 
private targets, private firms are less transparent because they are not subject to 
public exposures, thereby making it difficult for acquirers to assess the risks 
associated with the mergers.  
Finally, Chapter 7 examines whether the changes in acquiring bank’s 
default risk as a result of M&As have an influence on their own idiosyncratic risk; 
or whether it extends to other banks (systemic risk) and all listed companies 
(systematic risk). Therefore, examining the risk profiles of banks during the pre-
merger period (without M&As), and the change in risk profiles of acquirers 
between post-completion and pre-merger period (under the influence of M&As), 
enables this chapter to create an in-depth investigation into the relationship 
between default risk and the other risks of acquirers and consequently, to add 
further insight into existing literature. The findings emerging from this study 




banks’ default risk influence their’ contribution to systemic risk (MES). This result 
is particularly pronounced for non-US acquirers. Similarly, acquirers’ pre-merger 
default risk is also positively related to their pre-merger idiosyncratic risk. This 
indicates that the risk of default on any individual bank does not only affect this 
bank’s stockholders, but also extends to other banks in the banking system, 
causing the banking industry to become fragile and volatile. This research finding 
is consistent with that presented in many other studies (i.e. Asquith and Gertner, 
1994; Dichev, 1998; Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez, 2013; Opler and Titman, 
1994). In contrast, no relationship is found between acquirers’ pre-merger default 
risk and their pre-merger systematic risk (beta)4. However, the results do show 
that banks with the highest default risk pre-merger witness less systematic risk in 
general. The explanation for this finding is due to negative information regarding 
an insolvent bank being embedded in the bank’s share prices, even in an 
inefficient market, thereby causing the most financially distressed banks to earn 
lower stock returns. Since systematic risk is proxied by subsequent realised 
returns, lower returns are associated with lower systematic risk (Dichev, 1998). 
As such, a high default risk bank may witness less systematic risk. Overall, the 
Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 of this chapter are supported whereas Hypothesis 7.2 is 
rejected. 
This study also investigates the relationships among the changes in 
acquirers’ default risk (∆default risk), acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk 
(∆MES), acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk (∆idiosyncratic risk) and acquirers’ 
systematic risk (∆beta), between the pre and post-merger period. Overall, the 
                                                 




results show no relationship between ∆default risk and ∆MES or between 
∆default risk and ∆beta, which suggests that, in general, M&As do not affect these 
relationships. Nevertheless, acquirers with the highest default risk before merger 
witness an increase in MES post-merger as a result of M&As. This result is 
specifically more pronounced for U.S. acquirers than for non-U.S. Furthermore, 
there is weak evidence that, as a result of M&As, beta tends to increase post-
merger for non-US acquirers who have a high default risk profile pre-merger. This 
finding is explained by a bank’s motive to become TBTF via M&As in order to 
exploit the safety net and government bailouts, or to establish a more robust 
institution (see Molyneux et al., 2014). These banks are often near default and 
have the lowest possibility of obtaining a bailout before the merger. Therefore, a 
bank with the highest default risk pre-merger will often witness their contribution 
to systemic risk increase after a merger. In addition, the ∆default risk of acquirers 
has a direct positive impact on the change in their’ own idiosyncratic risk 
(∆idiosyncratic risk), suggesting that bank mergers play an important role in this 
relationship. It is significant to note that bank mergers are proven to reduce the 
default risk of acquiring banks in Chapter 5 of this study. Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that the reduction in acquirers’ default risk following a merger, also 
results in the reduction of their idiosyncratic risk, which means that M&As lead to 
safer banks in general. Other control variables, such as cost-income ratio, income 
diversification and capitalisation are found to be important drivers of 
∆idiosyncratic risk. In short, Hypothesis 7.6 of this chapter is supported whereas 
Hypothesis 7.4 and 7.5 are rejected.  
The main contributions of this study follow from the results above. First, 




period between 1998 and 2015. This period characterises the most active period, 
with respect to financial conglomerates and bank-nonbank partnerships, and 
therefore, contains the largest and most significant relevant deals. Second, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine various risk 
implications of bank mergers on a global sample, which allows for 
experimentation with rich variation in the level of changes in bidders' risks 
witnessed across the deals in different countries and different markets; thereby 
extending the literature. For instance, both chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis 
examines default risk and systemic risk of bidders on different types of markets, 
including developed, emerging and frontier markets. Therefore, it sheds lights on 
how M&As affect these risks in different types of markets which has not well been 
investigated before in the literature. Furthermore, chapter 6 looks at the impact 
of M&As on bidders’ systemic risk under different regions such as US, Europe, 
Asia and others, therefore, yielding new and valuable insights compared to other 
empirical studies regarding M&As and risk. Also, it is important to note that the 
global setting of the sample allows examinations into how GDP, the market 
concentration index (HHI), the political stability and the rules of law of each 
country affect the influence of M&As on bank risks in all chapters. Indeed, the 
political stability and the market concentration index are found to be crucial 
determinants of the merger-related changes in bank default and systemic risks. 
Third, it categorises deals between focusing and product-diversifying 
mergers (product diversification) and deals between in-country and cross-border 
mergers (geographic diversification), in order to acknowledge differentiation in 
the risk effects of M&As when banks merge with different types of targets, and 




diverges from various studies within literature that do not make these significant 
distinctions. Fourth, this study provides original evidence on the determinants of 
these merger-related changes in acquiring banks’ default risk, systemic risk, 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Finally, for the first time in literature, the 
coupled relationships surrounding a merger activity amongst default risk and 





1.4 Study Outline  
The structure of this study will be organised as follows. Chapter 2 focuses 
on the background of the banking market and a discussion on the function of 
banks in general. Additionally, it offers discussions regarding M&As global 
landscape and bank regulation development across many countries of the globe. 
Chapter 3 sets out to organise and review the existing body of research on 
banking risks and bank M&As activity (including M&As wave, driving forces, 
traditional motives for M&As, in addition to the impact of M&As on bank 
performance). Furthermore, it involves a thorough discussion of both the 
theoretical contributions to the phenomenon and a critical analysis and summary 
of the empirical contributions to the effects of M&As on banking risks. Chapter 4 
gives a detailed description of the data collection process as well as sample 
statistics. Chapter 5 examines M&As effects on bidders’ default risk employing 
the Distance to Default (DD) methodology, as in Vallascas & Hagendorff (2011), 
in order to measure default risk. Chapter 6 investigates whether bank mergers 
cause changes in bidders’ contribution to systemic risk and the determinants of 
these changes using both Marginal Expected Shortfall from Acharya et al., (2017) 
and ∆CoVaR from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), in order to measure systemic 
risk. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the impact of acquirer’s default risk on its 
systematic, systemic and idiosyncratic risk in the context of M&As. Chapter 8 
concludes the study with a detailed summary of its results, contributions and 





Chapter 2: Overview of M&As in the Banking Industry 
 
This section outlines the overall M&As background in the banking industry. 
It first describes the global landscape of bank M&As between 1998 and present 
times. The second section provides a thorough discussion on M&As and bank 
regulations across the globe over time.    
2.1 Bank M&As Global Landscape 
Institutions that form international financial structures have been rapidly 
consolidated since the 1980s and are encountering further re-structuring given 
the outcome of the global financial crisis. Lately, many financial institutions have 
disappeared, leaving survivors only the choice of being more prominent, pursuing 
geographical and product diversification. During the period since the 1980s, the 
financial services industry has experienced a rapid surge in both relative size and 
the number of deals. Data from Bloomberg reports that around 9,328 international 
mergers in the banking industry5 were announced and completed from 1998 to 
2017. Significantly, only 4,724 deals revealed their announced merger value, 
worth approximately $2,600 billion. Therefore, the actual total merger value of 
9,328 deals should be much higher than the $2.6 trillion total deal value 
announced. As seen in Figure 2.1, the two peaks in the number of deals were in 
2001 (657 deals) and in 2006 (708 deals).  
  
                                                 
5 The 9,328 deals are between acquirers being banks and targets being banks or 
non-bank financial firms (banks, insurance, diversified financial services, 




Figure 2.1: M&A Deals in the Global Banking Industry  
 
Source: Bloomberg 
The sharp increase in the volume of merger deals from 1998 to 2001 could 
be explained by the U.S. bank deregulation event in 1999. Specifically, the 
passage of Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 (or the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) allowed banks to merge with non-banks, such as insurance 
companies and security firms. This deregulation later paved the way for a surge 
in the number of M&As activities in the banking industry. Following this, the 
number of merger deals peaked again in 2006 before diving abruptly between 
2006 and 2017. Merger values in 2007 witnessed the highest value of deals 
executed, compared to other years during the whole period, totalling 
approximately $330 billion. However, the value of deals decreased sharply 
between 2007 and 2009 and remained stable until 2017. The 2007-09 global 




of deals between 2007 and 2009. During the crisis, banks may have been more 
reluctant to merge, due to the uncertainty and instability embedded in the 
financial system and would have taken more caution in M&As decisions. 
Alternatively, they may have experienced financial difficulty in financing a merger 
as a number of banking institutions had suffered from significant losses or failed. 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the deal breakdown by size. 






Concerning the deal count breakdown, it is evident that about 85% of the 
M&As deals (4005 deals) are in the $0-$500 million range. Nevertheless, it 




$10,000 million plus range, attaining $1,003 billion in total value. Regarding the 
average deal value, M&As deals in the $0-$500 million range have the lowest 
average value per deal. Figure 2.3 shows a summary of acquirer and target 
regions, in terms of deal value via M&As transactions. 









Overall, it is perceivable that European and North American bidders were 
among the most active bidders worldwide. The data shows that North American 
acquirers contribute to 37% of total deal value in these M&As transactions. 
Similarly, European acquirers are the most active bidders, with the total value of 
transactions worth $1,170 billion during the investigated time. In contrast, bidders 
from continents such as Latin America, Caribbean, Middle East and Africa 
scarcely engaged in M&As activities. Middle East and African acquirers spent the 
most modest amount of capital in M&As transactions, approximating $44.63 
billion. In a similar trend, European and North American targets were acquired 
most; meanwhile limited capital was injected into Latin America, Caribbean, 
Middle East and Africa economies.  
According to Figure 2.4, when targets were broken down by the financial 
services industry, banks were on top of the list, followed by real estate, diversified 
financial services and savings, loans and insurance. On the contrary, private 
equity and closed end funds were the least acquired by banks.  






In conclusion, most of the M&As transactions in the banking sector were 
conducted during the period of 1998-2008. Following this, the number of M&As 
activities dropped sharply and, until recently, remained stable, as 85% of the 
M&As deals fell into the $0-$500 million range. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the value of each M&As deal was generally quite small. In contrast, the value 
of each mega merger was significantly high. Acquirers and targets from North 
America and Europe were the most active compared to the rest of the world. In 
terms of target industry breakdown, banks were acquired the most, followed by 
diversified financial services, real estate and savings and loans. In order to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the background to the banking industry, 





2.2 M&As and Bank Regulations  
During the last four decades, the global banking sector has experienced 
rapid changes in regulation, deregulation, consolidation, globalisation and 
privatisation. The recent global financial crisis and the liberalisation of emerging 
markets, have influenced the share of the global banking market, leading to the 
failure of TBTF U.S. financial institutions. Moreover, banks in Latin America and 
Asia have been purchasing financial firms in the EU. Many nations have 
liberalised their banking sector since the 1980s, leading to a surge in the number 
of cross-border and conglomerate mergers. These extensive deregulations 
stimulate banks to engage in risky activities and a higher level of leverage; thus 
resulting in the fragility of the financial structure as well as a global banking crisis 
(Carbo-Valverde et al., 2012; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009).  
The UK began its deregulation in 1986 when the Big Bang successfully 
liberalised financial sectors by eliminating the prevention of mergers between 
banks and non-bank firms, as well as implementing fixed minimum commissions. 
Commercial banks could acquire brokerage firms; thus, resulting in a substantial 
number of merger activities; for instance, the mega-merger between stockbroker 
Charterhouse Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1985. The UK market 
then witnessed a rise in merger transactions by the U.S. acquirers. The 
deregulation was somewhat the same in Canada in 1987, known as the ‘little 
bang’. This deregulation encouraged Canadian chartered banks to merge with 
investment and security dealers; thus, consolidation transactions happened 
significantly between 1987 and 1988. The 1980s witnessed the same 
deregulation process in Japan when the targets of Japanese acquirers were the 




The regulatory climate has been serving as a means of determining how 
mergers and acquisitions in the financial industry have developed, particularly in 
the U.S. Contrary to the liberalisation of the European financial sector in 1989, 
when the EU Council of Ministers adopted the Second Banking Directive, the U.S. 
financial sector remained intensively splintered until 1999. The U.S. financial 
regulation from the 19th century prevented financial institutions from enlarging 
geographically to other states, along with their capability to consolidate with other 
types of financial institution, including, but not limited to, security companies, 
insurance firms and investment banks. Due to these legislative obstacles, 
banking institutions in the U.S. were not able to benefit from merger-related 
advantages, such as product and geographical diversification or economies of 
scale and scope 6.   
A significant milestone in the US financial regulatory history was the 
passing of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) (Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) to repeal part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. This removed 
barriers in the market and allowed banking firms to merge with security or 
insurance companies. This deregulatory event was a result of the intense 
pressure and lobbying by the financial services sector. Indeed, the merger 
between Citicorp and Travelers was announced in 1998, despite the fact that the 
remaining provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act still prohibited banks from 
consolidating with insurance underwriters. This merger somewhat challenged 
existing regulations and paved the way for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. 
Most of the regulatory obstacles dictated on the finance sectors by the National 
                                                 





Banking Act of 1864, the Banking Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 were eliminated under FSMA 1999. Explicitly, the Act voided the 
barriers on commercial and investment banks consolidating with security 
companies and insurance firms, written in sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall 
Act. It established new financial holding firms in section 4 of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 to involve security and insurance underwrites and 
merchant bank transactions. However, non-financial transactions of such holding 
firms were limited to 15% (US Senate Committee on Banking, no date)   
In comparison to the US, the European financial industry experienced 
liberalisation much sooner, via adoption of the Second Banking Directive of 1989, 
which introduced the concept of a ‘single passport,’ to allow all European 
members to partake in banking businesses in any other EU countries. 
Simultaneously, banks were subject to legislation and regulatory requirements 
from their home countries. As a result, when a bank operated in another EU 
country, the policymakers from the host country were to respect the supremacy 
of the home nation. New member states of the EU, such as Latvia, Poland, 
Lithuania and Hungary had no choice but to restructure their economy towards 
the EU benchmarks, thereby moving towards the market economies (Casu et al., 
2006). Numerous new member states of the EU then reduced these constraints 
in their financial markets and initiated vital privatisation plans. Furthermore, the 
Second Banking Directive permitted European banks to engage in functional 
diversification across activities such as securities, insurance, investment banking, 
commercial banking and other financial services. This diversification has led to a 




The 1990s also witnessed numerous significant banking and financial 
crises in emerging markets, urging governments from these markets to 
deregulate their financial sector. Some major financial crises from that period 
include the 1994-1995 tequila crisis, which initiated in Mexico, then expanded to 
Brazil and Argentina, and the 1997-1998 Asian crisis that hit Thailand first before 
spreading to countries in Southeast Asia. Significant changes and deregulations 
were therefore introduced into the emerging markets, after the crises, via bank 
restructuring plans, broadened access to foreign ownership and by encouraging 
competition from financial intermediaries (Molyneux et al., 2013).  
Although China has circumvented the direct negative influences of the 
1997-1998 Asian crisis, it still underwent secondary consequences, resulting in 
an economic slowdown. Since the slowdown, China has gradually followed the 
global development of steadily eliminating the strict separations that were 
conventionally enforced among banks, securities and insurances. The 
deregulation began with revision of the Law of PRC on Commercial Banks in 
2003 to insert the clause ‘unless the State Council provides otherwise’ to the 
general ban on banks involved in security transactions and later, insurance 
businesses. This financial development is characterised by the appearance of 
several giant financial conglomerates; for instance, China Everbright Group, 
CITIC Group and China PingAn Group, which created diversified institutions 
operating in various parts of the financial sector, involving insurance, trusts, asset 
investments, banks and securities (Huang, 2010).  
Following the banking crises in the 1980s and early 1990s, the financial 
crisis of 2007-09 could be considered the most significant and most extreme 




landscape of the global finance and banking sector. The underlying causes for 
such crisis were known to be a combination of the housing bubble and credit 
boom. This crisis drove the global economies, banking sectors and financial 
markets into severe disaster, taking massively financed bailouts from taxpayers 
to bolster the sector. A courageous response from the U.S regulatory authorities, 
given the immense damage caused by the financial crisis, was the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This Act intended to 
set up a sound economic foundation to boost employment, protect customers, 
control Wall Street and Big Bonuses, cease bailouts and the ‘too-big-to-fail,’ in 
addition to avoiding another financial crisis. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
Volcker Rule, finalised on December 2013, aimed to minimise the risks incurred 
by US banking entities. The Volcker Rule prohibited them from becoming 
involved in proprietary transactions, acquiring or holding partnerships, equity, or 
other possessions in a hedge fund or private equity fund, or from acting as a 
promoter for a hedge fund or private equity fund. 
Given the adverse effects of the global financial crisis on the EU market, 
the Liikanen report was commissioned by the EU to determine whether the 
structural reforms of banking and financial services in the EU could enhance 
financial stability, promote efficiency and increase customer protection. An 
example of these measures on EU proposals is where proprietary activities and 
other essential trading transactions had to be appointed to an independent legal 
entity and a segregated number of transactions would form an essential share of 
a bank's transactions. Furthermore, the EU was also nominated to employ more 




more persistent risk management in internal models (Europa, accessed 18 March 
2018).  
In response to the financial crisis, the UK also launched the Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 in order to make provisions for changes 
in the banking industry. This included an announcement of the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme, which protected depositors in the case of default of 
financial service companies. It also ensured the new Prudential Regulation 
Authority had enough power to hold banks responsible for how they split their 
investment transactions and retail trading.   
Overall, during the last three decades, numerous causes have drastically 
changed how financial firms are operating. The prospects for higher profitability, 
provided by technological and financial advances and the growing popularity of 
capital markets, have led to a structural evolution in the conventionally 
fragmented function of financial service institutions. Following a chain of delayed 
reactions, between regulation, circumvention and deregulation, the formation and 
consolidation of very big, international, multi-product financial operating 
institutions are presently the norms, rather than the exception. Financial 
institutions still find methods in which to circumvent or avoid the constraints that 
have been set, because regulations and loopholes exist together in every 
regulatory and legislative system. Therefore, all the leading financial markets' 
authorities are still attempting to implement regulatory changes to the landscape 






Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
This chapter examines the extant body of the academic literature on the 
motives for financial conglomerates and non-conglomerate types of mergers, in 
addition to reviewing the impact of these mergers on bank performance and risks. 
In the first section, the first part discusses M&A waves and driving forces. The 
second and third parts review the traditional motives for M&As in general and 
specifically. The final part of this section presents the impact of M&As on bank 
performance. Second, the next section provides a detailed discussion regarding 
the influence of M&As on banking risks both theoretically and empirically. 
3.1 Bank and M&As Activity  
3.1.1 M&As wave and driving forces 
M&As are significant activities, whereby two firms are consolidated with 
the aim of attaining specific strategic and corporate objectives, such as market 
power, maximisation of shareholder wealth value and increased profitability. The 
most remarkable feature of M&As as a phenomenon, is that they happen in 
waves. The opposing explanations of merger waves can be classified into two 
viewpoints: the neoclassical hypothesis and the behavioural hypothesis. 
The neoclassical hypothesis suggests that when a regulatory, 
technological and economic shock to an industry occurs, the joint responses of 
companies inside and outside the industry are such that the assets of the industry 
are reallocated via mergers and partial-firm acquisitions. The acquiring firm 
managers react simultaneously to the shock and then compete for the best mix 
of assets; therefore the merger activity clusters over time. It is only when sufficient 
capital liquidity endures accommodating assets reallocation, that an industry 




will lead to merger waves (Harford, 2005). The payment method for mergers will 
be either cash or stock, and partial-company activities for cash will be noticed. A 
firm might pursue a cash partial-company transaction and/or a stock swap. On 
the other hand, the behavioural viewpoint explains that mergers occur when 
acquirers' managers utilise over-valued shares to acquire lower-valued 
companies' assets. To produce a merger wave, it demands waves of high 
valuations for enough institutions. Thus, the behavioural hypothesis makes the 
following predictions. First, merger waves will happen after a period of abnormally 
high stock returns or market-to-book ratios, mainly when the diffusion in these 
returns or ratios is substantial. Second, industries experiencing waves will 
witness abnormal low returns after the height of the waves. Third, recognisable 
regulatory or economic shocks will not systematically precede the wave, because 
there is no economic driver enforcing the wave. Fourth, stock-financing mergers 
are tremendously seen in a wave, whereas cash-financing method should not 
raise in frequency throughout waves. Finally, due to the wave being compelled 
by consolidation of real assets with overvalued shares, partial-firm transactions 
for cash should not be the norm, and they should be particularly uncommon in 
companies that finance their mergers by stock (Harford, 2005).  
From the neoclassical viewpoint, empirical evidence from literature 
demonstrates that companies with a significant amount of cash reserves are 
more dynamic in M&As market, hence supporting arguments for the neoclassical 
view (Harford, 1999). The earliest study by Coase (1937), asserts that changes 
in technology result in mergers. Maksimovic & Phillips (2001) utilise performance 
enhancements at the plant-level to defend the neoclassical view of merger 




(2005), which investigates both groups of explanations, the neoclassical model 
and the behavioural model. The author concludes merger waves are caused by 
industry economic, regulatory and technological shocks.   
Regarding the behavioural view, Viswanathan & Rhodes-Kropf (2004) 
jointly constructed a model of rational managerial behaviour and unpredictability, 
related to the causes of overvaluation or undervaluation, and to the correlation 
between merger waves and market performance. This model suggests that 
rational acquired firms will agree more deals with overvalued acquirers because 
they do not have precise information throughout the peaks of market valuation 
and therefore, miscalculate synergies during this period. A merger wave is 
created from a higher flow of transactions. Indeed, Ang and Cheng (2006) and 
Dong et al., (2006), apply accounting data to measure a fundamental value and 
to observe evidence consistent with the behavioural hypothesis of merger wave. 
In addition, Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005), in their empirical study, assert that 
collective merger waves occur when market valuations, calculated as market-to-
book ratios, are high in comparison to good valuation, measured by residual 
income models or industry multiples. One of the advanced aspects of this 
empirical study is their attempt to interpret and classify their evidence based on 
different opposing hypotheses of merger wave; meanwhile, other authors 
investigating the behavioural view often seek evidence consistent with that view, 
rather than exploring both behavioural and neoclassical explanations and then 
correctly rejecting the latter one.    
In relation to the possible drivers of merger waves, it is notable that, since 
the 19th century, the globe has witnessed six significant merger waves, each 




happened within eight leading industries in the US, including food products, 
petroleum, chemicals, metals, transportation equipment, fabricated metal 
products, machinery and bituminous coal (Nelson, 1959). Most industries in the 
U.S. witnessed an increasing level of concentration. It is deemed that the first 
wave is a US event and its influence did not spill over into the UK, Asia or Europe. 
This first merger wave results from various situations. First, with regards to 
transaction costs, many substantial advances in the physical infrastructure of the 
U.S. and the production technology of companies (Markham, 1955; Salter and 
Weinhold, 1980) were perceived to reduce the cost of internalising many markets 
at this period, therefore encouraging M&As. Meanwhile, the regulatory and legal 
environment played an important role in triggering the wave. Before 1904, the 
courts stimulated agglomeration by demonstrating in various separate rulings that 
cartels and trade associations were far more vulnerable (Chandler, 1990). Based 
on the drivers of merger wave, it can be said that this wave is explained by 
neoclassical hypothesis whereby economic and regulatory shocks lead to merger 
wave. 
The second wave (ca. 1918-1929) occurred in the US, motivated by 
changes in the physical operating setting of a US institution (Gaughan, 2015). 
The majority of mergers concentrated on vertical integration, unrelated 
conglomeration and the creation of oligopoly, instead of monopolistic 
acquisitions. The second merger wave occurred in mining, manufacturing, public 
utility and banking industries (Gaughan, 2015). The lack of a unified regulatory 
scheme to challenge all anti-competition or regulations is perceived to play a role 
in explaining the second merger wave. This wave ended on Black Thursday – 24 




The growth of the modern management theory, which was, among other 
elements, dispersed from the US to the UK, drove the third wave (ca. 1960-1969). 
The third wave was greatly driven by financial innovation. The boom in M&As 
transactions is due to the fact that stock-financed mergers were usually non-
taxable. During this period, empirical evidence from literature shows the market 
supported diversification. Akbulut & Matsusaka (2010), Klein (2001), Matsusaka 
(1993) and Ravenscraft & Scherer (1989), all demonstrate that unrelated mergers 
in the 1960s produced a significant positive performance. This wave ended in 
1969 with the fall of the stock market.  
The first anti-merger wave, the fourth wave (ca. 1981-1989), occurred 
when institution leaders realised that many conglomerates, established in the 
1960s, were not as valued as when they performed individually (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1991). Throughout this period, M&As activities grew from the US to the 
UK and the EU. Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) assert that certain shocks, such as 
deregulation, foreign competition and oil-price shocks, explain numerous M&As 
transactions in the 1980s. Conglomerate firms were ripped up and restructured 
by hostile raiders when these conglomerate firms did not diagnose the flawed 
nature of diversification. The rise in concentration levels within broadcasting, 
entertainment, natural gas, trucking industries and air transport is explained by 
deregulation (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). The fourth wave terminated in 1989 
when the US economy went into mild recession.  
The fifth wave, from 1991 to 2001, was driven by a number of factors, such 
as globalisation, market liberalisation and deregulation (De Pamphilis, 2008; 
Gaughan, 2015). The world experienced an extremely high volume of M&As 




2003). The number of hostile deals decreased in the UK and the US, although, 
increased in Europe (Gaughan, 2015). The fifth wave is seen as the wave with 
the most significant losses, as $2.31 was lost for every $1 financing on 
acquisitions. Dong et al. (2006), Harford (2005), Shleifer & Vishny (2003) and 
Viswanathan & Rhodes-Kropf (2004) all advise that the fifth wave was the result 
of market timing by corporate managers. Hence when the bubble burst in March 
2000, the wave swiftly ended.   
The sixth wave (ca. 2003-2008) was considered to be the first worldwide 
merger wave, as well as the first wave of the 21st century. In this wave, private 
equity corporations exploited historically low interest rates in order to complete 
risky acquisitions. The fraction of stock-swap financing deals decreased by more 
than 57% during this period, and the fraction of equity-financing deals sank by 
32%, while numerous, wholly cash-financing mergers increased, in comparison 
to the level observed in the 1980s. Therefore, it seems that the neoclassical 
suggestion, which advises that merger wave is driven by plenty of liquidity, more 
effectively explains the rise of this merger wave than the behavioural theories7. 
The global banking panic in the autumn of 2008 drove worldwide economies into 
severe losses. Despite the various efforts of government interventions, to boost 
the solvency and liquidity of financial markets and the so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
organisations, the market still witnessed an excessive slump of almost all 
commodities and asset prices, the surge of borrowing costs for both individuals 
and institutions and the rarely-observed volatile increase of the financial market. 
Modest growth projections prevented business leaders from pursuing M&As 
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externally and shareholder enthusiasm was kept very low due to the shortage of 
customer and business confidence. As a result, the sixth merger wave finished 
between 2008 and 2009 and the M&As transactions dropped deeply to their 
lowest position since 2004. 
Following the discussion of merger wave and its driving forces, it is also 
important to understand the motives for M&As in general, and for bank M&As 
specifically. This will be discussed in the next section. 
3.1.2 Traditional motives for M&As 
 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) suggest three main motives for M&As, 
namely the synergy motive, the agency motive and hubris. Under synergy motive, 
the occurrence of M&As is explained by the economic benefits that are arising 
from the merger of resources between two corporations. The agency motive 
proposes that managers engage in M&As for their self-interest at the expense of 
acquiring a firm's shareholders. The hubris hypothesis suggests that managers 
of acquiring firms overpay for targets due to hubris and pursue M&As when no 
synergy is recognised. They also find that the three motives exist simultaneously 
in many U.S. mergers, which is in line with the findings of Seth et al. (2000); 
Nguyen et al. (2012). Similarly, empirical evidences of multiple motives are found 
in UK acquisitions (Arnold and Parker, 2009; Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008).  
3.1.2.1 Synergy motive 
The term synergy often refers to the form of reaction that happens when 
two entities integrate in order to generate a combined stronger effect than could 
be accounted for individually. Discussions regarding synergies often refer to 
Ansoff's synergy concept that illustrates positive synergies such as "2 + 2 = 5". 




profitable than the single parts of the two corporations that were merged. The 
predicted presence of synergistic welfares permits corporations to incur the cost 
of the merging process as well as affords to pay a premium for target 
shareholders (Gaughan, 2015). Synergies comprise operating and financial 
synergies. Operating synergy can arise from gains that improve revenues or 
those that decrease costs. The revenue-enhancing operating synergies can be 
achieved through greater pricing power, a merger of functional strengths and 
growth from fast-growing markets or new emerging markets. It is worth noting 
that because revenue enhancement synergies are difficult to achieve, managers 
from acquiring firms tend to expect more cost-decreasing synergies, which can 
be achieved through economies of scale reduction in the costs per unit that is 
associated with the increasing scale and size of a firm's operations. Economies 
of scope are another concept often connected with scale economies, which 
explains the capability of a corporation to make use of one set of inputs to deliver 
a variety of products and services. Scope economies are said to be one of the 
underlying elements behind the M&As activities across the banking sector during 
the fifth merger wave. Financial synergies in the context of M&As can result in 
two forms, which are either higher cash flows or lower costs of capital for the 
acquiring or combined firm (Gaughan, 2015). In a theoretical and empirical 
analysis, documented by Bradley et al. (1988), synergistic gains were found, but 
distributed inequitably between the target and acquiring shareholders. The 
sample consists of successful tender offers between 1963 and 1984, in which the 
target shareholders enjoyed the lion's share of synergistic gains; the share of 
gains has increased considerably since the passage of the Williams Amendment 




only before the change in the legal environment; however, they experienced a 
substantial loss afterwards. The findings may indicate that any legal or 
institutional changes have considerably affected the share of synergistic gains 
between target and acquirer shareholders. This result is consistent with 
Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al. (2000), that synergy gain is the 
main reason for both in-country and foreign acquisitions of US firms. The result, 
however, is inconsistent with the hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986), which will be 
discussed in the latter part of this section.  
3.1.2.2 Agency motive 
Under the agency motive, Jensen (1986) proposes the agency costs of 
free cash flow theory which, among many theories, can relevantly explain M&As. 
The free cash flow theory anticipates that mergers and acquisitions are more 
likely to demolish, rather than to create value. As such, the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders is present. This also indicates that 
managers of companies with unexploited borrowing power and large free cash 
flows are more likely to pursue M&As that are low-benefit or value-decreasing. 
The extant literature has extensive evidence of agency motive behind M&As. 
Malatesta (1983) investigates that mergers with agency motive normally destroy 
the value of acquirers. Shleifer and Vishny (1989), report that acquiring managers 
undertake M&As in order to increase the reliance of the company on their skills, 
regardless of whether such mergers are value enhancing or value destroying. 
Also, Morck et al. (1990) determine that many acquisitions focus on expanding 
company size, rather than its value. All of these findings may suggest that agency 





The hubris hypothesis, developed by (Roll 1986), explains that M&As 
happen because key decision makers in acquiring companies are infected by 
hubris8. Moreover, acquisitions are undertaken even when the valuation of 
targets exceeds the current market price, which merely reflects a valuation error. 
Indeed, Moeller et al. (2004), suggest that hubristic managers of big corporations 
have a tendency to propose higher acquisition premiums and are more likely to 
complete an acquisition than their smaller peers within the same industry. 
Moreover, substantial evidence, that supports hubris (defined as over-
confidence, Malmendier & Tate, 2008) as a motive for acquisitions, is found in 
UK samples (Firth, 1980), among Japanese bidding firms (Lin et al., 2008) and 
among U.S. domestic M&As (Nguyen et al., 2012). Conversely, Aktas et al. 
(2009) find that the decreasing trend of cumulative abnormal returns over deals 
does not necessarily mean hubris exists; it can be affected by other factors such 
as budget limits or growing competition throughout M&As waves. 
3.1.2.4 Other motives 
Apart from the motives discussed, it is suggested that M&As involve 
numerous motivations. Amihud & Lev (1981) propose that corporations pursue 
diversification in order to attain a more stable operating performance. In addition, 
it allows managers to lower the risk to personal capital. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
propose a model of managerial entrenchment in which managers pursue M&As, 
not only for increasing their job’s security and obtaining higher salaries and 
bonuses from shareholders, but also for greater freedom in decisions on business 
                                                 
8 The theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) suggests that managers may have good 
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strategies. The model contains some empirical implications consistent with 
evidence on the behaviours of managers. Furthermore, evidence of conflicting 
M&As motives found in Mehrotra et al. (2011) is consistent with the observation 
that the wealth gains over M&As announcements periods in Japan are lacking. 
To conclude, it is challenging to draw a good picture of the underlying motives for 
mergers, as multiple motives often exist simultaneously. In the next section, 
motives for M&As in the banking industry will be discussed.  
3.1.3 Motives for bank M&As 
3.1.3.1 Motives for non-conglomerate bank mergers 
As stated in the previous section, motivations for M&As in any sector, 
including the banking industry, can be summarised as synergy, agency and 
hubris. Additionally, in Berger et al. (1999) framework, the fundamental motive 
for consolidation in the financial services industry is to maximise shareholder 
wealth value. Managers of bidding firms expect to maximise value through 
mergers, mainly by enhancing participants' market power in setting prices or by 
boosting efficiency, and sometimes by making themselves more accessible to a 
safety net. Empirical proof on the motivations for non-conglomerate bank M&As 
(i.e. banks merge with banks) in Europe and North America, have a tendency to 
emphasize the importance of synergy motive (Focarelli et al., 2002); (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2004). 
Indeed, in most research from the 1980s and the early 1990s on the 
presence of economies of scale in retail, commercial banking observes a flat U-
shaped average cost curve, with medium-sized banks being slightly more scale 
efficient than either bigger or smaller banks. This outcome is quite robust and 




find evidence of economies of scale, ranging from 5% to 7% in their sample of 
European banks between 1989 and 1997, with assets from €1 billion to €5 billion. 
Furthermore, these outcomes also imply that, although the largest banks in 
Europe do not seem to benefit from economies of scale benefits as smaller banks 
do, they do gain advantages from the technical progress in decreasing bank 
costs. In a similar vein, Cavallo & Rossi (2001) confirm the existence of higher 
scale economies in smaller banks in all countries in Europe. Furthermore, they 
find the presence of scale economies at any production scale and for every 
banking type. The findings are similar to that of the US banking sector, where the 
minimum optimal size appears to be less than $500 million of assets on samples 
which examine mostly small banks from $2 billion to $10 billion of assets, 
containing mainly large banks or samples that regard risk as one of the related 
factors (Berger, 2000). Potentially significant economies of scale are found in a 
sample of hypothetical large bank M&As in Canada between 1976 and 1996 
(McIntosh, 2002).  
In contrast, Berger et al. (1993) found that the largest banks encounter 
insignificant diseconomies of scale, even though revenues grow marginally from 
1% to 4% with bank size. Hughes et al. (2001) asserted that most studies observe 
scale diseconomies, as they do not consider the distinctions in the capital 
structure of banks and their levels of risk-taking. Their studies showed that large 
banks possibly enjoy protection under the TBTF status and utilise safety net 
subsidies from the government; thus, they maintain lower capital than the cost-
minimising standard level. Meanwhile smaller banks keep more than the cost-
minimising standard level of capital. Likewise, evidence from Japan indicates that 




efficiencies within the banking sector. Indeed, a study from Altunbas et al. (2000) 
observed diseconomies of scale from their sample of Japanese banks where risk 
was taken into account.      
Regarding scope economies, empirical evidence from Australia proposes 
that scope economies were not exhausted by financial deregulation (Edirisuriya 
and Brien, 2001; Cavallo and Rossi, 2001). Evidence in which four leading 
Australian banks, still observing substantial scope economies after their 
deregulation periods (from 1982 to 1993), implies that they managed to adjust 
their joint production costs efficiently, and they have not entirely embraced 
deregulation (Edirisuriya and Brien, 2001). The study's outcomes suggest that 
the Australian banking sector could be more competitive and efficient if further 
deregulation is imposed. Similarly, significant economies of scope are found for 
all output ranges within the European banks' sample over the period of 1992-
1997 (Cavallo and Rossi, 2001). These findings support the prediction that the 
deregulation towards universal-type banking organisations, encouraged by the 
Second European Banking Directive, contributed to the increase of scope 
economies degree. It is also advised that small banks should expand production 
scale; meanwhile large banks may focus on the output mix diversification. 
Among the most popular discussions about synergy motive for bank 
consolidation, is by Hankir et al. (2011) who investigate market power motive as 
one of their primary motivations behind bank M&As transactions in North America 
and Europe, over the period 1990-2008. The market power hypothesis is based 
on the anti-competitive effects arising from M&As transactions. Under the market 
power hypothesis, the increased market power for an individual bank, as well as 




to set higher prices, thereby maximising their profit by employing customer 
surplus. This hypothesis can justify 10% of all bank mergers within that specific 
period. From the findings, it is concluded that the market power hypothesis cannot 
be deemed as the only primary merger motive, even though it has the highest 
occurrence rate compared to the other motives. Secondly, regulators should take 
into consideration the actual market concentrations and the levels of competition 
in the banking market, given the fact that more investors are confident about the 
prospect of market power exploitation, than synergy efficiency. 
In addition to the above motivation behind bank M&As, a managerial 
motive is found among large US bank mergers in a study by Bliss & Rosen 
(2001). The authors detected that the compensation of CEO increases during the 
post-merger period, irrespective of value creation or productivity enhancements, 
and translated the results into evidence of managerial empire building. 
To summarise, synergy appears to be the most popular motive for the EU, 
US and Canada bank M&As during the 1980s and 1990s which is contradictory 
with the scale of inefficiency found among Japanese bank mergers, when risk is 
taken into consideration. In addition, the evidence of managerial and market 
power motive in the US and EU, suggest that multiple motives often coexist and 
it is difficult to have a good picture of the fundamental motives behind bank M&As. 
3.1.3.2 Motives for product diversification and geographical diversification  
Theories summarise the motives for product diversification (i.e. banks 
merge with non-banks) under the general headings of agency, market power and 
resource views. Under the market power view, managers of bidding firms pursue 
diversification with the expectation to employ anti-competitive behaviour, through 




view suggests that corporations own multiple ranges of resources, unique 
capabilities and core competencies. These unique resources can provide 
corporations with growth opportunities, cost reductions via scope economies and 
revenue improvements. If the market could sell these assets, it would no longer 
be necessary to pursue diversification; although, diversified corporations may be 
able to employ these resources in different markets when transaction costs are 
high (Wilson et al., 2010). In addition, a variety of studies have investigated the 
motivation of firms’ diversification and the successive influence of diversification 
on organisational values. Santomero & Eckles (2000) assert that the explanation 
for diversification within the financial and banking industry is to obtain advantages 
via co-insurance (Asquith and Kim, 1982) expansion and development and 
efficiency achievement through scale and scope economies, thereby diminishing 
a company’s default’ risk (Halpern, 1983) and enhancing stability of the financial 
system. 
The utilisation of economies of scale is possibly the most popular motive 
for bank diversification regarding efficiency gains. Indeed, Hughes et al. (2001) 
confirm that economies of scale are positively related to bank size and 
diversification, whilst being negatively related to the balance sheet assessment 
of risk. In fact, considering risk would increase the possibility of achieving 
economies of scale and scope in managing risk. The more significant the scale 
is, means more diversified products and financial services will be offered.  The 
expanded spread of risks geographically, often indicates the potential for better 
diversification; therefore, financial institutions can be protected against financial 
hardship with fewer capital resources. For instance, McAllister & McManus 




standard deviation of the return rate on loans was shown to decrease abruptly 
when the portfolio of a bank loan rose to approximately $1 billion. Empirical 
research has been carried out on economies of scale and scope across the 
Taiwan banking industry (Tai-Hsin and Mei-Hui, 2004). The authors conclude that 
Taiwan banks in the sample, experience scale economies and reveal 
diseconomies of scope, which suggests that more substantial product 
diversification could lower costs within the banking industry, via product-mix 
economies. Accordingly, diversifying business lines further within the financial 
services industry may be beneficial for banks.     
Unlike scale economies, the effects of scope economies or agency costs 
are confirmed to be challenging when used to measure within the financial 
services industry due to econometric difficulties and the unavailability of data ( 
Berger & Humphrey, 1994). Despite this, Fiordelisi & Ricci (2011) attempt to 
measure cost and profit efficiency of acquisitions between Italian banks and 
insurance firms. In general, no firm evidence is detected to support efficiency 
gains from bancassurance, and bank mergers with life business do not perform 
better than their counterparts in either profit or cost.   
In the most thorough study of its type, Laeven & Levine (2007) investigated 
the diversification effects on the market value of large financial services 
corporations throughout 42 countries and reported less positive findings. The 
authors noticed that diversified financial services companies' market values 
tended to be less than their counterparts. It is concluded that the potential scope 
for economic benefits is not adequate to enhance the market value of diversified 
banks, and diversification turns out to raise agency problems. Agency problems 




demonstrated by scope diseconomies, before deregulation in the financial 
services industry. However, after the deregulation in the middle of the 1980s, 
agency costs decreased. 
Similar to product diversification, geographical diversification in the 
financial services industry often associates with scale, scope, geographic and 
international integration; and is thereby as motivated by the potential economies 
of scale and scope as the other types of integration (Berger, 2000). Likewise, 
Caiazza et al. (2012) find that cross-border M&As in the banking sector is more 
likely to be stimulated by diversification motives than in-country deals, possibly 
bringing potential benefits to the economy. In a more recent study, Karolyi and 
Taboada (2015) discovered evidence of a form of regulatory arbitrage9 whereby 
acquisition flows involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than 
their targets. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority cross-border 
deals, announced between 1995 and 2012, they show that target and aggregate 
abnormal returns around deal announcements are positive and more significant 
when acquirers come from more restrictive bank regulatory environments. This 
evidence can be interpreted as more consistent with a gentle form of regulatory 
arbitrage than a possibly destructive one. 
In conclusion, motives behind the following complex type of mergers and 
acquisitions in the banking sector: consolidation between banks, integration of 
banks and nonbank firms as well as cross-border M&As, can be summarised as 
synergy, agency, managerial motive, hubris and risk diversification. Empirical 
evidence found from various studies suggests that multiple motives often coexist 
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and that value-enhancing motives, in addition to value-decreasing motives, may 
exist simultaneously in a merger deal. 
3.1.4 Impact of M&As on bank performance 
Economic literature pays attention to the performance of banks, expressly 
regarding competition, concentration, efficiency, productivity and profitability. The 
literature has tried to measure these unobservable variables via many different 
methods, none of which, however, has been entirely conclusive or unchallenged. 
Aside from theoretical shortcomings, the practical problem is that different 
methods yield different estimates. 
It can be said that M&As directly influence bank performance. For 
instance, the sources of financial benefits produced by M&As can enhance the 
efficiency of an operation or the rise in market power. Merger-related 
enhancements can be measured straightforwardly in the efficiency of the 
combined entity's operation, by comparing accounting ratios before and after the 
merger or by using the efficiency frontier method. The consensus regarding the 
outlook of bank M&As and their effect on accounting ratios, cost and profit 
efficiency enhancements throughout the 1990s, was vague. 
 An alternative stream in literature uses an event-study methodology to 
capture the bond and security market reaction around merger announcements. 
These studies attempt to detect abnormal returns to bidders and target 
shareholders during the M&As announcement because these returns indicate the 
market's perception of whether the merger creates or destroys value. Abnormal 
return is the amount by which a share price in the actual market exceeds the 
forecasted share price by an asset-pricing model. The consensus outlook 




acquiring banks' shareholders experienced slightly negative abnormal returns, 
shareholders of target received significant positive abnormal returns, meanwhile 
the abnormal returns from the combined entity were statistically insignificant 
(Hudgins & Seifert, 1996; Subrahmanyam et al., 1997). Nevertheless, the post-
2000 studies regarding M&As performance produce adverse findings with a pre-
2000 outlook. More recent works propose that both bank M&As in the EU and 
North America enhance efficiency; however, only bank mergers in the EU create 
value for shareholders. In general, the following discussions will focus on merger 
performance under different types of M&As, namely non-conglomerate bank 
mergers (banks with banks), conglomerate bank mergers (banks with non-banks) 
and cross-border bank mergers.  
3.1.4.1 M&As impact on the performance of non-conglomerate bank 
mergers 
In general, a sizable number of recent studies on bank M&As in the EU 
produce convincing evidence of the enhancements in performance. Huizinga et 
al. (2001), investigate 53 bank mergers in the EU from 1994 to 1998 and find 
evidence of positive enhancements in cost efficiency, but quite minor gains in 
profit efficiency. Furthermore, other evidence from the EU studies witnesses 
efficiency and gains in profit after the deal (Diaz et al. 2004; Altunbas & Marques 
2008; Hagendorff & Keasey 2009). Some features of these pan-EU studies are 
that non-conglomerate bank mergers (Diaz et al. 2004) and merger deals, in 
which both acquirers and target implement comparable strategies (Altunbas and 
Marques, 2008), tend to have better performance regarding profit and efficiency.   
Regarding stock market reaction, Beitel et al. (2004) examined 98 bank 




abnormal returns for both acquirers and target stockholders. It is estimated that 
60% of all merger deals create value for their shareholders. Non-diversified deals 
are found to have significant wealth effects; the same results are found for 
acquiring banks involved in fewer merger deals and when the acquired bank 
demonstrated a history of poor stock performance. In a similar vein, Campa & 
Hernando (2006) investigated 244 bank merger transactions in the EU from 1998 
to 2002 and detected minor effects on acquirers share prices. However, positive 
abnormal returns were found for stockholders of target along with a substantial 
enhancement of a target’s financial performance two years after the completion 
of the deal.  
In a recent study on stock market reaction to European merger 
announcements and completions, during the recent global financial crisis (2007-
2010), Beltratti & Paladino (2013) found no significant abnormal returns around 
the deal announcements, but did find positive abnormal returns on deal 
completions. Also, they discovered that the characteristics of acquiring banks 
determine the returns at the announcement; meanwhile the returns after 
completion depend on a target's opacity and on the reduction of idiosyncratic 
instability, which relates to the decrease in uncertainty. To conclude, the authors 
notify that bank M&As transactions are different during the financial crisis period.   
Evidence from the US also reports quite positive findings as seen in the 
EU in the post-2000 studies. Hannan & Pilloff (2009) utilise a hazard function 
methodology in order to study the characters of acquiring banks from 1996 to 
2003, and discover that banks operating in a cost-efficient manner tend to merge 
with their less efficient counterparts. This result indicates the presence of 




are used in Hagendorff & Keasey (2009), to compare bank mergers in the EU 
and the US from 1996 to 2004. The evidence suggests that US acquirers tend to 
concentrate on the generation of revenue after the completion of the deal, even 
though this does not lead to enhanced performance, because of the rise in costs.   
Evidence outside the EU and the US also shows enhancements in 
performance as a result of M&As. McIntosh (2002) found the potential of 
substantial economies of scale from their sample of Canadian bank mergers. 
Hosono et al. (2006) reported significant cost and profit efficiency improvements 
after merger deals in their Japanese bank merger studies. In a more recent study, 
Sufian and Kamarudin (2017) examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions 
on the productivity of the Malaysian banking sector, finding that the Malaysian 
banking sector has exhibited a higher total factor productivity level during the 
post-merger period, attributed to technological progress. Overall, evidence 
worldwide shows optimistic findings concerning merger-induced cost and profit 
efficiency improvements within the last two decades. 
3.1.4.2 M&As impact on banking product diversification and geographical 
diversification 
Literature suggests that evidence of the effects of product diversification 
on bank performance are mixed. Hendershott et al. (2002) investigated the 
market reaction to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, concluding that non-
bank financial institutions are likely to enjoy more benefits from product 
diversification than from banking institutions. The authors also found that 
investment banks and insurance companies witnessed positive abnormal returns 
as a result of the Act; meanwhile, commercial banks experienced no change in 




Act, in their sample of US mutual fund M&As from 1994 to 1997 (Jayaraman et 
al., 2002). Here the authors find that acquirers witness negative abnormal losses, 
whereas target stockholders experience positive abnormal returns.    
Numerous studies have focussed on specific nations within the EU.  For 
instance, Acharya et al. (2006) discovered that asset diversification across 
individual bank loan portfolios does not enhance the risk profile or performance 
of Italian banks. Hayden et al., (2007) utilised statistics on individual bank loan 
portfolios for their sample of German banks in order to evaluate the extent to 
which diversification in lending, within different regions and different industries, 
enhances performance. They detected that all kinds of diversification result in 
poorer bank performance.  
In the most comprehensive study of its kinds, Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011) 
employed the event study method to measure abnormal returns around merger 
announcements of banks and insurance firms from different countries. They 
reported that European, U.S. and Canadian bancassurance transactions yield 
positive returns, whilst Australian acquirers receive an insignificant valuation from 
the market. The authors also highlight that when a suitable institutional model is 
carefully chosen, mergers between banks and insurance firms can add value to 
shareholders. In a more recent study, Varmaz and Laibner (2016) aimed to 
empirically analyse the success of European bank mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), including targets who involved in insurance, brokers, real estate and 
holding and investments. Their study focused on the analysis of the shareholder 
value implications of stock market reactions, which announced and cancelled 
M&As from 1999 to 2015. The paper found that European bank M&As had not 




whereas targets experienced significant value gains. Abnormal returns for 
bidders and targets exhibited the same characteristics upon the announcement 
of M&As that were cancelled at a later date, whereas the results for transaction 
cancellations deviated. Targets experienced greater negative abnormal returns 
than upon the transaction announcement. The findings for bidders are striking, 
as they destroyed shareholder value upon the transaction cancellation, and 
consequently, they suffered twice. In particular, banks with higher profitability, 
higher efficiency and lower liquidity experienced negative abnormal returns 
around the announcement dates. Negative abnormal returns before the 
transaction announcement and provision for loan losses significantly increased 
the likelihood of M&As cancellation.  
In terms of geographic diversification, recent studies on cross-border bank 
M&As in the US and the EU have had a tendency to obtain little or no proof of 
enhancement in cost efficiency (Berger & Deyoung, 2001), though some 
evidence of accounting returns improvements and profit efficiency enhancements 
were found (Elsas et al., 2010). Indeed, Berger & Deyoung (2001) found that 
bank holding companies in the U.S. expanded more geographically as a result of 
the consolidation trend within the banking industry. However, this expansion 
brought about managerial obstacles for the merging bank, hence the efficiency 
of operation decreased. Becher & Campbell (2005) observed that focused 
mergers, before and after the geographic deregulation (Riegle-Neal Act), 
experienced different announcement effects. Geographically focused deals 
witnessed significant abnormal returns in the pre-deregulation period; hence 
these are value-enhancing deals. Nevertheless, focused mergers were 




results might suggest that market power seems to be hard to achieve via M&As 
after deregulation when the entry barriers are lower, putting pressure on profit 
margins.  Finally, in the most comprehensive study of its type on the impact of 
the global financial crisis on cross-border deals in the global banking sector, Rao-
nicholson & Salaber (2016) noticed that banks from emerging markets seemed 
to be the leading bidders after the crisis, and they targeted developed economies 
in the EU as well as neighbouring nations.    
In conclusion, pre-2000 studies have usually focussed on bank mergers 
in the US after the consolidation process happened in the US, and earlier than 
the EU and other continents. Literature before 2000 summarises that bank M&As 
are likely to enhance efficiency, although the event-study method does not detect 
substantial evidence of positive shareholder wealth effects. Post-2000 literature 
has witnessed a clearer consensus from the EU M&As transactions, which seems 
to lead to both efficiency benefits and value creation. This may be because 






3.2 Impact of M&As on Bank Risks 
3.2.1 Conceptual framework 
Banks exist in order to take on the risks of their clientele. By providing risk 
management products and services to its customers; many risks are added to 
each operation (refer to Appendix C for discussion regarding bank risks). These 
products and services are priced accordingly, based on the estimation of the 
expenses of managing the risks inherent in each transaction. Since banks are 
risk intermediaries, they retain an inventory of risk that should be measured 
responsibly in order to guarantee that the risk exposure does not intimidate the 
bank’s solvency. It is also widely accepted within existing literature that M&A 
activities alter the risks of acquiring banks, particularly the risks of large banks 
whose credit or liquidity problems may affect many other institutions (Casu et al., 
2015; Laeven et al., 2016; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011; Weiß et al., 2014). 
These risks consist of acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk, default risk, contribution to 
systemic risk and others. Therefore, this section aims to discuss different 
theoretical models in the literature explaining the rationale behind the 
relationships between M&As and bank risks.  
First, the reasoning behind the relation between M&As and idiosyncratic 
risk in the banking sector can be explained by the Modern Portfolio Theory of 
Markowitz (1952). According to the theory, diversification between portfolios that 
do not have perfectly correlated returns should result in lower variance of the 
combined portfolio. M&As activity is generally seen as the diversification of 
portfolios between acquirers and targets. In the absence of perfect correlation 
between the returns of acquirers and targets, the total variance after merger is 




risk of the merged firms is reduced following M&As activity. Also, as a further 
development of the modern portfolio theory within the M&As context, Levy and 
Sarnat (1970) assert that if the excepted return post-merger of the combined firm 
is presumably the weighted average of each acquirer-target returns, the total risk 
should be decreased without any change in the level of return for the merged 
firm, which signifies an efficient combination of the risk-return features of the new 
firm.  
Second, the relationship between mergers activity and banks’ default risk 
is enlightened by a theory of financial intermediation by Diamond (1984) in which 
diversification is the key to this theory. The natural reasoning for the significance 
of diversification is marginally distinctive between model with risk neutral agents 
and the model with risk-averse agents. In the former model, diversification is 
crucial since it raises the chance that the bank has adequate loan incomes to pay 
a fixed liability claim to depositors; in the limit, this likelihood is one, and the 
likelihood of experiencing bankruptcy costs is nil. In the latter model, 
diversification raises bank’s risk tolerance toward each loan, to an extent that 
permit the risk-bearing essential for incentive purposes to be cheaper. When 
expanding to the case of mergers activity, this delegated monitoring model 
envisages that well-diversified banking firms as a result of the combination 
between acquirers and targets carry less default risk. Indeed, Levy and Sarnat 
(1970) add that mergers raise the size of the company, therefore, might produce 
financial benefits such as greater access to the capital markets and experience 
substantial cost savings when ensuring their financing requirements. The cost 
savings seemingly indicate the decrease in banks’ default risk attained via 




bank to experience significant losses to the extent that a default can occur, it can 
be demonstrated that the joint possibility of such default event is decreased by a 
merger. Undoubtedly, the probability that significant losses that happen at the 
same time for both acquirer and target of the merger are much lower than each 
individual probability of default. Therefore, mergers often lead to a reduction in 
default risk for the combined firms.  
In contrast, there are several theoretical models in the literature predicting 
that mergers increase default risk of acquirers. One of the reason for firm’s default 
risk to increase is because of the increase in financial leverage of the combined 
entity post-merger. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) design a dynamic model for 
merger activity, in which they demonstrate the existence of an asymmetric 
equilibrium in financing policies among leverage, insolvency, acquisition terms. 
In this model, the acquirers with the lowest leverage succeed the acquisition 
game. Also, bidders have a tendency to lever up after the completion of the 
acquisition which may contribute to the rise of merging firm’s default risk post-
merger. The second reason for the increase in default risk is related to 
asymmetric information10. When asymmetric information exists, management 
can better conceal possible value-reducing transactions from external 
shareholders. One of the proxies for asymmetric information is the idiosyncratic 
volatility of share, in which greater values may enable management to conceal 
risk-increasing transactions since they may merely be explained as indicating a 
random result of higher ex-ante uncertainty (Dierkens, 1991).  
                                                 
10 Asymmetric information sometimes referred to as information failure, is present 
whenever one party to an economic transaction possesses greater material 




Third, the reason why M&As activity affects systemic risk of the combined 
firms are explained in a theoretical model by Wagner (2010). His model shows 
that while diversification may diminish a corporation’s probability of bankruptcy, it 
also raises the tendency for that corporation to break down at the same time as 
other corporations; in other words, it creates higher probability of a systemic 
crisis. Extending beyond diversification, he asserted that various kinds of financial 
unification, for example, M&As (both geographical and functional mergers) or 
bancassurance businesses, are similar to diversification, in the sense that they 
increase the likelihood of systemic breakdown. For instance, when two banking 
corporations guarantee each other against liquidity collapse, they are likely to 
face the shared breakdown, possibly placing destructive influences on the 
financial system as a whole. As a result, the cons of diversification with systemic 
crises usually begin to exceed the pros for an adequately high degree of 
diversification. It is worth noting that the detrimental influences of diversification 
in Wagner's setup is not subject to contagion, instead, the influence emerges for 
a merely mechanical reason that when risks are shared evenly among 
corporations, the probability of joint collapse rises.  
On the contrary, there are theoretical motivations in the literature 
supporting the notion that bank mergers help to reduce individual bidders’ risk 
and as a result, a reduction in systemic risk. For instance, Allen and Gale (2000, 
2004) argue in their model that monopolistic banks in a concentrated banking 
system with a few banking firms are able to produce greater capital buffers that 
can be used as a cushion against external distress to the financial system. 
Besides, M&As lead to greater diversification in terms of loan portfolios 




2000); therefore, they can result in better financial stability for the individual banks 
as well as the financial system.  
In conclusion, M&As activity changes different types of risks that the 
merged banks have to bear, namely idiosyncratic risk, default risk, systemic risk, 
amongst the others. Generally, diversification benefits deriving from M&As are 
the centre of the key theories that explain why M&As reduce merged banks’ risks. 
However, diversification also makes banking firms becoming more identical to 
each other in terms of portfolios held, thereby making systemic crises more likely 
as firms are exposed to the same risks.  
3.2.2 Empirical evidence 
In the previous section, a number of theoretical models are discussed to 
examine the relationship between M&As activity and bank risks. This section, as 
a result, provides discussions on empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
M&As on bank risks in different regions. Empirical evidence in North America 
concludes that expansion of banks into less traditional financial activities is 
associated with increased risk and lower returns (DeYoung and Roland, 2001). 
Similarly, cross-border M&As by US banks appear to be associated with higher 
risk and lower returns (Berger et al., 2016). In contrast, Deyoung and Torna 
(2013), using a sample of US banks covering the global financial crisis 2007-09, 
found that banks that diversify their activities via M&As to pure fee-based non-
traditional activities, such as securities brokerages and insurance sales, enjoyed 
stable revenue and consequently had a lower probability of default. However, 
large banks may also engage with asset-based non-traditional activities, which 
may increase the probability of bank failure. Hence the overall influence of 




Outside the US, the picture seems to be less uniformed. In a study of 
Russian banks, Berger et al., (2014) find that middle ground between complete 
focus and full diversification via M&As increases expected returns and decreases 
risk and the probability of default. For cross-country studies of European banks, 
Lepetit et al., (2008) finds that risk is negatively related to the extent of bank 
trading activities, while Mercieca et al., (2007) asserts that small banks, that have 
diversified into non-interest income activities, are riskier than those that focus on 
traditional areas of business. The effects of cross-border bank mergers on bank 
risk, also remains an open question in literature. Through geographically 
diversifying, bank M&As have the possibility to decrease the risk of bank 
insolvency. They also have the possibility to increase that risk due to the increase 
in risk-taking incentives by bank managers and stockholders following these 
transactions. Choi et al., (2010) empirically investigates whether cross-border 
bank mergers raise or reduce the risk of acquiring banks, as captured by changes 
in acquirers’ yield spreads. Following M&As announcements, the paper also 
investigates how dispersions in the institutional environments between acquirer 
and target countries influence changes in yield spreads. Overall, the study finds 
that bondholders, in general, perceive cross-border bank M&As as risk-
increasing activities, unlike domestic bank mergers. This study also uncovers that 
these yield spreads are significantly affected by the differences in investor-
protection and deposit insurance environments between the transacting 
countries. The overall evidence results in a policy implication that regulators 
should assess the relative market, in both the home and the host countries, in 
evaluating the associated risks of an active multinational banking firm and in 




To elaborate further, one of the recent vigorous debates in literature is the 
diversification effects of M&As upon systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Researchers in support of diversification have asserted that this strategy helps to 
reduce total risk via a decrease in idiosyncratic risk. Mishra et al. (2005) confirm 
this argument in their empirical study of U.S. non-conglomerate types of mergers, 
specifically, banks with banks, where acquirers use equity to finance their 
mergers. They find that tremendously statistically significant evidence of M&As 
between banks helps to decrease total risk and unsystematic risk, although these 
do not have a statistically significant effect on systematic risk. The authors 
conclude that diversification appears to be a possible motive for bank M&As. 
In contrast, other authors are against risk diversification benefits, disputing 
that, financial firms might be vulnerable to similar shocks, due to diversification, 
which in turn can cause fragility of the entire financial system. Therefore, to verify 
the above hypothesis, that risk is reduced through diversification, Casu et al. 
(2015) broke down total risk into systematic and idiosyncratic components and 
measured risk for acquirers before and after M&As announcement. They 
examined bank consolidations with insurance providers and with securities firms 
from 1991 to 2012. Their results indicated that M&As between banks and security 
companies raised the total risk via the higher level of systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks. Conversely, the consolidation of banks and insurance firms and insurance 
agencies/brokers recognise market betas (systematic risk) increase. On the basis 
that the period 2007-2012 witnessed an increase in the combined entity' risk after 
the announcement, the authors advised that it is the financial crisis which causes 
markets' caution. The authors also highlight the significance of bank size as a 




promotes the assertion that regulators should impose excessive regulatory 
inspection on systemically important banks in the form of improved risk-based 
capital, liquidity and leverage requirements along with better information 
disclosure to the public (Krainer, 2012).  
Similarly, a study from Baele et al. (2007) utilised a stock-return 
methodology to investigate franchise value, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk 
in EU banks from 1989 to 2004. They confirmed that franchise value was 
promoted by the rise in non-interest income, however, increases in systematic 
risk, indicate that from time to time bank returns are directly connected to the 
market. The diversification effect on the idiosyncratic risk element is non-linear 
and mainly downward sloping; therefore, some European financial 
conglomerates can reduce idiosyncratic risk providing they do not exceed the 
optimal size. These outcomes present different implications for various bank 
stakeholders, for instance, shareholders, bank management, supervisors and 
investors. Investors, such as pension funds, can diversify themselves; therefore, 
they consider the exposures of systematic risk. European bank investors 
experience the typical risk/return trade-off in which the higher the expected 
returns, the higher the systematic risk will be. In addition, shareholders of banks, 
borrowers, managers and customers are all interested in idiosyncratic risk. For 
these stakeholders, diversification brings benefits with regards to bank risk 
reduction in the case of European banks, although it is unsafe to rely too much 
on non-interest income due to the non-linear relationship. Finally, from the 
policymakers and bank supervisors’ point of view, both the systematic and 
idiosyncratic share of bank risks need to be considered, since they are 




For systematic risk, large diversified banks should be supervised cautiously 
because these financial conglomerates tend to have higher market betas. 
With regards to geographic diversification, Buch & DeLong (2008) 
investigated a sample of international bank acquisitions between 1998 and 2002, 
finding that the host countries' supervisory scheme impacted on the changes in 
total risk after completion of the deals, but did not seem to influence systematic 
risk. Acquiring banks operating in a territory with strict supervision is deemed to 
shift risk back to its home nation. These outcomes indicate that a strong 
supervisory scheme within the banking sector can help a nation to diminish return 
variability (total banking risk) and regulatory schemes might promote a risk-
connected motive for cross-border consolidations within the banking industry. 
Contradicting Buch & DeLong (2008), Amihud et al. (2002) asserted that the 
acquiring bank's total risk and systematic risk via cross-border M&As, remained 
unchanged in the predator's home banking sector during the post-merger period, 
in their sample of bank mergers from 1985 to 1998. The implication, in this case, 
is that policymakers should not adopt a systematic policy to restrict cross-border 
M&As. Instead, policymakers from both home and host country should adopt a 
case-by-case approach when risk is taken into account. It is possible that these 
contradictory results arise from the use of a slight difference in methodology by 
Buch & DeLong (2008), since they break down the risk of security return of a 
bank into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, in addition to using different 
samples in different periods, compared to Amihud et al. (2002). 
In conclusion, it is observed that many empirical pieces of evidence show 
the increase in systematic risk as a result of product diversification. Studies 




acquisitions on total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, are still limited 
and produce mixed results. 
The debate regarding the link between systemic risk and bank M&As is 
also very fruitful. In the most recent empirical study, by Weiß et al. (2014), of the 
international and cross-border M&As transactions and their contribution to 
systemic risk, they find strong evidence for the substantial increase in acquiring 
banks’ contributions to systemic risk as a result of consolidation. The findings 
entail two major policy implications. Firstly, bank managers and supervisors 
should impose stricter supervision of merger deals, given the negative effects of 
bank M&As on systemic risk. Secondly, the findings highlight the significance of 
market discipline, as government intervention, such as government-owned banks 
or deposit insurance guarantees, are one of the factors that contribute to the 
adverse effects of bank M&As to systemic risk. Likewise, De Nicolo et al. (2004) 
investigate the relationship among consolidation, conglomeration and systemic 
risk potential within the banking sector, by using the Z-score technique. Their 
international evidence highlights the increasing trend of positive correlation 
between banking structure instability and concentration. Furthermore, large 
conglomerate institutions tend to take a higher level of risk in comparison with 
their smaller and specialized counterparts. Indeed, Caminal & Matutes (2002) 
observed that monopolistic financial institutions are able to generate risky loans 
that bring about negative effects on the overall financial structure. In a similar 
vein, Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009) also use Z-score techniques as do De Nicolo et 
al. (2004), in order to examine European banks between 1997 and 2005, 
whereby they found that market concentration in the banking industry at national 




developed from the findings are that European policymakers and supervisors 
should enhance cross-border cooperation and should carefully explain 
responsibilities for prudential supervisions and the regulation of EU banks 
operating cross-country.   
An alternative perspective supports the view that a concentrated banking 
structure with several large banks is less vulnerable to systemic crises than a less 
concentrated banking structure with many more banks (Allen & Gale 2000; Allen 
& Gale 2004a). It is suggested that the concentrated banking structure might 
improve market power and enhance bank profits. The higher profits then bring 
greater capital buffers that could assist the financial structure against sudden 
shocks from the external factors, as well as enhancing the bank’s franchise value 
and charter (Allen & Gale, 2004a), decreasing bank managers’ motivations to 
become involved in excessive risk-taking projects and thereby lowering the 
possibility of a systemic shock in the banking industry (Hellmann et al., 2000; 
Matutes & Vives, 2000). Moreover, it is possibly more straightforward and more 
efficient to regulatory and supervisory authorities to control the concentrated 
financial structure, because of the decreasing numbers of financial market 
players, hence resulting in a systemic risk reduction. In an empirical study using 
data from 69 countries, between 1980 and 1997, Beck et al. (2006), found that a 
more concentrated banking structure indicates less systemic risk. However, the 
authors do highlight that their study is yet to explore the mechanisms behind 
these findings; thus, the results should not be regarded as a suggestion for 
regulators to promote bank concentration. In a somewhat similar vein, Schaeck 
et al. (2009) investigated a sample consisting of 31 systemic banking crises in 45 




stability of the banking structure. Their empirical evidence shows that both 
competition and concentration reduces the probability of a systemic crisis and 
rise time to crises which is consistent with the results from (Beck et al., 2006). 
The policy implication arising from this study shows that if regulators impose 
policies that encourage bank competition, and those policies are executed 
appropriately, they might help to enhance the stability of the financial system. 
To summarise, the diversification effects, as well as M&As' effects on 
systemic risk in the banking industry, remain ambiguous regarding theoretical 
and empirical evidence. It is possible that the mixed findings arise from the fact 
that authors of the above papers use different methodologies to measure 
systemic risks, such as Z-score, marginal expected shortfall or a logit probability 
model that is robust to heteroskedasticity under different samples and a different 
time period (before and after the global financial crisis 2007-09).   
One strand of literature looks more deeply into the causal link between 
CEO's and Board of Directors' incentives, and their risk-taking behaviours in the 
context of bank M&As. For instance, Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) examine 
how the structure of CEO compensation of acquiring banks affected the default 
risk implications of mergers in a sample of 172 U.S. bank mergers. The findings 
show that contractual risk-taking incentives (vega) were raised following the 
passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act, 1999, and for the largest banks in our 
sample. While the former suggests that bank compensation encourages CEOs 
to take advantage of the growing opportunity investment set, which resulted from 
the deregulation of bank activities, the finding that vega is higher for the largest 
banks is somewhat alarming. The link between bank size and CEO vega 




activities, whereby shareholders in systemically important banks encourage 
CEOs to undertake risk-increasing investment choices in order to extract wealth 
from regulators and bondholders. The policy implication arising from this finding 
can be that regulating executive compensation in banking could take the form of 
imposing limits on the amount of risk-inducing compensation. Alternatively, it 
could take the form of linking capital requirements or deposit insurance premiums 
to risk-taking incentives embedded in CEO compensation or of increases in the 
amount of deferred compensation. Evidence from Japan offers somewhat 
conflicting results as Sakawa and Watanabel (2016) found that bank board size 
is negatively correlated with bank risk-taking. In other words, smaller bank boards 
contribute somewhat to excessive risk-taking. This finding contradicts with the 
expectation that the expansion of Japanese banks, after a series of M&As booms 
due to financial deregulation, is expected to be a driver behind their risk-taking.   
In conclusion, the question of whether diversification benefits of mergers 
and acquisitions reduce the risks for banking firms is an area of active research 
and researchers have examined the link between diversification and risk from a 
variety of perspectives. Given the previous discussion on the endogeneity of risk-
taking, it is not surprising that it has been challenging to find a clear and stable 
link between the measures of diversification and risk. Overall, no consensus was 
found on those who studied the impact of diversification on banking risk in the US 
and around the world. Risk-taking is endogenous, and optimising managers may 
choose to exploit any diversification gains by increasing returns or adding risk in 
another dimension. Many papers, however, have found that risk-adjusted returns 










Chapter 4: Sample Description and Data Collection 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed discussion on the 
selection of sample and the variables used in the whole study. 
4.1 Sample Description  
The selected sample of bank mergers is gathered from Bloomberg 
Terminal and contains merger announcement dates, which fall between 1998 and 
2015. The reason for collecting merger deals from 1998 is to fully capture the 
effects of product diversification due to the Financial Services Modernisation Acts 
of 1999 in the US. The Act voided the barriers on commercial and investment 
banks consolidating with securities companies and insurance firms, written in 
sections 20 and 32 of the Act. Considerable diversification effects on bank risk 
may be observed, since US acquirers constitute a significant proportion of the 
sample. In order to study the most up to date merger deals, the sample includes 
mergers announced up to 2015, which allows the existing literature to be 
extended by examining deals long after the 2007-09 global financial crisis. 
Acquiring banks and targets are located worldwide. Acquirers include bank 
holding companies, commercial banks and credit institutions; whereas, target 
banks include life and accident insurance companies, mortgage finance and 
securities companies, etc. Acquiring banks are listed with equity returns and 
accounting data available on Bloomberg. Methods of payment may be cash 
and/or stock. Deals that contain failing banks will be omitted and will be verified 
via Bloomberg or press coverage around the deal.  
Based on the above criteria, the initial sample contains 3,130 deal 
observations. In addition, it is essential that the acquisition is completed and is 




privatisation, reverse takeover, repurchase, leveraged buyout or minority stock 
purchase. As a result, the sample was reduced to 2,940 deals. Additional criteria 
are required to ensure that all deals in the sample have a potential impact on 
acquirers' risks. For instance, only deals where the time elapsed between the 
date of announcement and the completion date is less than one year will be 
selected (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). As a result, the sample was further 
reduced to 2,863 deals. Furthermore, merger deals were chosen where acquirers 
purchased at least 50% of the target banks and the acquiring banks' ownership 
of target banks following mergers exceeds 90% (Koerniadi et al., 2015). Hence, 
204 acquisitions were omitted as a consequence of this criterion. Moreover, it is 
expected that only targets with a substantial size in comparison to acquirer size 
may have an impact on the risk of acquiring banks. Therefore, the ratio of deal 
size to acquirer's total assets is at least 1%, but no more than 150%, as 
suggested by Furfine & Rosen (2011). This criterion eliminates a substantial 
amount of deals, leaving only 887 deals in the sample. The confounding events 
will be bypassed by choosing deals with at least 180 trading days between two 
separate deal announcements by the same banking firm, and not more than one 
deal pending until 180 days following completion of a deal by the same bank 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). This left the sample with 766 deals in this 
category. The minimum size requirement of a deal is $10 million because minor 
deals are not expected to impact on acquirers' risk, consequently, 24 deals were 
omitted in this category. Finally, the sample consists of 608 deal observations 
after excluding deals where data on share prices was only available for less than 
the estimation period (six months before merger announcement and six months 




in an infrequent basis and illiquid. The resulting dataset is described in Table 4.1 
as follows: 
Table 4.1: Overview of M&As Sample Distribution by Year 
Year Number of Mergers % 
Total Deal Value 




1998 48 7.89 161,104.86 14.50 3,356.35 
1999 43 7.07 84,977.83 7.65 1,976.23 
2000 49 8.06 140,399.1 12.64 2,865.29 
2001 44 7.24 49,579.35 4.46 1,126.80 
2002 26 4.28 38,792.47 3.49 1,492.02 
2003 42 6.91 68,607 6.17 1,633.50 
2004 50 8.22 70,097.91 6.31 1,401.96 
2005 44 7.24 88,520.18 7.97 2,011.82 
2006 42 6.91 119,508.57 10.76 2,845.44 
2007 37 6.09 95,405.37 8.59 2,578.52 
2008 20 3.29 101,698.78 9.15 5,084.94 
2009 13 2.14 5,243.91 0.47 403.38 
2010 14 2.30 23,252.54 2.09 1,660.90 
2011 13 2.14 7,162.99 0.64 551.00 
2012 18 2.96 8,948.96 0.81 497.16 
2013 27 4.44 9,781.25 0.88 362.27 
2014 46 7.57 17,620.88 1.59 383.06 
2015 32 5.26 20,446.26 1.84 638.95 
Total 608 100.00 1,111,148.21 100.00   
 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the M&As sample distribution by year. 
As shown, the majority of sample mergers were announced between 1998 and 
2007. This figure continues to fall sharply to only 13 deals in 2009 and 2011 but 
increases gradually up to 2015. This observation can be explained by the effects 
of the global financial crisis. Companies may not be healthy enough to engage in 
costly M&As transactions, or they may just be reluctant to risk the uncertainty. 
Additionally, the total deal value has decreased sharply over the sample period, 
from US$ 161,104 million in 1998 to about US$ 20,446 million in 2015, except for 
a peak between 2006 and 2008. Likewise, the most substantial average deal 




seen in 2013 (US$362 million). Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) state that 
companies within the same industry often buy firms in financial trouble because 
acquirers tend to have some form of past relationship with targets. Therefore, 
acquirers may already know the actual value of the firm being acquired through 
bankruptcy. Also, acquirers would benefit from synergies when merging with 
same-industry targets. The prices that are paid by acquirers are at a substantial 
discount, compared to prices paid for matched non-bankrupt firms that offer more 
enormous potential for positive returns around M&A announcements during the 
financial crisis. The fact that the 2007-09 global financial crisis did indeed offer a 
higher number of bargains in the banking sector explains why both tremendous 
total deal value and the most significant average deal value are observed 
between 2006 and 2008.  
Table 4.2 below provides more information regarding the regions of 





Table 4.2: Merger Sample Distribution of Acquirers and Targets by Region and 
Deal Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Regions BD TG BD TG BD TG BD TG BD TG BD TG 
Africa 6 4 6 4         
Asia 52 56 43 47 1 1 6 6   2 2 
Europe 66 60 47 44 2 2 14 10  1 3 3 
Oceania 9 9 4 4 1 1 4 4     
South 
America 12 11 11 9   1 2     
North 
America  463 468 432 435 2 2 25 28 3 2 1 1 
Total 608 608 543 543 6 6 50 50 3 3 6 6 
Note: 
(1) All deals  
(2) Focusing deals 
(3) Bank-Insurance 
(4) Bank-Financial Services (Mortgage Finance, Speciality Finance, Consumer Finance) 
(5) Bank-Other (Asset Manager, Securities Companies) 




As shown in Table 4.2, it is evident that the sample consists of mergers 
with bidding banks and targets predominantly located in Asia, Europe and North 
America. There occurred 463 mergers involving bidders in North America and 66 
mergers in entire Europe. In Asia, 52 transactions were completed, while the 
remaining deals were completed in other regions (South America, Oceania and 
Africa). For 599 transactions (98.5%) both bidding banks and targets originate in 
the same region. It is also notable that the phenomenon of focusing deals is 
predominantly observed in the sample, whereas the number of product-
diversifying deals is far less. The focusing deals are relatively evenly distributed 
across Asia and Europe, although the majority of them are witnessed in North 
America. Examples of focusing deals are as follows: Wells Fargo & Co acquired 




Charter One Financial Inc (2004) and Bank of America acquired FleetBoston 
Financial Corporation (2003). Regarding product-diversifying deals, mergers 
between banks and financial services account for the most substantial proportion. 
The majority of bank-financial services mergers are conducted within the North 
American borders, followed by Europe and Asia. The number of bank-insurance, 
and bank-investment service deals, are the same, originating mostly in Europe 
and Asia. Some examples of product-diversifying deals include: Barclays PLC 
acquiring Woolwich Ltd (2000), Canadian Western Bank acquiring HSBC 
Canadian Direct Insurance Inc (2004) and Bradford & Bingley PLC acquiring 
GMAC-RF mortgage portfolio.  
 Table 4.3 demonstrates the merger sample, which has been divided, 
based on different categories, such as target status, payment method, 





Table 4.3: Merger Sample by Different Categories 
 

























deals) 600 8 157 451 50 558 543 65 




deals) 451 1 87 365 3 449 427 25 






149 7 70 86 47 109 116 40 
 
Regarding target status, private targets account for the most prominent 
number in all cases, including the US sample and non-US sample. It is worth 
noting that there are only a few deals where acquirers engage in acquisitions with 
public-listed targets within the sample. This may be because private firms 
experience increasing pressure to merge, due to the decrease in government 
ownership or the phasing out of public guarantees of their liabilities. With respect 
to the payment method, deals financed by cash only in the non-US sample 
constitute up to around 45% of 156 deals in total, whereas this is only 19% in the 
US sample. Regarding deal geography, it is observed that US acquirers tend to 
engage in domestic mergers (99%), meanwhile non-US acquirers are fond of 
cross-border deals more than US acquirers (30%). Regarding product 




deals than on activity diversifying deals, although the balance is more on the non-
US acquirers' side.   
4.2 Data Collection 
4.2.1 Definitions and statistics of variables 
In empirical Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis, the following variables are 
used and collected from different reliable sources, such as Bloomberg Terminal 
and World Bank database. The definition of each variable, and the summary 
statistics, are provided in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below, followed by an explanation 
and the justification for each variable used in each chapter.  










Pre-merger distance to default (180 days to 11 days 







Post-merger distance to default (11 days to 180 





















































Pre-merger systematic risk (180 days to 11 days 







Merger-related change in systemic risk (beta) 












Pre-merger idiosyncratic volatility (180 days to 11 
days before merger announcement) 
 
Merger-related change in idiosyncratic volatility 
between pre-merger and post-completion period (11 








Acquirer and deal characteristics 
Payment 
method 





Equals 1 if the target is a private firm (zero 
otherwise) 
Bloomberg 
Deal size Natural logarithm of the deal value (in millions of US 
dollar) 
Bloomberg 
Relative size Ratio of the deal value to the acquirer's market value 









Equals 1 if the acquirer and the target do not share 
the same four-digit ICB11 code (0 otherwise) 
Bloomberg 
ROA Pre-tax profits over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Market to 
book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio (%) Bloomberg 
Leverage Long-term debt over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Operating 
efficiency 
Ratio of operating costs over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
Capital ratio Book value of equity over total assets (%) Bloomberg 
                                                 
11 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification 
taxonomy owned by FTSE. The ICB is used globally to divide the market into 
increasingly specific categories, allowing investors to compare industry trends 
between well-defined subsectors. The ICB uses a system of 10 industries, 
partitioned into 19 super-sectors, which are further divided into 41 sectors, which 







Natural logarithm of acquirers' total assets (in 






The pre-merger default risk of acquirers, which 
takes the value of 1 for banks in the first distance to 
default quartile (i.e. banks with the highest level of 







Operating cost to operating income ratio the year 









Non-interest to operating income ratio the year 
before merger announcement 
 
Natural logarithm of net equity (in million US dollar) 










GDP Annual real GDP growth rate (in %) Bloomberg 
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index computed as the sum 
of the squared market shares of a country’s 
domestic and foreign banks. A higher value 







This indicator measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violence. Indicator 
ranges from (-2.5) to 






Rule of Law The Rule of Law indicator measures the individual’s 
degree of confidence in rules of society and the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The scores range 
between -2.5 and 2.5. Higher scores correspond 




















Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Summary Statistics. This table reports summary statistics for variables used in 
this study, including risk measures, deal and acquirer characteristics as well as 
country control. The sample consists of 608 international bank mergers 
announced between 1998 and 2015. 
  Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Median Max 
Risk 
Measures 
Pre-merger DD 3.747 1.386 1.022 3.536 8.025 
 Post-completion 
DD:  
3.766 1.392 1.028 3.573 7.960 
 ∆DD 0.020 0.067 -0.160 0.016 0.271 
 Pre-merger MES 0.005 0.010 -0.014 0.003 0.036 
 Post-completion 
MES 
0.005 0.011 -0.015 0.003 0.042 
 ∆MES 0.000 0.011 -0.028 0.000 0.032 
 Pre-merger 
∆CoVaR 
0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.018 
 Post-completion 
∆CoVaR 
0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.017 
 Change in 
∆CoVaR 
0.000 0.004 -0.015 0.000 0.013 
 Pre-merger Beta 0.263 0.451 -0.601 0.134 1.523 
 ∆Beta 0.024 0.391 -0.888 0.004 1.208 
 Pre-merger 
idiosyncratic risk 
0.019 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.046 
 ∆idiosyncratic 
risk 






0.258 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Status of target 0.987 0.114 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Deal size 5.299 1.932 2.486 4.868 10.331 
Relative size 0.426 0.772 0.032 0.237 1.000 
 Cross border 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Product 
diversification 




ROA  1.223 0.627 0.007 1.152 3.544 
Market to book 
ratio 
1.610 0.730 0.476 1.441 4.021 
Leverage  7.240 7.619 0.000 5.404 66.187 
Operating 
efficiency  
2.829 0.980 0.706 2.783 6.425 
 Capital ratio  9.201 3.057 2.382 9.027 20.838 
 Acquirers' total 
assets  
8.742 1.852 5.942 8.303 13.459 






2.387 2.374 -1.116 1.850 14.304 
 Income 
diversification  
1.139 1.199 -0.352 0.805 7.168 
 Capitalisation  6.318 1.752 3.556 5.961 10.761 
Country 
Control 
GDP  3.122 1.874 -2.780 2.810 8.899 
HHI  0.083 0.074 0.050 0.070 0.540 
 Political stability  0.467 0.548 -1.600 0.575 1.425 
 Rule of Law 1.372 0.516 -0.700 1.546 1.915 
 
 
4.2.2 Variables used in Chapter 5 
This section addresses the issues of how merger-related changes in 
acquirers’ default risk can be explained in the multivariate analysis by a group of 
bidders, and deal characteristics as well as variables on the acquiring banks’ 
macroeconomic environment. The dependent variable of this chapter, ∆DD, is 
the difference between post-completion DD and pre-merger DD. Independent 
variables of this chapter include cross-border and product diversification. First, 
product diversification is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for bank merge with non-
bank financial firms and 0 for mergers between bank and bank. This variable is 
used to test the diversification effects of bank mergers on ∆DD of acquirers 
(Hypothesis 5.2 of this chapter). Empirical evidence in the literature suggests that 
consolidation into non-traditional banking activities can benefit banks from both 
financial synergies, via asset growth and improved profits, operating synergies 
through co-insurance (Asquith and Kim, 1982) and economies of scale and 
scope. Therefore product diversification should lead to lowering a firm’s default 
risk (Halpern, 1983; Boyd and Graham, 1988; Estrella, 2001; van Lelyveld and 
Knot, 2009). The second independent variable is cross-border, a dummy variable 
equalling 1 for cross-border deals and 0 for domestic deals. This variable is 
employed in order to examine whether deals involving geographic diversification 




border deals suggest that bidders can gain higher valuation by purchasing 
international targets in a related industry (Dos Santos et al., 2008) or by acquiring 
targets from nations that have a weaker governance scheme ((Bris and Cabolis, 
2008; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Furthermore, banking firms are highly 
regulated, and thus banking supervisors and policymakers often act in ways in 
which to thwart merger deals that increase risk (Buch & DeLong, 2008; Elyasiani 
& Jia, 2008; Koetter et al., 2007). Consequently, cross-border mergers are 
expected to reduce acquirers’ default risk. 
The cross-sectional analysis of this chapter also includes control variables 
such as deal and bidders characteristics, as well as bidders’ macroeconomic 
environment, which are predicted to impact on ∆DD of acquirers. More 
specifically, deal characteristic variables consist of the payment method, target’s 
status, deal size and relative size. The first variable, payment method, is 
represented by a dummy variable which equals one if the merger is financed in 
cash and zero otherwise. Furfine & Rosen (2011) propose that deals that are fully 
paid for in cash are expected to raise acquiring banks’ default risk as acquirers 
are replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a riskier balance sheet of the target. 
Additionally, target status is controlled via a dummy variable, which differentiates 
between private (dummy equals one) or public-listed target institutions. Merger 
deals involved in private targets are expected to generate a risk-increasing effect. 
This is because private firms are subject to lower disclosure requirements; thus 
it limits the acquirers’ capabilities to evaluate the risks associated with private 
targets themselves, as well as making bidders’ due diligence ineffective 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). The variable deal size is evaluated by the 




are various ways in which deal size can impact on the riskiness of bidders. 
Specifically, bigger deals can generate risk-reducing effects for bidding banks as 
a result of diversification benefits. Nevertheless, Hughes et al., (1999) assert that 
if bigger mergers produce diversification effects, bigger deals can also stimulate 
banks to engage in more risk-taking, after the completion of the deal. 
Furthermore, Knapp et al. (2005) raise the issue of the complicated integration 
process in bigger acquisitions; thus resulting in complex organisational merging 
of banks. This complex organisational structure might, consequently, increase 
acquirers’ default risk post-merger. Since small deal values in absolute terms 
could produce similar risk effects for small bidders, more so than bigger mergers, 
the relative size variable is included in the ratio of deal value to acquiring banks’ 
market value at the end of the year, prior to the announcement of the deal. 
Therefore, the signs for variables deal size and relative size are unrestricted.  
With respect to the bidders’ characteristics, measures of ROA, market-to-
book ratio, leverage and operating efficiency are taken into consideration. The 
ROA ratio (pre-tax profits over assets) is chosen as profitability performance, 
because ROA captures the key financial ratio, which relates to the performance 
of the company. ROA is projected to have a risk-reducing effect on acquirers, 
since the more profitable a bank is, the more capital buffer they can hold to cope 
with sudden shock. Moreover, the market-to-book ratio is included in the 
regressions as a proxy for executive hubris. A higher market-to-book ratio may 
indicate that a company is over-valued, suggesting negative effects of market-to-
book ratio to the default risk of bidders. On the other hand, Keeley (1990) asserts 
that more valuable banking institutions have less motivation to take part in risky 




Hence, it is difficult to predict the effect of market-to-book ratio on bidders at this 
point. Besides, Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) confirm that leverage 
encourages banking institutions to lower agency cost. Leverage increases 
liquidation risk (with the outlook of pay losses for executives) and puts pressure 
on executives to produce high and sufficient cash flows for interest payments. 
Consequently, executives in banking firms with low leverage might be more 
inclined to engage in risky transactions, such as M&As, with their free cash flows 
to raise their pay levels, with the possibility of organisational collapse. The 
leverage of acquiring banks is measured by long-term debt, over total assets, 
prior to the deals. In order to assess the influence of management quality on the 
merger-related changes in bidders’ default risk, the operating efficiency ratio is 
added to the regressions (the ratio of operating costs over total assets). This 
variable is expected to produce a risk-reducing effect for bidders (Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2011). 
In terms of the acquirers’ macroeconomic environment, the GDP real 
growth rate is included in the model in order to evaluate the impact of country 
characteristics on the risk effects of acquisitions. In addition, an indicator of 
political stability, an indicator variable for the rule of law and the HHI of the bidding 
bank’s home country, are included as further control variables (Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2011).  
It is also essential that a multicollinearity check is applied to all the 
variables used to avoid any disturbance in the data. Table 4.6 below shows the 
correlation coefficients among all variables used in this chapter. As can be seen, 
all of the correlation coefficient values are small and do not incur any problem of 




a), it is also observed that all values of centred VIF are below ten, which indicates 
that there is no multicollinearity. Unexpectedly, deal value and relative size are 
far from perfectly correlated (r=0.196). Thus, both variables provide different 
information on deal characteristics. Also, a summary of all variables used in this 
chapter as well as their expected influence on the change in Distance to default 
is summarised in part b of Table 4.7. It is important to note that the smaller the 
DD, the smaller the distance of a firm from default point, whereby the default 
probability is higher. Therefore, if a variable has positive influence on ∆DD, it 
means that this variable is expected to produce a risk-reducing effect on ∆DD 









Table 4.6: Correlation Table for Chapter 5 

















Table 4.7: Variance Inflation Factor for Chapter 5 
a. Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable Coefficient variance Centered VIF 
∆DD 2.18E-04 1.326 
Diversification 7.19E-05 1.241 
Cross-border  1.00E-04 1.43 
Payment method 3.20E-05 1.141 
Status of target  0.001 1.138 
Deal size  2.15E-06 1.602 
Relative size  1.10E-09 1.168 
ROA  3.53E-05 1.276 
Market to book  2.45E-05 1.235 




GDP  3.38E-06 1.4 
HHI  1.00E-03 1.201 
Political stability  5.06E-05 1.726 
Rule of Law  6.69E-05 1.4 
   
b. Expected influences of various variables on the change in DD 
Variable Expected influence on ∆DD 
Diversification + 
Cross-border  + 
Payment method - 
Status of target  - 
Deal size  +/- 
Relative size  +/- 
ROA  + 
Market to book  +/- 
Leverage  +/- 
Operating efficiency  + 
GDP  + 
HHI  + 
Political stability  + 





4.2.3 Variables Used in Chapter 6 
This section examines how merger-related changes in acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk can be explained in the multivariate analysis, by a 
group of bidders and deal characteristics, in addition to variables on the acquiring 
banks’ macroeconomic environment. The dependent variables of this chapter are 
∆MES and change in ∆CoVaR. Independent variables of this chapter include 
product diversification and payment method. Dummy product diversification is 
stimulated by the second Hypothesis 6.2 of this chapter, predicting that product-
diversifying deals generate a more systemic risk-reducing effect than focusing 
deals. This is because diversification can bring about benefits through co-
insurance (Asquith and Kim, 1982), expansion and development, efficiency 
achievement through scale and scope economies and improved profit; thereby 
lowering a firm’s default risk (Halpern, 1983) and maintaining the stability of the 
financial system. The payment method is motivated by Hypothesis 6.3 of this 
chapter, which predicts that deals financed by cash only will have a risk-
increasing effect on systemic risk. As mentioned above, cash-financing mergers 
are expected to raise acquiring banks’ default risk because acquirers are 
replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a riskier balance sheet of the target; thus 
it is also reasonable to expect that cash-financing deals may weaken the stability 
of the financial system. 
The multivariate analysis of this chapter also includes control variables, 
such as deal and bidders characteristics and bidders’ macroeconomic 
environment, which are predicted to impact ∆MES and change in ∆CoVaR of 
acquirers. Deal characteristics used in the multivariate analysis consist of: status 




mentioned above, merger deals involved with private targets are expected to 
generate risk-increasing effect for acquirers because private firms are less 
transparent, thereby making it difficult for bidders to evaluate the associated risks. 
Regarding the deal size and relative size, both variables' signs are expected to 
be unrestricted. Firstly, large deals may produce a risk-reducing effect on 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, as larger banks may be able to diversify 
their credit and asset portfolios better. However, larger deals are positively 
connected with organisational and procedural complexity, integrating with the 
target, hence reducing transparency (Beck et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012; 
Laeven et al., 2016). Finally, it is difficult to project the sign of dummy variables 
cross-border because possible diversification benefits, as a result of 
globalisation, could correspond with potential combination problems post-merger 
(Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015). 
Furthermore, a group of bidding banks' characteristics will be included in 
the regressions, such as ROA, market-to-book ratio, leverage, capital ratio, 
operating efficiency, acquirers’ total assets and high-risk banks. The ROA is 
expected to be negatively associated with systemic risk, i.e. enhancing banking 
stability. Moreover, the projected sign of the coefficient for the market-to-book 
ratio is positively associated with systemic risk, as both papers from Vallascas & 
Hagendorff (2011) and Milidonis and Stathopoulos (2011) hypothesise that 
higher values of market-to-book ratio could imply high growth expectations on the 
part of the investors, leading to excessive risk-taking. Regarding acquirers' 
leverage, it is expected that variables leverage and capital ratio (an additional 
proxy for leverage) signs are unrestricted. On the one hand, leverage increases 




on management to produce high, and sufficient cash flows for interest payments. 
Thus, executives at banking firms with low leverage may be more interested in 
engaging in risky transactions, such as M&As, with their free cash flows, which 
in turn raise their pay levels and consequently the possibility of organisational 
failure, destabilising the banking system (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). On 
the other hand, banking firms with a low level of leverage can be overcapitalised 
in comparison to their target's capital ratio. Therefore, acquiring banks can be 
driven to acquire a target with a high level of leverage, instead of, e.g. issuing 
new debt. In the case of an acquiring bank merely altering its capital structure, 
the rise in leverage should not be associated with any substantial changes in the 
acquiring bank’s total risk (Weiß et al., 2014). In order to assess the influence of 
management quality on the merger-related changes in bidders’ contribution to 
systemic risk, the operating efficiency ratio is added to the regressions and is 
expected to have a negative relationship with systemic risk. In terms of an 
acquirer's total assets, the influence of a bidding bank's pre-merger size on 
systemic risk measures is projected to be positive. This is because larger banks 
tend to be motivated toward engaging in M&As and becoming TBTF which, in 
turn, increases bidders' contribution to systemic risk (Benston et al., 1995; 
Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015). Finally, the motives for bank M&As were different 
before and during the crisis, and the occurrence of the 2007-09 global financial 
crisis has raised the need to consider ‘TBTF motive’ as a significant motive for 
M&As.  During the global financial crisis, banking firms could be stimulated to 
engage in M&A transactions in order to become SIFIs to exploit the safety net, 
for government bailouts or to establish a more robust institution (see Molyneux et 




included in the regressions to test whether banks drive findings with the 
motivation to merge into TBTF (i.e., banks that were near default and had the 
lowest possibilities of obtaining a bailout before the merger). To construct the 
variable, first, utilising the Merton distance-to-default methodology as in 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011), the pre-merger default risk of acquirers in the 
sample will be extracted from the previous empirical chapter. Following this, the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for banks in the first distance to default 
quartile (i.e. banks with the highest level of pre-merger default risk) and 0 
otherwise.   
The third set of control variables accounts for the macroeconomic 
environment of acquirers, as it may influence the relationship between bank 
mergers and systemic risk. For accuracy, the annual real GDP growth rate, 
political stability, the rule of law and the HHI of the bidding bank’s home country 
are included. Generally, a country with a stable political environment, high GDP 
growth rate and stricter rule of law, may promote safer markets for a bank to 
operate in. Therefore, the signs for all these three variables are expected to be 
negatively associated with systemic risk. The sign for the HHI index, however, is 
expected to be unrestricted. Some authors suggest that in a more concentrated 
banking sector, a few market participants are seen to hold higher capital buffers 
against external shocks and higher return via credit rationing, whilst being easy 
to monitor and thereby improving stability for the entire banking system (Allen 
and Gale, 2000, 2004; Beck et al., 2013). However, other authors argue that a 
banking sector with a high concentration degree often leads to moral hazard 
problems, organisational and procedural complexity and contagion, due to high 




As further checks for multicollinearity, as can be seen from the below Table 
4.8, the set of variables used do not suffer from multicollinearity, thus eliminating 
the need for further transformations of these variables. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is also performed for all dependent, independent and control 
variables to ensure that all the regression models are free from correlation (see 
Table 4.9, part a) and it indicates that there is no multicollinearity among variables 
used. Also, a summary of all variables used in this chapter as well as their 
expected influence on ∆MES and the change in ∆CoVaR is summarised in part 








Table 4.8: Correlation Table for Chapter 6 
















Table 4.9: Variance Inflation Factor for Chapter 6 
a. Variance Inflation Factor 
 
Variable Coefficient Variance Centered VIF 
∆MES 2.57E-05 1.426153 
Change in ∆CoVaR 3.12E-06 1.705363 
Product diversification 2.12E-06 1.212238 
Payment method 1.08E-06 1.452447 
Status of target 5.97E-06 1.138466 
Deal size 3.58E-07 6.783691 
Relative size 2.03E-11 1.765539 
Cross-border 2.95E-06 1.953894 
ROA 8.04E-07 1.717404 
Market to book 8.47E-07 2.18947 
Leverage 3.89E-09 1.188438 
Operating efficiency 3.20E-07 1.559079 
Capital ratio 2.90E-08 1.596446 
Total assets 4.48E-07 7.673152 
High-risk banks 1.50E-06 1.328068 
GDP 8.70E-08 1.562179 
HHI 2.60E-05 1.271175 
Political stability 1.46E-06 2.336973 
Rule of Law 2.04E-06 2.57942 
 
 
b. Expected influences of various variables on ∆MES and ∆CoVaR 
Variable Expected influence on ∆MES and ∆CoVaR 
Product diversification - 
Payment method + 
Status of target + 
Deal size +/- 
Relative size +/- 
Cross-border +/- 
ROA - 
Market to book + 
Leverage +/- 
Operating efficiency - 
Capital ratio +/- 
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Total assets + 
High-risk banks + 
GDP - 
HHI +/- 
Political stability - 








4.2.4 Variables Used in Chapter 7 
This section aims to addresses how merger-related changes in acquirers’ 
idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and systemic risk can be explained in the cross-
sectional analysis, by acquirers’ default risk, as the independent variable on top 
of a group of bidder characteristics and variables on the acquiring banks’ 
macroeconomic environment as control variables. The dependent variables of 
this chapter include: pre-merger MES, pre-merger beta, pre-merger idiosyncratic 
risk, ∆MES, ∆beta and ∆idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, pre-merger MES, pre-
merger beta and pre-merger idiosyncratic risk are the average of acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk, the average of systematic risk and the average of 
idiosyncratic risk of acquirers respectively, in the pre-merger period (180 days to 
11 days before merger announcement). Furthermore, ∆MES, ∆beta and 
∆idiosyncratic risk are the differences between post-completion and the pre-
merger period of acquirers’ MES, beta and idiosyncratic risk respectively. The 
independent variables of this chapter include pre-merger DD and ∆DD. Existing 
evidence from the studies of Denis and Denis (1995), Lang and Stulz (1992) and 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) on the relationships between default risk and 
systematic risk find that that default risk could be positively related to systematic 
risk. Moreover, Asquith and Gertner (1994), Dichev (1998) and Opler and Titman  
(1994) suggest that bankruptcy risks are idiosyncratic. Indeed, some studies find 
that default risk is positively associated with systemic risk (see Fiordelisi and 
Marqués-Ibañez, 2013). Consequently, the signs of pre-merger default risk are 
hypothesised to be positively associated with pre-merger MES, pre-merger beta 
and pre-merger idiosyncratic risk (Hypotheses 7.1,7.2,7.3 of this chapter). 
Additionally, the influences of the change in default risk on ∆MES, ∆beta and 
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∆idiosyncratic risk are hypothesised to be positive (Hypotheses 7.4,7.5,7.6 of this 
chapter).  
Besides the independent variables, other factors may also influence 
idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and systemic risk, on top of the possible impact 
of acquiring bank’s default risk and are included as control variables. These 
factors may be at bank level (e.g. cost efficiency, business model and size), or 
industry level (e.g. banking industry concentration) and country (GDP growth 
rate). More specifically, the control variables in the acquirers’ characteristics 
group include: cost-income ratio, income diversification, capitalisation and high-
risk banks. First, cost efficiency is estimated using the cost-income ratio (i.e. 
operating cost over operating income). It is recognised that efficiency is likely to 
have an impact on the link between individual bank default risk and systematic 
risk, as well as idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, cost-income ratio is considered, 
since banks aim to increase profits by reducing their costs and this may impact 
on their risk-taking profile (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2011). Second, it is recognised 
that bank business models may also influence the link between bank default risk 
and systematic risk (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Hence building on the previous 
work of Baele et al., (2007); De Jonghe (2010); Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011); Lepetit 
et al. (2008), income diversification is accounted for (measured as the ratio of 
non-interest to total operating income) and the sign is unrestricted. Third, bank 
size is controlled, as it is widely believed that systematic and systemic risks are 
highly related to bank size, as larger institutions have more weight on the broad 
economy, the financial system and tend to be more interconnected. DeYoung et 
al., (2009) document that bank size is a central aspect of M&As. Size confers, 
among other things, management quality, market power, political influence, the 
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extent of access to safety net provisions, in addition to establishing relations with 
profitability, efficiency and risk. In the context of the present analysis, the 
relationships between acquirers’ default risk and other risks may vary with bank 
size for different factors. Hence, capitalisation variable is included, which is the 
natural logarithm of its net equity capital. The sign of the coefficient of this variable 
is unrestricted. Finally, variable high-risk banks are included in the regression for 
systematic and systemic risk to test whether banks with the highest default risk 
(i.e., banks that were near default before the merger) drive the findings pre-
merger.  
Furthermore, macroeconomic factors are also likely to impact on systemic 
and systematic risks. Therefore, several macroeconomic variables commonly 
used in the banking literature for this purpose are included (e.g. Brissimis et al., 
2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Salas and Saurina, 2003; Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007). These variables are the annual real GDP growth to capture 
the business cycle and HHI of the bidding bank’s home country. As mentioned in 
the previous section, GDP growth rate is expected to be negatively associated 
with systemic risk and systematic risk, whereas the sign for the HHI index is 
unrestricted. 
Table 4.10 (part a) shows the correlation coefficients among all variables 
in this study during a pre-merger period and the change of risks between post-
completion and pre-merger period. All of the correlation coefficient values are 
small and do not incur any problem of multicollinearity. The only exception is the 
coefficient between pre-merger MES and pre-merger systematic risk is 
considered to be high (0.81). However, it is argued that this number does not 
show perfect multicollinearity between the pair; therefore, each variable pre-
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merger MES and pre-merger systematic risk still provide different information 
regarding the risk profiles of banks. Also, a summary of all variables used in this 
chapter as well as their expected influence on dependent variables is 
summarised in part b of Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10: Correlation Table for Chapter 7 











Chapter 5: The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on 
Acquiring Banks’ Default Risk 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In August 2007, dilemmas in sub-prime mortgage lending in the U.S. 
spread globally and triggered a global financial crisis. Turmoil in the global 
financial markets has badly influenced the banking industry, which was previously 
considered fast growing, profitable, vigorous and innovative. Many banks failed 
and suffered significant losses and had to raise extra capital to cope with 
damages caused by the global financial crisis, through various bailout systems 
or via M&As. One important effect of the global financial crisis is the decrease in 
M&A activities around the globe, both in the volume of mergers and in total deal 
value. Nevertheless, this trend is not exclusive to the banking sector, rather, it 
reflects a general economic recession in many countries (Rao-nicholson and 
Salaber, 2016). The global financial crisis has also highlighted a deficiency within 
supervisory establishments to diagnose reliable indicators of distress in the 
banking sector. One of the primary objectives of regulators and supervisory 
authorities is to enhance competitiveness within the financial services sector, 
meanwhile minimising the risk of system failure. Despite this, investors continue 
to show interest in low risk and high returns, whilst depositors, policymakers, and 
bondholders are keen on minimising company-specific risk. For such reason, the 
effect of M&As on the risk of acquiring banks in particular, and also of the financial 
system in general, is an essential issue for all stakeholders.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-09, a handful of 
continuous research has reconsidered the measurement of default risk of 
banking firms, as well as the impact of M&As on merging firms’ default risk. The 
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initial stream of literature suggests that M&As lead to diversification effects, 
therefore, resulting in higher capital buffers and lowered cash flow variability, 
which is, associated with a decrease in default risk. This notion has been 
approved theoretically by Amihud and Lev (1981) and empirically by Emmons et 
al., (2004), Hughes et al., (1999) and Van Lelyveld and Knot (2009). An 
alternative stream of research asserts that an increase in default risk post-merger 
may be due to either the transfer of risk from targets to bidders (Billett et al., 2004; 
Furfine and Rosen, 2011), managerial compensation at the expense of risk 
increase (Harford and Li, 2007) or the increase in bidders’ leverage both 
theoretically in Morellec & Zhdanov (2008) and empirically in Ghosh and Jain 
(2000). 
Besides the debate on diversification benefits and risk-reduction effects 
attributed to M&As, the literature suggests that supervisory schemes might 
promote a risk-connected motive for consolidation in the banking industry. One 
strand of literature proposes that stricter supervision of banks is likely to prevent 
acquirers from making bad acquisitions, thereby reducing risk (Buch and DeLong, 
2008; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). In contrast, empirical evidence from 
Hoque et al. (2015) shows that higher supervisory power increased risk-taking 
during the credit crisis. This risk-increasing can be explained by the rent-seeking 
view of supervisors as they employ power to benefit favoured voters, attract 
donations and extract bribes (Djankov et al., 2002; Quintyn and Taylor, 2003).  
These controversies within existing literature provide the motivation for this 
chapter to investigate the effects of M&As on bidding banks’ default risk. 
Employing a global sample of 608 bank M&A deals from 1998 to 2015 and 
applying the Distance to Default (DD) methodology, as in Vallascas and 
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Hagendorff (2011), to measure default risk of acquiring banks, this study extends 
literature on the risk effects of bank mergers. Furthermore, it provides original 
evidence on the determinants of merger-related changes in bidding banks’ 
default risk. The main findings and contributions of this chapter are discussed 
below. 
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it contributes to on-
going academic and policy debates regarding the effects of M&A activities on 
acquirers’ default risk using a global bank M&A sample. This global sample offers 
a particularly suitable setting and is expected to yield interesting findings. 
Specifically, the sample set is divided into emerging markets, developed markets 
and frontier markets in order to examine the risk effects of bank consolidations 
within different markets. This paper also separates U.S. acquirers and non-US 
acquirers because of the high volumes of mergers in the U.S. Overall, this chapter 
finds that bank mergers reduce the default risk of bidders. This finding also 
adheres to the presumption gained from literature that the diversification of assets 
between two merging institutions, which are imperfectly correlated, should, 
without countervailing movement from management of acquirers, lead to a 
reduction in the default risk for the combined firm both theoretically (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984) and empirically (Emmons et al., 2004; Koerniadi et 
al., 2015; van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009). Therefore, the first hypothesis of this 
chapter, which predicts that M&As reduce the default risk of acquirers, is affirmed.  
Secondly, this is the first study that shed light on the risk effects of both 
geographic and product diversifications on acquirers’ default. Previous work on 
risk-taking and bank mergers has only involved European bank mergers 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011), U.S. bidders in domestic mergers (Furfine and 
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Rosen, 2011), Japanese focusing mergers (Harada and Ito, 2011) and most 
recently, the U.S. acquiring firms in cross-border mergers (Koerniadi et al., 2015). 
Focusing mergers relies merely on portfolio diversification benefits, whereas 
diversifying deals are expected to generate synergies at many levels of the value 
chain with more integration at the operational level (Berghe Van Den and 
Verweire, 2001). Likewise, cross-border deals usually comprise complex 
elements, such as: political and economic concerns, various accounting and 
information disclosure systems and cultural matters. These activities can produce 
various benefits that are not accessible within domestic markets; for instance, 
more relaxed supervisory systems, favourable tax treatments and cheaper labour 
costs (Koerniadi et al., 2015). Therefore, the different relationships between 
default risk and both types of diversification are projected in hypothesis 5.2 and 
5.3 of this chapter which predicts that bidders’ default risk reduce under product-
diversifying mergers and cross-border deals respectively. The results produced 
in this chapter show that not all forms of diversification exert an equal effect on 
the reduction of bidders' default risk. Product diversification is found to pose a 
positive effect on bidding banks' default risk (lower risk) which is in line with the 
broader literature about the diversification benefits of reducing bank default risk, 
as demonstrated by van Lelyveld and Knot, (2009) and Wall et al., (2007). 
Thereby, the second hypothesis is affirmed. Conversely, geographic 
diversification does not seem to have a statistically significant relationship to the 
reduction in default risk for acquiring banks; therefore, the third hypothesis is 
rejected.   
Finally, this study provides valuable insight into the underlying factors and 
possible explanations that influence the changes in the default risk of acquirers’ 
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post-merger. Specifically, deal size, ROA and status of the target are all found to 
play important roles in affecting the risk profile of acquirers. Initially, large deals 
prevent acquirers from realising the risk-reduction effects associated with M&As. 
The finding that deal size demonstrates a negative influence on the change in 
distance to default raises concerns about the risk implications of mega-mergers 
on banking sector stability. This demonstrates that large merger deals bring about 
organizational and procedural hurdles in the post-merger integration process that 
might prevent the advantages of merger from materializing (Knapp et al., 2005). 
Additionally, since banks develop substantially via M&A, they also acquire more 
risk (Hughes et al., 1999). This is also consistent with banks facing incentives to 
use mergers to become too big to fail in an attempt to extract benefits from 
regulators. Furthermore, bidding banks with higher pre-merger performance 
enjoy more default risk reduction following the deal. These results support the 
notion that higher profitability creates a larger buffer, therefore providing greater 
ability to absorb adverse shocks to asset values and a further likelihood of 
rebounding as the market improves. Finally, acquisitions of private targets 
increase the default risk for acquirers. This is because private firms are subject 
to lower disclosure requirements; hence, restricting the acquirers’ capabilities to 
evaluate the risks associated with private targets for themselves in addition to 
making acquirers’ due diligence ineffective.  
The remaining sections of this chapter will be planned as follows. The next 
section discusses the existing literature of the default risk's implications of bank 
mergers and the regulatory incentive for M&As as well as the hypotheses of the 
study. The third section describes various models used to compute bidders’ 
default risk, with particular attention given to the DD model. A detailed analysis 
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5.2 Literature Review 
The objective of this section is to investigate the extant body of academic 
literature on the effects of bank mergers on default risk. The first part 
concentrates on the definitions of default risk, followed by a discussion regarding 
the diversification effects on bank default risk on part two. Furthermore, a 
summary of the literature regarding the influence of regulators’ incentive on the 
risk effect of bank merger is provided. Finally, the research hypotheses of this 
chapter are discussed.  
5.2.1 Definition of default risk 
The Banking Supervision Basel Committee highlighted that because the 
exposure to credit risk remains to be the dominant source of problems in banking 
organisations globally, it is essential for banking firms and supervisory authorities 
to learn valuable lessons from previous several financial crises. Banking firms 
should address themselves to the need of identity, estimate, monitor and oversee 
credit risk; at the same time, controlling that banks hold enough capital buffer 
against these risks and that they are sufficiently compensated for the risks 
incurred. Banking supervisors, on the other hand, should stimulate sound 
practices for managing credit risk at an international level. The effective credit 
risk management is a crucial element of a thorough approach to risk management 
and vital to the long-run success of any banking firms (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 1999).  
In the simplest of terms, credit risk is defined as “the potential that a bank 
borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed 
terms” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999, p.1). As such, 
measuring credit risk relies upon the probability of default of a company to fulfil 
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its contractual obligation and upon the extent of loss if default occurs. In the event 
of the default, the Basel Committee provides clear guidance that “a default is 
considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when either or 
both of the two following events have taken place: (1) the bank considers that the 
obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full, without 
recourse by the bank to actions such as realising security (if held) and/or (2) the 
obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the 
banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the 
customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than 
current outstanding”. As so defined, Golin and Delhaise (2013) suggest that credit 
risk and default risk are essentially synonymous and will be used interchangeably 
in this paper.  
5.2.2 Diversification effects on bank default risk 
Since it is not possible to assess whether a potential borrower would be 
able to meet its required obligation, the lending decision and the credit spread 
have to be based on the creditworthiness of that corporation (Berger et al., 2015). 
To justify the risk of default (among other financial risks), shareholders inevitably 
demand a spread, in the form of dividends or share price appreciation, over the 
risk-free interest rate. The higher the risk they have to bear, the higher the return 
they expect. Classic modern portfolio theory demonstrates that investors can 
diversify their portfolios to reduce risk. Hence, fundamentally, the spread needed 
to invest in a firm, is affected by systematic elements. In essence, banking 
organisations can diversify themselves via three types of financial integration: (1) 
domestic M&As within a single product type (e.g. a bank with a bank); (2) the 
consolidation of a bank into universal-type corporations, for instance, merging 
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investment banks and securities companies and (3) cross-border acquisitions. 
These M&A types are expected to produce diversification benefits and reduce 
risks. There are two strands in the literature regarding the default risk effects of 
bank acquisitions. Firstly, M&As deliver diversification effects and lower risk, and 
alternatively, stimulus from regulators, which might motivate the higher level of 
risk taking.  
The question raised by the first strand of literature is whether M&As within 
the banking industry are deriving diversification12 benefits and whether or not they 
reduce risk. The supporters of the diversification strategy declare the presence 
of synergies via cost economies, asset growth and improved profits. In addition, 
the imperfect correlation of revenue flows from various activities. Indeed, 
Diamond (1984) construed the fundamental insight of portfolio diversification as 
a means of reducing the risk for banks. Banks could decrease the default risk of 
their asset portfolios without losing on their expected return by integrating assets 
where payoffs are not perfectly correlated. Furthermore, some empirical studies 
have detected the potential for default risk-reducing diversification benefits as a 
result of the diversification of banks into non-banking activities such as insurance, 
securities (Van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009; Wall, Reichert, and Liang, 2007) and 
geographic diversification (Koerniadi et al., 2015).  
Conversely, arguments against diversification continue to develop. The 
most important one regards corporate diversification as unnecessary as investors 
could diversify away company-specific risk from their portfolios. Similarly, Levy 
and Sarnat (1970) exploited the portfolio theory to show that without capital cost 
                                                 
12 The term “diversification” alone in this study refers to the strategy in which 
acquirers obtain diversified portfolios or product ranges as a result of a merger.  
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economies and synergistic gains, the potential diversification benefits associated 
with the acquisition strategy cannot bring about economic gain in a perfect capital 
market. Furthermore, opponents of the diversification strategy highlight the risk 
that diversification may spur the management of a firm away from their core 
competency. For instance, several studies have revealed that managers may 
undertake M&As which increase risk in exchange for their increasing 
compensation and bonuses, even when the merger destroys shareholder wealth 
(Furfine and Rosen, 2011 and Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). Wagner (2010) 
considers a model with two banks. A bank is considered to be failing if the value 
of its assets falls below its liabilities. Bank assets are also assumed to be carrying 
idiosyncratic risk. Thus, diversifying into the asset of the other bank reduces the 
likelihood of a bank's portfolio value dropping below its liabilities. It lowers a 
bank's probability of failure, which is the standard effect of diversification. 
However, large-scale diversification is a common denominator between banks as 
it exposes them to the same risks.  
Despite numerous methodological approaches pursued within the 
literature, the above debate still prevails. Indeed, survey papers of academic 
literature give no clear consensus on this matter. Mainly, Wilsonet et al. (2010) 
conduct a review of the literature on risk, performance and governance within 
banking firms. They deduce that, in the US, most empirical studies conclude that 
diversification into less traditional financial activities leads to higher risk and lower 
returns. In contrast, Berger et al. (1999) proposed that consolidation is associated 
with an increase in profit efficiency and hence diversifies the portfolio risk of 
financial firms. In Europe, Berger et al. (2001) undertook a review of the literature 
on the effects of M&As regarding the efficiency of the financial services sector. 
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They summarised that the potential for efficiency gains via consolidation is 
substantial and is primarily attributable to the diversification of risk. However, 
most of these gains are offset by the presence of consolidation barriers such as 
language, distance, culture and implicit regulations against foreign firms. 
In addition to the surveys discussed, a variety of studies have utilised 
merger simulation techniques for their samples. Previously, before using a 
simulation technique, in the Second Banking Directive of 1989 in the EU and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999 in the US, alongside deregulations in other 
continents, financial regulations around the world restrained the opportunity of 
banking institutions in order to enlarge geographically to include other states. 
They also forbade banks to consolidate with other kinds of financial institutions, 
including securities companies, insurance firms and investment banks. Thereby, 
simulation approaches allowed researchers to evaluate the effects of banking 
institutions’ expansion within these banned activities. The assumptions of such a 
hypothetical acquisition approach are relatively simple. The authors presume that 
the combined entity is the sum of two single companies. The companies are 
combined based on their book values. However, the shortcoming of this 
simulation technique is that synergy, premiums, as well as the capital structural 
changes resulting from the merger, are all ignored. This presumption is 
undoubtedly impractical; nevertheless, simulation technique is still used because 
of its simplicity and its ability to examine the effects of prohibited activities (Boyd 
and Graham, 1988). 
These simulation studies reveal that U.S. bank mergers decrease the 
probability of default of the merging institutions as a result of portfolio 
diversification (Emmons et al., 2004), product diversification (Boyd and Graham, 
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1988; Estrella, 2001; van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009) and geographic diversification 
(Hughes et al., 1999). For instance, acquisitions were simulated in a sample of 
US community banks from 1989 to 1993, which resulted in community banks 
obtaining the most significant advantages of risk-reduction via geographical 
enlargement (Emmons et al., 2004). Although this simulation technique is 
suitable for diagnosing the sources of bank risk, it might also overstate the 
advantages of geographic diversification over risk reduction because it does not 
make any adjustment for cost increase or the exposure to loss that banks may 
experience when associated with overseeing a firm with geographically dispersed 
offices.  
In line with the findings of Emmons et al. (2004), Hughes et al. (1999) 
asserted that increasing size tends to raise insolvency risk while geographic 
diversification helps to reduce this risk. This is because more significant bank 
holding companies, whose more extensive branch networks have afforded them 
better macroeconomic diversification, achieve greater safety and improved 
efficiency, which is priced by capital markets. Their simulation study uses 
production-based and market-value-based performance measures that utilise 
both accounting information and stock market data to measure financial 
performance and the bank safety of U.S. bank holding companies. However, the 
outcomes of this simulation study should be carefully interpreted as they ignore 
the complications of organisational inefficiencies within operations, and merger-
related changes within the strategy of the bank. Results show that the most 
substantial economic advantages are observed for banks that pursue interstate 
enlargement, which diversifies their macroeconomic risk. The improved bank 
safety resulting from geographic consolidation would benefit society. 
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Regarding activity diversification, the effect of a hypothetical diversification 
of bank holding companies (BHCs) into nonbanking, at the risk of BHCs, is 
examined from 1971 to 1984 (Boyd and Graham, 1988). The authors use the 
approach of M&A simulations, making a comparison of the results with unmerged 
banks. The results of their study indicate that the diversification of BHCs into life 
insurance decreases the default risk as well as the volatility of returns. 
Nevertheless, mergers between BHCs and real estate developers, securities 
firms, property and casualty insurance raise the volatility of returns and the risk 
of default. Craig and Santos (1997) also found the risk-reduction effect of 
acquisitions using the Z-score methodology. The authors compared the Z-score 
of each bank in their sample before merging them into the Z-score of a 
hypothetical bank formed by combining the accounting statements of two 
merging firms before the acquisition. The Z-scores estimated after the 
acquisitions were more substantial (which means lower default probability) than 
those of the hypothetical banking organisations pre-merger. Nevertheless, the 
authors failed to recognise these risk-reduction effects when using other 
methodologies, such as computing the deviation and coefficient variation of a 
bank’s profitability. These measures are computed for both the return on assets 
(ratio of net income to total assets) and the return on equity (ratio of net income 
to equity capital). Therefore, their findings are not strong enough to conclude that 
risk diversification is a primary motive behind bank mergers. 
         Despite the substantial work devoted to these simulation studies, this 
approach to assessing the risk effects of actual acquisitions suffers from 
drawbacks. One apparent weakness of the simulation approach is that authors 
are not able to recognise the positive or negative cash flow synergies that may 
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happen in actual merged companies. Furthermore, simulation may understate 
the risk reduction from scale effects, as managers of the combined entity can 
make changes regarding operations and business strategy, which improve 
efficiency. More efficiency means lower default probability as the bank engages 
in a more favourable risk-return frontier. In addition, the absence of real bank 
M&As and the indirect approach of examining the phenomenon are drawbacks 
of the simulation approach. The development of financial conglomerates, as well 
as the relentless wave of bank mergers, has encouraged various studies to 
generate more reliable outcomes based on actual mergers, hybrid firms or 
developed extended models. 
First, Nurullah and Staikouras (2008) developed a simple approach to 
assessing the actual expansion of banks into insurance between 1990 and 1999. 
The authors created measures of risk, profitability and creditworthiness at the 
company and industry levels in order to investigate the risk-return effects before 
and after the merger period of European banks’ expansion into non-life and life 
insurance underwriting, and into insurance broking. These findings demonstrate 
that non-life and life insurance substantially raise default probability and return 
volatility. Therefore, it is suggested that insurance brokerage is the most 
appropriate target for bank diversification.  
Second, OLS regressions of market-based and accounting-based risk 
measurements on a set of variables are utilised to examine the relationship 
between product diversification and banking risk, in a sample of European banks 
from 1996 to 2002 in Lepetit et al. (2008). The initial evidence demonstrates that 
traditional banking activities are exposed to lower risk than banking institutions’ 
expansion into non-interest income activities (noncore transactions such as 
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trading activities, venture capital and investment banking). Nevertheless, further 
analysis reports that for small banks, trading activities sometimes reduce the 
default risk of banks.  
One of the more developed methodologies widely adopted to measure 
default risk, both empirically and commercially, is the extended DD model 
developed by Merton (1974). This model employs both stock market data and 
balance sheet information, such as the market value of an asset or the book value 
of a debt. As such, this is a reliable, robust predictor of a firm's default risk. One 
way to estimate the distance to default is to use Expected Default Frequency 
(improved by MoodysKMV) as in Furfine and Rosen (2011). Their model employs 
both stock market data as well as balance sheet information, such as market 
value of assets and book value of debt. The study reported that M&As increased 
acquirer’s default risk in a sample of North American deals between July 1993 
and September 2006. The authors also revealed that the motivation for M&As 
comes from the private interests of those making the acquisition decisions rather 
than underlying elements such as potential merger-associated synergies. 
However, Duan (2012) pointed out that the MoodysKMV estimation method is 
limited to measure the default risk for financial institutions. Financial institutions 
usually have a significant portion of liabilities that cannot be accounted for by the 
MoodysKMV method; therefore, this method tends to exaggerate the volatility of 
assets leading to the distortion of distance to default.  
An alternative estimation method is to employ a Newton search algorithm 
to diagnose the daily market value of company assets and asset volatility in an 
iterative process to calculate firms’ distance to default, implemented by Akhigbe 
et al. (2007), Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011), Vassalou and Xing (2004). In a 
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European context, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) report that some less risky 
bank pre-mergers have witnessed an increase in default risk after completion of 
the deal, which is somehow in line with findings from Furfine and Rosen (2011). 
That increase in acquiring banks’ risk profile is driven by cross-border mergers 
and product diversification in addition to weak supervisory schemes. This finding 
suggests that policymakers should control M&A transactions involved cross-
border and product diversification because acquiring banks exhibit a higher 
default probability after deal completion. In contrast, a study on the US markets 
shows that acquirers’ default risk decreases as a result of cross-border activities 
(Koerniadi et al., 2015). Their result indicates that the overvaluation of share 
prices, information asymmetry, geographic expansion and industry significance 
were the potential elements impacting on the level of default risk after deals have 
been completed. Specifically, stock overvaluation may give incentive to 
managers to undertake risk-increasing mergers. In contrast, geographic 
expansion and industry relatedness reduce bidders’ default risk. However, the 
authors did not recognise a direct influence of option compensation with 
managers’ high risk-taking motives. The latter finding is contradictory, with many 
authors, such as, Brown et al. (2015); Furfine and Rosen (2011); Harford and Li 
(2007) and Hagendorff and Vallascas, (2011), demonstrating that CEOs with a 
higher compensation scheme pursue risk-inducing acquisitions.  
Using a Japanese sample of bank M&As in the late 1990s and 2000s, 
Harada and Ito (2011) also employed distance to default, in order to investigate 
whether mega-banks use acquisitions as a mean of avoiding default. They 
estimated the market value of a bank asset via a geometric Brownian motion and 
logarithmic normal distribution, utilising both equity prices and long-term liabilities 
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of banks. Their findings are consistent with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) in 
that default probability does not decrease after deal completion. Overall, the 
distance to default method, employed in the studies above, overcomes the 
controversy regarding which type of data (accounting or market data) produces 
a more reliable estimation of risk and return, because these studies utilise both 
types to compute the default risk. On one side, accounting data is more accurate 
(as directly observable) but less flexible (as updated only annually). On the other 
side, market data enables updating the failure probability more frequently; 
however, this is not directly observable, as it must be inferred from equity prices, 
Hence, it may under or overestimate the probability of failure. Therefore, both 
types of data complement each other’s weaknesses and provide a better 
measure of risk. Furthermore, both Gropp et al. (2006) and Harada and Ito (2011) 
show that distance to default scores are an appropriate indicator and a robust 
measure of bank health rather than traditional indicators used for European and 
Japanese banks respectively. It is worth noting that, if the market value of assets 
plummets severely or has stochastic volatility, a substantial poorer ranking 
performance is observed when using DD and therefore, may result in a significant 
underestimation of the banks’ default risk.   
Instead of looking at the shareholders’ perspective, Choi et al. (2010) 
conducted an empirical study to examine the risk effect of cross-border bank 
M&As for the bondholders of the acquirer, by looking at the yield spread. The 
authors show that bondholders recognise cross-border bank mergers as risk-
increasing transactions. Indeed, they observe a significant increase in the yield 
spreads of acquiring banks after the announcement of cross-border deals. As 
such, acquirers’ bondholders demand a higher yield as compensation for the 
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perceived increase in the risk associated with mergers. This study also advises 
that policymakers should look at similar circumstances within the host and home 
nations when assessing the risk of international financial firms, and also when 
deciding whether these financial institutions' capital reserves are adequate. 
5.2.3 The influence of regulators’ incentive on the risk effects of bank 
mergers 
Besides the debate of diversification benefits, another strand of the 
literature suggests that bank consolidation might be driven by risk-shifting or risk-
taking due to a favourable regulatory environment. For instance, Buch and 
DeLong (2008) investigated cross-border deals within the banking sector and 
concluded that the supervisory schemes of the partners’ nations have an impact 
on the changes in total risk after deal completion. Specifically, an acquiring bank 
from a nation with a strong supervisory structure decreases its total risk 
(systematic risk and firm-specific risk) post-merger. Nevertheless, total risk rises 
when the target bank is situated in a country with quite strong supervision; in this 
instance, an acquiring bank seems to shift the risk back to its home market. The 
findings imply that strong supervision in the banking sector of a country can help 
reduce the total banking risk. Similarly, Hagendorff and Nieto (2015) find that 
bank acquisitions have weakened bank safety and soundness in some 
circumstances; their results still point out that strong supervisory regime and 
regulation can somewhat mitigate this. In contrast, Hoque et al. (2015) assert that 
official supervision results in an increased default risk for banks (captured by DD 
method), while a higher level of private control results in the reduction of bank 
risk during the credit crisis. The outcomes imply that even though supervision and 
regulatory constraints are vital, it is also essential to maintain improved private 
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control. On the other hand, Choi et al. (2010) do not regard regulatory structure 
and supervisors as significant factors in justifying the changes in acquiring banks’ 
yield spreads (due to risk) after merger announcements.   
Financial institutions may attempt to shift their transactions to countries 
with less strict regulation and furthermore, they conduct risk-shifting via an under-
priced deposit insurance scheme in order to reduce their risk (Buch and DeLong, 
2008). According to Amihud et al. (2002), an under-priced safety net may 
encourage key decision makers of firms to transfer risk onto banking supervisors 
and away from the company itself. Regarding the safety net of the government 
deposit insurance scheme, taxpayer grants and loans from central banks grant 
thousands of millions of dollars subsidy to financial institutions that operate in 
investment and commercial banking activities. This assistance from the 
government indicates that banks have more economical access to capital and 
are less affected by the market. The activity of the bailout procedures for financial 
firms, as well as deposit insurance structures, also promotes the moral hazard in 
the banking sector (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). The subsidy generates 
stimulus for excess risk-taking via higher leverage level and risky transactions. 
Therefore, higher default risk and increased number of banking M&As created by 
the subsidy could build a weaker economy and create a higher risk for taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the safety net itself may bring extra safeguarding to firms 
regarded as TBTF. TBTF banks may take advantage of the under-priced safety 
net structures in order to strengthen their deposit subsidy, which boosts both the 
size and total risk of a corporation (John et al., 1991). When banks consolidate 
with non-bank transactions, such as securities underwriting and insurance, the 
safety net might also broaden. Kwast and Passmore (2000) explained that bank 
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holding companies exploit a net subsidy benefit (gross subsidy less regulatory 
expenses) from the safety net, which has a positive margin with the purpose of 
maximising their shareholder value. This result might be seen to strengthen the 
prosperity of the banking industry at the cost of financial service rivals, to a level 
that may show an inefficient capital allocation.   
Several studies focus on one of the signs for safety net subsidy which is 
the target premium paid on consolidation, with the assertion that banks having 
the implicit bailout assurance will receive greater premiums upon consolidation. 
Evidence from Schmid and Walter (2009) shows that substantial premiums are 
received in large conglomerate M&As (over $100 billion) when investigating 
sizeable conglomerate consolidations between 1985 and 2004. Additionally, 
Brewer and Jagtiani (2013) discovered greater target premiums above a certain 
significant size. In short, the risk-shifting motivation of safety net subsidy might 
offset the constructive impact of risk diversification strategies within the banking 
sector.  
5.2.4 Hypotheses development 
In finance literature, the vast majority of M&As studies so far have focused 
on the performance of a transaction, i.e., whether it creates value and for whom. 
This study takes a different approach by looking at another critical aspect of 
M&As which is default risk, particularly relevant to banking institutions. This 
section attempts to develop hypotheses on whether M&As affect the default risk 
of acquiring banks, and if so, which type of mergers influence the risk-reducing 
or risk-increasing effect. 
M&As activities are conventionally seen to reduce the risk for the merging 
firms (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984 and Galai and Masulis, 1976). 
  
 135 
Additionally, the merging banks will benefit from both financial synergies via asset 
growth and improved profits, through operating synergies via co-insurance 
(Asquith and Kim, 1982) and economies of scale and scope. All this should lead 
to lowering a firm’s default risk (Halpern, 1983) and creating better stability of the 
financial system. In the context of bank M&As where default risk is crucial, 
empirical evidence for the U.S. suggests that the probability of failure after deal 
completion decreases as a result of portfolio diversification (Emmons et al., 
2004), product diversification (van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009) and geographic 
diversification (Hughes et al., 1999). Furthermore, during the global financial 
crisis, many major financial institutions worldwide have been encouraged by 
regulators to merge or take over, mainly to avoid bankruptcy, for example: the 
Bank of America & Merrill Lynch; J.P. Morgan & Bear Stearns; Wells Fargo & 
Company and the Wachovia Corporation in the U.S., Lloyds TSB & Halifax Bank 
of Scotland (HBOS) in the U.K. (Douglas, 2009); Caisse Nationale des Caisses 
d’épargne (CNCE) & Banque Fédérale des Banques Populaires in France and  
Fortis NV/SA & BNP Paribas in Belgium (Molyneux et al., 2014). Hence from a 
regulator’s perspective, M&As are often perceived as a tool to avoid bankruptcy 
for the merging institutions. Taking this into consideration, the first hypothesis of 
this chapter is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 5.1 M&As lower the default risk of acquiring banks  
This is followed by examining whether product diversification plays a role 
in the changes in acquiring banks’ default risk post-merger. The potential for risk-
reducing in mergers is especially noticeable for product-diversifying acquisitions, 
as this type of merger has the potential to significantly reduce the volatility of 
profitability (Estrella, 2001; Boyd et al., 1993). Indeed, Wall et al. (2007) assert 
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that acquisitions between banks and non-bank institutions are carried out only if 
management perceives that the benefits from the consolidation are likely to 
outweigh the costs. Hence, the merged entity could enjoy risk-reducing effects 
from owning a more diversified portfolio, by either holding riskier assets than 
either firm can hold on a stand-alone basis. Banks can also achieve economy of 
scale and scope via M&As. One area where scale economies are made possible 
is in risk management. However, the use of derivatives in risk management can 
be costly and complicated; therefore, only big institutions are more likely to use 
derivatives. The more prominent scale arising from merging a bank with a 
nonbank institution might permit a combined firm to tolerate the fixed costs related 
to more sophisticated risk management tools. Considering this, the second 
hypothesis will be:  
Hypothesis 5.2 Product-diversifying mergers bring more risk-reducing effects for 
acquiring banks than focusing deals. 
With respect to international bank mergers, cross-border deals can bring 
about various benefits, for instance, more relaxed supervisory systems, 
favourable tax treatments, cheaper labour costs or a combination of reasons not 
accessible in the domestic market. Indeed, Hughes et al. (1999) assert that 
increasing size tends to raise the insolvency risk while geographic diversification 
helps to reduce this risk. The most substantial economic advantages are 
observed for U.S. banks that pursue interstate enlargement, which diversifies 
their macroeconomic risk. The improved bank safety resulting from geographic 
consolidation would benefit society. Koerniadi et al. (2015) also reach the same 
conclusion in their cross-border sample consisting of U.S. acquirers and 
international targets. Their result indicates that geographic expansion is one of 
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the possible elements that have a positive impact on the level of post-merger 
default risk (lower default risk). These findings help motivate the third hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 5.3 Acquiring banks will be able to decrease their default risk even 
more when targeting cross-border institutions as opposed to domestic ones.  
To test these hypotheses, the next section explains in detail the 
methodologies used to measure the post-merger change of the default risk of 




5.3 Research Methodology 
5.3.1 Default risk measurement models 
There is renewed interest in default risk assessment, driven by the 
requirements of Basel II/III and substantial growth in the credit derivatives market. 
Models of measurement for credit risk pay attention to estimate companies’ 
probability of default due to the fact that it is the major area of uncertainty in 
making the lending decision. The credit risk measurement models may be divided 
into two broad categories, namely the non-structural models and the structural 
models. The former’s objective set by Beaver (1968) and Altman (1968) is to 
identify important determinants in evaluating credit risk and adopt fundamental 
analysis. They evaluate the importance of these determinants and map a 
condensed set of accounting variables and financial ratios such as leverage, 
working capital over total assets, retained earnings over total assets, earnings 
before interest and tax over total assets as well as other information into a 
quantitative score to measure the default probability of a firm. The latter, on the 
other hand, goes back to Black and Scholes (1973) as well as Merton (1974) who 
assume corporate liabilities as contingent claims on a company’s assets. The 
default event of a firm is decided by both the market value of the company’s 
assets along with the liability structure of this company. A company is considered 
to be in default when the assets value decreases below a specific threshold. 
Because it is infeasible to observe the market value of assets, share price of the 
company is utilised instead to infer the assets value, then the probability of default 
can be determined. There are also attempts from worldwide authors to combine 
both non-structural model and structural model into a hybrid approach with the 
expectation to achieve better estimations of default risk; for instance Bellalah et 
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al. (2016); Doumpos et al. (2014); Li and Miu (2010); Benos and 
Papanastasopoulos (2007).  
Going into more details, with regards to non-structural models, the two 
most well-known and widely-used models are the Z-Score and O-Score. The Z-
Score, developed by Altman (1968), weights the independent variables (financial 
ratios and accounting variables, for instance, the return on average assets before 
taxes (ROAA), the capital ratio (equity capital over total assets and profitability) 
and produces a single composite discriminant score. From an economic point of 
view, the Z-Score primarily assesses a bank’s probability of default when the 
value of debt is above the value of assets. The Z-Score model has been used in 
various studies in order to measure default probability; as noted by Hillegeist et 
al. (2004), Lepetit et al. (2008) and Craig & Santos (1997). Taffler (1983) also 
proposes a UK-based discriminant function, termed as Z-score. This model is 
derived for the evaluation of company solvency by public accounting information 
alone. The model requires the input of four appropriately defined financial ratios, 
each measuring a distinct aspect of company performance. To test the predictive 
power of the Z-score, Taffler (1983) identifies 80 potential useful ratios and 
computes them for each of the 92 companies in his sample. The resulting Z-score 
can be interpreted as the degree to which the financial profile of the company 
resembles more than of typical financially healthy companies.    
Alternatively, the O-Score, developed by Ohlson (1980),  measures the 
probability of default based on four critical elements of the financial statements 
(equally weighted); size (logarithm of total assets to GNP13 price-level index); 
                                                 
13 GNP calculates the monetary value of all the finished goods and services 




leverage (total debts to total assets); performance (net income to total assets and 
fixed assets to total debts) and current liquidity (working capital to total assets, 
current assets to current liabilities). This model is applied in numerous empirical 
studies to examine the probability of bankruptcy such as Karamzadeh (2013), 
Lawrence et al. (2015).  
The main advantages of both Z-Score and O-Score models are their 
accuracy in assessing default probability. However, the use of financial ratios and 
accounting data associated with using Z-Score and O-Score create less flexible 
results. The default probabilities cannot be updated during the fiscal year as 
accounting statements are generated per annum and quarterly statements are 
yet to be audited (Bellalah et al., 2016). Besides this, Hillegeist et al., (2004) 
argue that another critical drawback of accounting-based bankruptcy prediction 
models is their failure to incorporate a measure of asset volatility. Volatility is an 
important variable in bankruptcy prediction because it captures the likelihood that 
the value of the firm's assets will decline to such an extent that the firm will be 
unable to repay its debts.  
Regarding structural models, the original Merton (1974) model proposes 
that the default event is decided by the market value of a company’s assets in 
combination with the debt structure of the company. When the value of assets 
drops below a specific threshold, the company is deemed to be in bankruptcy. 
There are several extensions of the model suggested in literature. For instance, 
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) review KMV’s default probability model, developed by 
KMV Corporations. Multiple classes of debt are modelled in this method. The 
three fundamental steps for the determination of default probability are (1) 
estimating the daily market value of assets and volatility of assets, (2) calculating 
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the distance-to-default and (3) transforming the distance to default into an 
expected default frequency (EDF) using an empirical default distribution. The 
benefit of this model is that it permits default to happen at any point in time and 
not necessarily when the debt matures, as with the original Merton model. 
However, despite being used in some studies, such as Furfine and Rosen (2011) 
and Mitchell et al. (2004), it is problematic to construct theoretical EDF’s without 
an assumption of normal asset returns. Given the fact that the calculation of KMV 
model requires share price data, it is more difficult to calculate the EDF for private 
companies, with only accounting data available. Furthermore, Duan (2012) 
pointed out that the KMV estimation method is limited to measure the default risk 
for financial institutions. Financial institutions usually have a significant portion of 
liabilities that cannot be accounted for by the KMV method; this method, 
therefore, tends to exaggerate the volatility of assets leading to the distortion of 
distance to default. 
There have been some recent papers using this structural approach for 
assessing the likelihood of corporate failure (e.g., Bharath and Shumway (2008); 
Hillegeist et al.,(2004) and Vassalou and Xing (2004)). Such a methodological 
approach encompasses most of the above criticism of accounting-ratio-based 
models because firstly, it produces a sound theoretical model for firm default and 
secondly, in an efficient market, stock prices will reflect all the information 
contained in financial statements and will also contain information, outside the 
company’s accounting statements. Furthermore, market variables are unlikely to 
be influenced by firm accounting policies, and finally, market prices reflect future 




5.3.2 Distance to Default model 
In order to measure the changes in default risk associated with M&A 
activities of acquiring banks, the Merton Distance to Default (DD) model will be 
employed in this study as extended by Akhigbe et al. (2007); Gropp et al. (2006); 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) and Vassalou and Xing (2004). DD is a credit 
score originated from observed share prices and book liability, exploiting the 
structural model of default risk by Merton (1974). This model has been 
demonstrated empirically to perform well when it involves ranking companies 
based on their default risk, as in Bharath and Shumway (2008); Duffie et al. 
(2007) and Hillegeistet al. (2004). Hence, this method is regularly employed as a 
measure of ratings to monitor the default risk of companies, as demonstrated by 
Acharya et al. (2013) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010). DD estimates default 
risk as the number of standard deviations by which the market value of a firm’s 
assets is beyond the default point. A default point is the point where the market 
value of assets is lower than the book value of total liabilities (the company is 
then regarded as bankrupt). Specifically, the smaller the DD, the smaller the 
distance of a firm from default point, whereby the default probability is higher. For 
instance, a DD of 3.0 suggests that bank failure within a year is a three-standard-
deviation event, assuming that the asset values' fluctuation follows the recent 
historical value, and the starting point is the current market value of assets. If DD 
ever becomes zero, it does not necessarily mean that the firm becomes 
bankrupts at that specific time. The DD negative or being 0.0 indicates that the 
firm is in a severely vulnerable situation and will be extremely likely to default 
unless the asset value increases. If short-term liabilities (maturity of less than a 
year) are not rolled over, the firm might need to consume its assets in order to 
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pay within a year. Nevertheless, if short-term liabilities are rolled over, the firm 
would sustain on a cash flow basis, even though this situation is technically 
regarded as bankrupt. In the situation of a bank run, a sudden default will occur 
(Harada and Ito, 2011). 
The fundamental elements of a simple version of the Merton model applied to 
derive the DD measure are: 
(1) The process of a company’s asset value, V, follows a geometric Brownian 
motion and thus, specifically, has constant volatility without jumps. 
(2) The capital structure of a company comprises equity and debt, where debt 
is issued as a single zero-coupon bond. It suggests the company can only 
fail when the debt matures.  
DD is used to measure default risk in this chapter because of the model’s 
various merits. First, DD yields a better measure of the default risk than other 
traditional accounting-based methods because it combines both market data and 
accounting information into its measure. Therefore, it simultaneously 
incorporates an important measure of asset volatility from a market-based 
method (volatility is a crucial variable in bankruptcy prediction) as well as is 
measured based on the actual financial situation of the firm from its financial 
statements. As a result, DD increases the accuracy in assessing the firm’s default 
risk. Indeed, various empirical studies have shown that the DD method is a 
superior, more reliable predictor of a firm's default risk than other traditional non-
structural models, in spite of the model's simplistic assumptions on asset 
movements and debt structure (Gropp et al., 2006, Harada et al., 2013; Vassalou 
and Xing, 2004) Second,, Gropp et al. (2004) asserted that dissimilar to credit 
default spreads, DD methods are reliable indicators for the downturn of bank 
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health even when a bank is far from default. Third, another advantage of DD 
measure is its flexibility, as analysts can make frequent adjustments to changes 
in the market value of a firm’s assets, hence continuously updating the probability 
of default (Bellalah et al., 2016). Finally, Jessen and Lando (2014) also apply 
simulation studies to demonstrate that the empirical victory of DD might be a 
consequence of its substantial robustness to model misspecification. They 
revealed that even when the underlying assumptions of the model are changed, 
DD still succeeds in ranking companies’ probabilities of default.  
DD on day t is expressed as  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  = ln (𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)+�𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡−0.5𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡2 �𝑇𝑇⁄ 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡√𝑇𝑇  (5.1) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 is the market value of assets, 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the face value of total debts, 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is 
the risk-free rate (the annualised yield on two-year government bonds in the 
acquiring bank’s country), 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 is the annualised asset volatility at t and T is the 
time to maturity of outstanding debt (traditionally set to one year). 
The calculation of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 requires the estimation of 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡. Both of which are 
unobservable directly. Based on the Black and Scholes (1973) model, the market 
value of a company’s equity can be expressed as a function of asset value for 
call options with time to maturity equal to T and where 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 plays the role of the 
strike price of the call: 
𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 =  𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁�𝑑𝑑1,𝑡𝑡� −  𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑2,𝑡𝑡)  (5.2) 
where:  
𝑑𝑑1,𝑡𝑡 = ln (𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)+�𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+0.5𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡2 �𝑇𝑇⁄ 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡√𝑇𝑇  (5.3) 




𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡�𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑1,𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 (5.5) 
Equation (5.5) is the optimal hedge equation that connects the standard 
deviation of an acquirer's equity value to the standard deviation of asset values 
(both on an annualised basis). 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 is set equal to the total market value of equity 
based on the closing price at the end of the company’s fiscal year. 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 is 
calculated by employing daily return data over the whole year (Hillegeist et al., 
2004). N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 
The values of 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 are derived via an iterative process, which 
employs a Newton search algorithm that ends when the pair of values solves both 
the call option and optimal hedge equation above. Specifically, daily data from 
the past 12 months before the deal announcement will be employed to achieve 
an annualised estimation of the equity volatility 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡, obtained by multiplying the 
standard deviation of daily equity returns by the square root of the number of 
trading days (252 days) in the year (Akhigbe et al., 2007). Then the total market 
value 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡, the annualised equity volatility 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 and total liabilities 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 will be 
employed to calculate the starting value for 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡, where  𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡/(𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡). 
The starting value for the market value of assets 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 equals the sum of the market 
value of equity 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡  and the face value of total liabilities 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡. The pair 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 
will be used as initial values for the iterative process to solve the simultaneous 
nonlinear equations above (Equations 5.2 and 5.5), generating daily values for 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡. 
Employing the calculated daily values of 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 from this iterative 
process as well as T and 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡, the daily distance to default for each bank in Equation 
(5.1) will be computed.  
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The change in acquirer DD associated with a merger event is the difference in 
mean DD before the merger (over a-180 days to a-11 days relative to merger 
announcement date a) and mean DD after the deal completes (over c+11 days 
to c+180 days after the completion date c). This time window is suggested in 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) as it helps to decrease the level of noise 
inherent in DD and to make sure that the projections of default risk are based on 
accounting data that relate to the period after the deal completion.  
The change in DD for acquiring banks (∆DD) can hence be expressed as:  
∆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����(𝑐𝑐+11;𝑐𝑐+180) −  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷����(𝑎𝑎−180;𝑎𝑎−11) (5.6) 
All of the model inputs are collected from Bloomberg. 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the book value 
of total debts from acquirers of the sample in the year before the merger 
announcement. The acquirers’ historical daily prices of equity are gathered 
according to three time windows: (1) for the past twelve months before the 
acquisition occurs to calculate an annualised estimate of the equity volatility 𝜎𝜎𝐸𝐸,𝑡𝑡, 
(2) over a-180 days to a-11 days in relation to merger announcement date a and 
(3) over c+11 days to c+180 days subsequent to the completion date c. Equity 
prices for both time windows (2) and (3) are used to estimate the change in DD 
for bidders over these estimation periods. The annualised yield on two-year 
government bonds in the bidding bank's country is chosen to proxy for the risk-
free rate  𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡. Finally, to assess whether bank M&As influence the change in 
default risk of acquirers, a t-test is performed on the mean and median of pre-
merger and post-merger DD as well as the merger-related change in DD. 
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5.3.3 Model of the determinants of merger-related changes in bidders’ 
default risk 
Several deal-specific and firm-specific characteristics are employed to 
evaluate their influence on default risk changes via M&As. The model estimated 
via OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors, 
assumes the following specification: 
∆𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊= 𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 + 𝜸𝜸′𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 +  𝜽𝜽′𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊 (5.7) 
where: 
∆𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 is the merger-related change in distance to default  
𝜸𝜸′𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 is a (k x 1) vector of merger characteristics 
𝜽𝜽′𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 is a (j x 1) vector of bidder characteristics at the end of the fiscal year 
before the deal announcement and bidders’ macroeconomic environment.   
The vector of merger characteristics consists of the payment method, 
target’s status (public or private), deal size, relative size, cross-border and 
product diversification. For the bidders' characteristics, measures of size and 
performance of acquirers (ROA), leverage, market to book and operating 
efficiency before the acquisition are taken into consideration. Regarding the 
acquirers' macroeconomic environment, the GDP real growth rate, the rule of law, 
political stability and the HHI is included in the model to evaluate the impact of 
country characteristics on the risk effects of acquisitions (Vallascas & Hagendorff, 
2011). All explanations and justification of variables used in this chapter are 




 5.4 Empirical Findings 
5.4.1 Bank merger and acquiring banks’ default risk 
This section assesses the effects of bank mergers on bidders' default risk 
in general, and for specific types of mergers, in order to test this chapter 
hypotheses. Table 5.1 reports the DD of acquiring banks before and after 
mergers based on the global sample of 608 banks M&As.  
Table 5.11: Bank Merger and Distance to Default 
Bank mergers and distance to default (DD). The table reports mean (median) 
distance to default (DD) for a sample of acquiring banks. Distance to default 
before the merger is computed as the average of the distance to default over 
the period from -180 days to -11 days relative to the announcement date (a), 
while the distance to default after the merger is computed as the average 
distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days after the 
effective date (c). The change in the distance to default is the difference 
between the post-effective completion date and the pre-announcement period 
DD, winsorised at the 1%-level. The t-test evaluates if the mean, median DD 
and ∆DD are equal to zero. The higher the magnitude of t (either positive or 
negative), the higher the evidence against the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference. 
 N Mean    
(t-stat) 
Median  
(t-stat)          
∆DD>0 
    N % 
DD: before merger  
(a -180, a -11) 





DD: after merger  
(c +11, c +180) 










**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1% 
 
     
The mean and median DD before mergers are 3.747 and 3.536 
respectively and both are statistically different from zero (at the 1% level). As 
seen in the table, the mean and median DD after completion are both higher than 
those of DD before the announcement (3.766 and 3.573 respectively), with both 
statistically different from zero. This means that banks tend to have a higher 
  
 149 
default risk pre-merger than post-merger. The mean and median change in DD 
is 0.02 and 0.016 correspondingly and is statistically different from zero (at the 
1% level). Because DD is measured in standard deviations, it can be said that on 
average, acquiring banks improves about 0.02 standard deviations away from 
the default point post-merger compared to pre-merger period (they are less risky). 
Furthermore, it is observed that more than half of the bank mergers (65.3%) 
produce a positive change in DD which means a significant decrease in default 
risk following the deal. This finding is inferred the first hypothesis of this chapter, 
i.e. M&As lower bidders’ default risk. Additionally, it adheres to the presumption 
from literature that the diversification of assets between two merging institutions 
that are imperfectly correlated should, without countervailing movement from 
management of acquirers, lead to the reduction in default risk for the combined 
firm, both theoretically (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984), and empirically 
(Emmons et al., 2004; Koerniadi et al., 2015; van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009). The 
finding is also consistent with Koerniadi et al. (2015), as they find that on average, 
cross-border M&As decrease the level of default risk of acquiring firms. However, 
it contradicts Vallascas and Hagendorff's (2011) findings since their evidence 
suggests that M&As are risk neutral in their European bank mergers sample. 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) also reach the opposite conclusion by saying that North 
American firms observe an increase in their default risk post-merger. The differing 
results from other empirical research may be explained by choice of samples and 
examination periods in each study. This thesis covers a global sample with 
acquirers and targets coming from different markets, using developed, emerging 
and frontier markets within a long examination period (1998 and 2015). 
Furthermore, this sample contains M&As between banking acquirers and targets 
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coming from different sectors, such as insurance, security, investment services, 
mortgage finance and asset managers. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that M&A 
deals in this sample produce significant geographical and activity diversification 
benefits, which may explain the decrease in acquirers' default risk post-merger.  
In the next step, the risk implications of bank M&As according to the type 
of deal examined. The potential for risk-reducing in mergers is especially 
noticeable for either cross-border or product-diversifying acquisitions, as both 
deal types have the potential to significantly reduce the volatility of profitability of 
bidding banks (Estrella, 2001; Boyd et al., 1993). Nevertheless, the integration 
process of merging firms after the completion of the deal involved in 
diversification might often lead to organisational complexity, and substantial 
changes in the strategy post-merger may prevent acquirers from realising the 




Table 12: Bank Merger on Distance to Default, by Deal Type 
Bank M&As on the distance to default, by deal type. Panel A reports the sample 
mean (median) of the distance to default (DD) for domestic and cross-border 
deals. Panel B reports the sample mean (median) of the same risk measures 
computed for focusing and diversified mergers. A merger is defined as product 
diversifying if bidder and target do not share the same four-digit ICB code. For 
each bank, distance to default before the merger is computed as the average of 
the distance to default over the period from -180 days to -11 days from the 
announcement (a), while the distance to default after the merger is computed as 
the average of the distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days 
after the completion date (c). Changes in the distance to default is the difference 
between the post-completion date and pre-announcement period DD, winsorised 
at the 1%-level. The t-test evaluates if the mean DD and ∆DD are equal to zero. 
The higher the magnitude of t (either positive or negative), the higher the 
evidence against the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference. 
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Table 13: Bank Merger on Distance to Default, Matched Sample 
Univariate analysis- Matched sample. Bank M&As on the distance to default, by 
deal type. Panel A reports the sample mean (median) of the distance to default 
(DD) for domestic (matched sample) and cross-border deals. Panel B reports the 
sample mean (median) of the same risk measures computed for focusing 
(matched sample) and diversified mergers. A merger is defined as product 
diversifying if bidder and target do not share the same four-digit ICB code. For 
each bank, distance to default before the merger is computed as the average of 
the distance to default over the period from -180 days to -11 days from the 
announcement (a), while the distance to default after the merger is computed as 
the average of the distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days 
after the effective date (c). Changes in the distance to default is the difference 
between the post-effective date and pre-announcement period DD, winsorized 
at the 1%-level. The t-test evaluates if the mean DD and ∆DD are equal to zero. 
The higher the magnitude of t (either positive or negative), the higher the 
evidence against the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference. 
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Table 5.2 reveals the effects on DD of bidders that can be classified 
regarding geographical (domestic versus cross-border) or product diversification 
(focusing versus product-diversifying where acquirer and target do not have the 
same four-digit ICB code). Table 5.3 demonstrates the effects of M&As on 
acquiring banks’ distance to default on the matched sample of cross-border and 
activity-diversifying deals. The matched sample is created to reasonably compare 
the effects of M&As on DD between domestic and cross-border deals, as well as 
between focusing and activity-diversifying deals, since the number of cross-
border mergers and activity-diversifying deals are far less than those of domestic 
and focusing deals within the entire sample. Precisely, the chosen 50 deals in 
domestic mergers have the same characteristics as the 50 deals in cross-border 
mergers. Similarly, 65 deals in focusing mergers are selected to have the same 
characteristics with 65 product-diversifying mergers. The matched sample is 
based on the following criteria: (1) both domestic and cross-border mergers have 
to come from the same acquiring banks’ country, (2) the announcement dates of 
both deals have to be less than one year apart and (3) the discrepancy between 
both acquiring banks’ total asset has to be as small as possible (Moeller et al., 
2004) 
Panel A of Table 5.2 demonstrates geographic diversification. As seen, 
the mean and median change in DD, with regards to domestic bank mergers, is 
0.019 and 0.016 respectively (statistically different from zero at 1% level). This 
indicates that domestic deals help to reduce bidders’ default risk which is in 
contrast to Furfine and Rosen (2011) who find that domestic mergers in the U.S. 
raise the overall default risk for bidders. The difference in findings may come from 
the sample selection itself as Furfine and Rosen (2011) use only U.S. bidders, 
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whereas this chapter sample contains worldwide bidders. Concerning cross-
border deals, the positive and significant mean and median change in DD (0.03 
and 0.01 at 5% level of significance) shows that the acquirers' default risks 
decrease post-merger. This finding is in line with Koerniadi et al. (2015) who 
evidence that cross-border acquisition is one of the leading factors found to 
explain the reduction in default risk of institutions. Also, the mean DD of cross-
border deals (0.03) is higher than the mean DD of domestic deals (0.019). As a 
reminder, the higher DD is, the higher the distance of a firm from default point is 
and the lower default risk. However, it is also observed that the positive change 
in DD of domestic deals is slightly higher than that of cross-border deals (65.59% 
compared to 62%). Moving onto Table 5.3, it is observed that the median change 
in DD of the matched sample of domestic mergers is slightly lower than that of 
cross-border deals. However, the recorded positive change in DD is at 67% 
compared to 62% of cross-border deals. This result differs from Choi et al., (2010) 
as they find that domestic deals in the banking industry are perceived to be less 
risky than cross-border deals from bondholders.  
Panel B of Table 5.2 focuses on the effect of product diversification on 
distance to default. It is noticeable that the mean and median changes in DD, of 
both focusing and product-diversifying deals, are statistically different from zero 
at a 5% level. Furthermore, the positive change in DD of product-diversifying 
deals is higher than that of focusing deals (75.3% compared to 64%). According 
to Table 5.3, the median change in DD of the matched sample of focusing deals 
is less than that of activity-diversifying deals. Moreover, the positive change in 
DD of focusing deals is only 59% compared to 75% of activity-diversifying deals. 
This leads to a preliminary analysis of Hypothesis 5.2 that product-diversifying 
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mergers generate greater risk-reducing effects for acquiring banks in comparison 
to focusing deals. It may be the case that securities markets have begun to realise 
the benefits stemming from product-diversifying deals as well as appreciate 
financial conglomerates.  
To enable further analysis of the risk effects, the entire data sample is 
divided into several sub-samples and analyses the change in the bidding banks’ 
default risk. Table 5.4 reports the investigation of the sub-samples based on (A) 
deal value, (B) the home markets in bidders, (C) total assets and (D) ROA.  
Table 14: Bank M&A on Distance to Default, Sub-sample Analysis 
Bank M&A on the distance to default, sub-sample analysis. Panel A reports the 
sample mean (median) of the distance to default (DD) for high, medium and low 
deal value. Panel B reports the sample mean (median) of the same risk measures 
computed for mergers taken in emerging, developed and frontier market 
according to MSCI market classification. Emerging markets include Brazil, China, 
Russia, Malaysia, Korea, etc. Frontier markets include Argentina, Lithuania, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, etc. Developed markets are US, UK, France, Germany, etc.  
Panel C reports the sample mean (median) of the distance to default (DD) for 
high, medium and low bidders' total assets and Panel D reports the sample mean 
(median) of the distance to default (DD) for high, medium and low ROA. For each 
bank, distance to default before the merger is computed as the average of the 
distance to default over the period from -180 days to -11 days from the 
announcement (a), while the distance to default after the merger is computed as 
the average of the distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days 
after the effective date (c). Changes in the distance to default is the difference 
between the post-effective date and pre-announcement period DD, winsorised at 
the 1%-level. The t-test evaluates if the mean DD and ∆DD are equal to zero. 
 
 DD: before 
merger  
(a -180, a -11) 
DD: after  
merger  
(c +11, c +180) 
 
          ∆DD 
A: Deal value Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
       
High deal value  3.89*** 3.59*** 3.90*** 3.59*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
(203 deals) (34.91) (12.35) (34.87) (12.35) (3.03) (3.22) 
Medium deal value  3.89*** 3.82*** 3.92*** 3.85*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
(203 deals) (41.22) (12.35) (41.32) (12.35) (4.67) (4.51) 
Low deal value  3.45*** 3.36*** 3.47*** 3.38*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 




B: Markets       
Emerging markets  3.22*** 3.15*** 3.26*** 3.15*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
(55 deals) (18.88) (6.44) (18.99) (6.44) (3.60) (3.19) 
Developed markets  3.81*** 3.64*** 3.82*** 3.65*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
(539 deals) (63.67) (20.11) (63.63) (20.11) (6.42) (7.39) 
Frontier markets  3.33*** 3.04*** 3.37*** 3.02*** 0.04 -0.01*** 
(14 deals) (9.98) (3.26) (9.83) (3.26) (1.49) (0.56) 
 
C: Total assets       
High total assets  4.03*** 3.68*** 4.05*** 3.66*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
(203 deals) (34.21) (12.35) (34.21) (12.35) (3.55) (3.76) 
Medium total assets  3.85*** 3.84*** 3.88*** 3.86*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
(203 deals) (45.45) (12.35) (45.37) (12.35) (4.79) (5.09) 
Low total assets  3.35*** 3.26*** 3.37*** 3.29*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
(202 deals) (42.72) (12.32) (42.82) (12.32) (4.66) (4.99) 
 
D: ROA       
High ROA  3.79*** 3.50*** 3.82*** 3.56*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
(203 deals) (36.38) (12.32) (36.41) (12.32) (4.50) (4.04) 
Medium ROA  3.84*** 3.59*** 3.86*** 3.63*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
(203 deals) (43.26) (12.35) (43.44) (43.44) (4.11) (4.69) 
Low ROA  3.61*** 3.51*** 3.62*** 3.50*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
(203 deals) (36.76) (12.35) (36.69) (12.35) (4.88) (5.40) 
       
**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1% 
 
  Panel A of Table 5.4 focuses on deal value, differentiating between high, 
medium, and low deal values. The results of the computations show a statistically 
significant, positive change in DD for the bidding banks for all of the sub-samples 
based on the deal size. The default risk-reducing effect of bank consolidation is 
therefore common to all of the deals, regardless of the deal value. This is an 
exciting finding because the literature tends to find that larger deal value 
increases the risk profile of acquirers post-merger because more significant deals 
can also stimulate banks to involve in more risk-taking (Knapp et al., 2005; 




Panel B differentiates among the mergers in emerging markets, developed 
markets and those in the frontier markets14. It is expected that mergers in 
emerging markets and frontier markets are to be primarily motivated by growth 
considerations and thus will have more risk-reducing effects than mergers in 
developed countries. The results of the estimations, however, reject this 
expectation as bidding banks in frontier markets show an insignificant negative 
median change in DD. This insignificance may be because there are only 14 
acquirers in frontier markets. However, it can also be argued that because the 
frontier market has lower market capitalisation and less liquidity than emerging 
markets, acquirers in frontier markets experience higher default probability than 
those in emerging and developed markets. Conversely, bidding banks in 
developed and emerging markets show significant and positive mean and median 
change in DD. This means that mergers reduce the default risk of bidding banks 
in those markets. 
Furthermore, Panel C presents the results of the investigation based on 
acquirers' total assets. The bidding banks' pre-merger level of total assets is used 
as a proxy for bank size. It is seen that positive and significant mean and median 
change in DD are observed, and therefore, the reduction in default risk post-
merger can also be detected for all bank size levels. Particularly, medium banks 
experience a significant decrease in default risk due to a merger. Significantly, 
                                                 
14 Frontier market is a type of emerging market. A frontier market is considered 
to have lower market capitalisation and less liquidity than many emerging 
markets. Frontier markets countries include: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Burkina Faso, Benin, Croatia, Estonia, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Serbia, Senegal, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Togo, 




the results conflict with those investigating the effects of M&A on acquirers' 
systematic risk and contribution to systemic risk. The importance of bank size is 
noted as the primary contributor to the increase in systematic risk (Casu et al., 
2015) and acquirers' contribution to systemic risk (Weiß et al., 2014). The positive 
and significant change in the DD of large banks shows that merger also 
decreases default risk of large banks. Therefore, consolidations among banks do 
help to reduce the default risk of bidders, regardless of their size. 
 In the last panel D, the ROA ratios of bidders are used as a proxy for bank 
profitability performance as in Hagendorff and Nieto (2015). Significant merger-
related reduction in bidders’ default risk post-merger is observed for all 
profitability performance levels. When looking at the absolute magnitude of these 
decreases in default risk, one can see that the decrease in the acquirers’ default 
risk is the largest for bidders with high profitability performance (high ROA) before 
a merger. The results are consistent with the notion that higher profitability 
performance creates a larger buffer, providing greater ability to absorb adverse 
shocks to asset values and greater ability to rebound as conditions improve. If a 
bank absorbs an adverse shock with low liquidity buffers, it may be subject to 
considerable stress in order to obtain liquidity in the market short term, whereas 
banks with large liquidity buffers will have time to demonstrate their underlying 
solvency to the market. If a bank is insolvent after an adverse shock, the 
supervisors will likely have more time to respond to the insolvency if the bank is 
more liquid. Changes in the bank profitability performance should be of interest 
to supervisors, regardless of whether the changes were caused by the merger or 
whether the merger simply facilitated changes that the acquirer's management 
already wanted to implement (Hagendorff and Nieto, 2015). 
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Finally, in the next table, it is investigated bank consolidations that were 
completed in the period of pre-crisis prior to 2007, merger deals that were 
completed during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 and deals that were 
completed after 2009. The findings demonstrate that during the global financial 
crisis, statistically significant and negative ∆DD can be observed, indicating that 
default risk raises substantially in both global and U.S. samples. These findings 
promote the view that bank mergers in periods of financial crisis can, among other 
determinants, be stimulated by government safety net, and a bank manager’s 
desire to become TBTF; hence producing a raise in default risk. However, in the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, significant decreases in default risk are noticed 
for acquirers, in the global, U.S. and non-US samples. The main discovery in this 
respect, is that bank mergers during the financial crisis do not produce default 
risk reducing effect for bidders as expected. Rather, it makes bidders riskier and 
more fragile.  
Table 15: Sub-sample Analysis: The effect of the 2007-09 global financial crisis 
Bank M&A on the distance to default, sub-sample analysis. This table reports 
the mean of the change in distance to default (∆DD), taken into account the 
pre-crisis period, the 2007-09 financial crisis period as well as the post crisis 
period for various regions: global, U.S. and non-US countries. For each bank, 
∆DD is the difference between the post-effective date and pre-announcement 
period DD, winsorised at the 1%-level. p-value is denoted in parentheses. 
    Global   US   Non-US 
 N  N  N  
Pre-crisis 372 0.02*** 281 0.02*** 91 0.03*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Crisis 78 -0.02** 51 -0.04*** 27 0.02 
  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.40) 
Post-crisis 158 0.03*** 120 0.04*** 38 0.02 
    (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.18) 
**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10%     




 In conclusion, the results from the analysis of sub-samples above show 
that the default risk-reducing effect of M&A is common among deals and 
acquirers regardless of deal value, size, performance or geographical 
diversification and product diversification. Therefore, the Hypothesis 5.1 of this 
chapter, which projects that M&A reduce acquirers’ default risk, is inferred. To 
control for possible correlations between these variables and biases, originating 
from omitting macroeconomic control variables, a multivariate analysis of the 
factors that drive the changes in acquirers' default risk is performed. Therefore, 
the question of how the merger-related changes in acquirers' default risk can be 
explained in the cross-section by a set of the deal and idiosyncratic bank 
characteristics as well as the variables on the mergers' macroeconomic 
environment will be discussed in the next section.  
5.4.2 The determinants of merger-related changes in default risk 
To assess the robustness of the univariate tests above, this part examines 
if certain types of deal and acquirer characteristics influence and can explain for 
the default risk reduction post-merger of acquirers in the sample. It is expected 
that cross-border deals and diversifying deals play a role in justifying the risk-
reducing effects of mergers as hypothesised. The results are produced by 
regressing ∆DD of acquirers after merger on independent and control variables 
capturing specific deal and acquirer characteristics and acquirer’s 
macroeconomic environment (see Equation (5.7)). The outcomes are displayed 
in Table 5.6 below and reveal several interesting findings.  
Table 5.6: Changes in distance to default 
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Changes in distance to default: deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics 
and acquirers' macroeconomic environment. The dependent variable is the 
change in distance to default. The model is estimated via OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors. Model (1) uses all 
acquirers with acquirers and deal characteristics and country controls. Model 
(2) uses the same sample of acquirers but with only acquirers and deal 
characteristics. Model (3) uses US acquirers with both acquirer and deal 
characteristics. All variables and data sources are defined in chapter 4. 
Statistically significant coefficients are highlighted in bold type. The p-values 
are denoted in parentheses 
 (1) All 
banks  
 (2) All 
banks 
 (3) US 
banks  
 
Panel A: Acquirers and 
deal characteristics 
      
       
Product diversification  0.0158 * 0.0152 * 0.0072  
 (0.0620)  (0.0775)  (0.4568)  
Cross-border  0.0126  0.0119  0.0031  
 (0.3218)  (0.3417)  (0.9044)  
Payment method 0.0020  0.0038  0.0015  
 (0.7190)  (0.4891)  (0.7873)  
Status of target -0.0316  -0.0364  -0.0168 ** 
 (0.4408)  (0.3686)  (0.0233)  
Deal size -0.0029  ** -0.0032 ** -0.0023  
 (0.0444)  (0.0202)  (0.1628)  
Relative size 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
 (0.4260)  (0.4357)  (0.6750)  
ROA 0.0126 ** 0.0138 ** 0.0125 * 
 (0.0338)  (0.0192)  (0.0750)  
Market to book ratio -0.0035  -0.0027  -0.0037  
 (0.4739)  (0.5722)  (0.4935)  
Leverage 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0009 * 
 (0.9786)  (0.9452)  (0.0911)  
Operating efficiency -0.0007  0.0006  -0.0052  
 (0.8312)  (0.8561)  (0.1551)  
Panel B: Country control       
GDP 0.0002      
 (0.9010)      
HHI 0.0084      
 (0.8321)      
Political stability -0.0119 *     
 (0.0942)      
Rule of Law -0.0013      
 (0.8690)      
Constant 0.0612  0.0543  0.0571  
 (0.1648)  (0.2079)  (0.0049)  
R-squared 0.0485  0.0384  0.0245  
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Adj. R-squared 0.0259  0.0222  0.0022  
Number of observations 608  608  452  
**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1% 
 
Regression (1) and (2) of Table 5.6 estimates the relationship between the 
changes in the acquirers' distance to default and acquirer and deal characteristics 
as well as with and without country control respectively for the full sample of bank 
mergers. 
The first independent variable, product diversification, has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (at 10% level of confidence) in both regressions. 
It indicates that product-diversifying deals help to decrease acquirers’ default risk 
following a merger. Therefore, the Hypothesis 5.2 of this chapter, which projects 
that product-diversifying deals produce a default risk-reducing effect, cannot be 
rejected. This finding is consistent with a handful of theoretical studies (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984) and empirical studies (van Lelyveld and Knot, 
2009) regarding the diversification hypothesis which suggests that the combined 
banks will benefit from default risk reduction, no matter how diversification is 
achieved, and as long as the asset diversifications are not perfectly correlated. In 
terms of Hypothesis 5.3, which projects that acquiring banks decrease their 
default risk more when targeting cross-border banks as opposed to domestic 
ones, the coefficients of the cross-border variable in both regressions are 
insignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.3 is rejected. This finding contradicts with 
Koerniadi et al. (2015) who evidence that cross-border acquisition is one of the 
leading factors used to explain the reduction in default risk of institutions.   
With respect to control variables, deal size has a statistically significant 
negative coefficient (at 5% level) in both regressions. In other words, acquirers 
conduct large M&A deals witnessing their default risk profile increase after a 
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merger. This finding is consistent with the notion in literature that large bank 
mergers pose organisational and procedural hurdles in the post-merger 
integration process that may prevent merger benefits from materialising (Knapp 
et al., 2005) or that as banks grow via M&A; they also take on more risk (Hughes 
et al., 1999). Moreover, Beck et al. (2006) warned that an increasing bank size 
due to M&A activities might result in lower transparency as consolidation allows 
banks to expand around various geographic markets and business lines, 
employing sophisticated financial means to established complex corporations. It 
is also consistent with banks facing incentives, to use mergers to become ‘too big 
to fail’ in an attempt to extract benefits from regulators. One can argue that the 
size of the deal could have a reducing effect on the default risk of bidders because 
it could enable larger banks to diversify their asset and credit portfolio more 
efficiently. Additionally, larger deals could facilitate collusion among the 
remaining competitors, thus increasing profits and ultimately reducing the 
acquirers' risk. However, the results show that this is not the case. This finding is 
also in line with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) who find the negative impact of 
deal size on the risk effects of M&A. Overall, the result complies with the 
univariate test above, in which deal size poses a significant influence on the risk 
effects of bank mergers.    
Pre-merger profitability performance, as proxied by the acquirers' ROA in 
the pre-merger period, has a statistically significant positive coefficient (at 5%) in 
both regressions. It indicates that the higher the level of profitability performance 
of acquiring banks before a merger, the more the default risk reduction is 
observed following a bank merger. One can debate that it is possible for acquiring 
banks to temporarily boost pre-merger levels of ROA to enhance its ability to 
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obtain supervisory approval for the takeover, thereby casting doubts on the 
significance of ROA to explain risk-reduction effects of M&A. Also, Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011) report the insignificant coefficient of ROA in their sample, 
indicating that ROA does not have the explanatory power to explain the change 
in default risk within their sample. Nevertheless, this finding supports the notion 
that a larger capital buffer, generating from higher profitability performance, 
enhances a bidder’s ability to absorb adverse shocks to asset values and a far 
improved ability to recover when the market conditions improve. To summarise, 
this finding is consistent with the univariate test above, that profitability 
performance of acquiring banks pre-merger significantly and positively influence 
the risk-reduction of bank mergers.  
Regression (3) only uses the 452 mergers of U.S. banking acquirers to 
check the results on the relation between the acquirer and deal characteristics 
and the change in DD when non-U.S. bidders are excluded. The status of target 
variables witnesses a negative and statistically significant coefficient. It indicates 
that private target is a determinant of the increase in acquirers' default risk post-
merger, as hypothesised. Indeed, mergers involved in private targets are 
projected to a produce default risk-increasing effect for acquirers because private 
firms are subject to lower disclosure requirements; hence, it restricts the 
acquirers’ capabilities to evaluate the risks associated with private targets 
themselves, as well as making acquirers’ due diligence ineffective. Therefore, the 
acquisitions of hidden risks from target firms may contribute to the increase in 
acquirers’ default risk (Furfine and Rosen, 2011). 
The ROA as a proxy for bank profitability performance is found again, to 
be significantly positively related to the merger-induced change in the acquirer’s 
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distance to default; although the coefficient is weak at 10% level of confidence. 
Deal size, on the other hand, is not significant in this case. It means that for U.S. 
acquirers, mega-mergers do not contribute to the increase in their default risk 
post-merger, in contrast to acquiring banks from other countries. The regression 
also witnesses a weak negative and significant coefficient of leverage, which 
suggests that the more leveraged a bank is, the more likely it is that acquirers 
might witness the increase in their default risk post-merger. This is consistent with 
the notion that high leverage puts pressure on the executive to produce high and 
sufficient cash flows for interest payments; urging them to engage in risky 
transactions and thereby raising their default risk (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2006). Also, as a preliminary test which is not included in the main content of this 
chapter, the effect of leverage on non-US banks is investigated and no 
statistically significant coefficients are found.  
In short, all the regressions affirm the findings on the univariate test above, 
thereby, inferring Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, that M&As, as well as product-
diversifying deals, reduce acquirers’ default risk. Hypothesis 5.3 is, however, 
rejected as the coefficient of the cross-border variable is insignificant. When 
examining the influence of potential factors that are anticipated to have an impact 
on the change in bidding banks' default risk after the deal completion, deal size, 
ROA and status of a target are all found to be significant determinants. First, large 
deals prevent acquirers in realising the risk-reduction effects associated with 
M&As. Also, bidding banks with higher levels of pre-merger profitability observe 
more default risk reduction following the deal. Only in the US, private targets 
contribute to an increase in acquirers' default risk post-merger. To test the 
robustness of the results obtained in the empirical analysis, it requires the need 
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to control for a possible heteroscedasticity in the regression, which is currently 
estimated using Huber–White standard errors. As an alternative, all regressions 
are re-estimated using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) to correct for possibly 
inefficient regression coefficient estimates and heteroscedasticity. It is found that 
the conclusions drawn from the OLS regressions with Huber–White standard 





In conclusion, this chapter examines the impact of bank mergers on 
bidders' default risk on a global sample. Additionally, it utilises a direct measure 
of default risk, namely the Distance to Default as in Vallascas and Hagendorff 
(2011). Academic literature so far has debated the risk implications of bank 
mergers on acquirers and the determinants of the changes in bidders' default 
risk. This chapter, for the first time, extends literature by examining the risk effects 
of the different types of bank M&As, namely product diversification and 
geographic diversification on bidders' default risk. In addition, it is the first to study 
the risk implications of bank mergers on a global sample which allows for 
experimentation with rich variation in the indication and level of changes in 
bidders' risks witnessed across the deals; thereby possibly yielding interesting 
results. Furthermore, this chapter provides original evidence in academic 
literature with regards to the determinants of merger-related changes in bidders' 
default risk, examining acquirers' characteristics, deal-specific characteristics 
and bidding banks' macroeconomic environment. Employing a comprehensive 
and latest global sample of bank M&As from 1998 to 2015, this study provides 
new insight on the phenomenon, with findings that lead to various implications for 
policy makers and bank managers, as well as to broader academic literature. 
Overall, the findings show that bank mergers significantly and positively 
affect acquirers’ default risk. In other words, bank mergers reduce the default risk 
of acquiring banks, thereby agreeing with the first Hypothesis 5.1 of this chapter. 
This finding complies with other theoretical and empirical studies from literature, 
which suggest that mergers lead to the reduction in default risk for the combined 
firm (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Diamond, 1984; Emmons et al., 2004; Koerniadi et 
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al., 2015; van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009 and Koerniadi et al., 2015). However, it 
differs from Vallascas & Hagendorff (2011) and Furfine & Rosen (2011), since 
their evidence suggests that M&As are risk-neutral in European bank mergers 
and increase default risk for North America firms respectively.  
With respect to independent variables, the findings show a greater default 
risk reduction for acquirers who are witnessed in product-diversifying deals 
following a merger, compared to focusing deals. Therefore, the Hypothesis 5.2 of 
this chapter, which hypothesises the greater impact of activity-diversifying deals 
on acquirers’ default risk reduction, is supported. Nevertheless, cross-border 
variable enters all specifications with statistical insignificance at the conventional 
level of significance within regressions. Therefore, the Hypothesis 5.3 of this 
chapter, which predicts that cross-border deals reduce bidding banks' default risk 
post-merger, more than domestic deals, is rejected. 
Other control variables such as deal size, ROA, status of a target and 
leverage, are all found to play essential roles. Initially, large deals prevent 
acquirers in realising the risk-reduction effects associated with M&As. The finding 
that deal size demonstrates an adverse influence on the change in distance to 
default, raises concerns about the risk implications of banking mega-mergers on 
banking sector stability. The importance of bank size is noted as the primary 
contributor to systematic risk (Casu et al., 2015). Besides, bidding banks with a 
higher level of profitability performance before merger observes more default risk 
reduction following the deal. These findings are consistent with the perception 
that higher profitability performance creates a more substantial buffer, providing 
improved ability to absorb adverse shocks to asset values and greater ability to 
rebound as conditions improve. For US acquirers, private targets contribute to an 
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increase in acquirers’ default risk post-merger. Mergers involved in private targets 
are projected to produce default risk-increasing effect for acquirers because 
private firms are subject to lower disclosure requirements; hence, it restricts the 
acquirers’ capabilities to evaluate the risks associated with private targets 
themselves, in addition to making acquirers’ due diligence ineffective. 
Accordingly, the acquisitions of hidden risks from target firms may contribute to 
the increase in acquirers’ default risk (Furfine & Rosen, 2011). Finally, for US 
acquirers, the more leveraged a bank is, the more likely it is that acquirers might 
witness an increase in their default risk post-merger. 
The findings from this chapter result in some policy implications for 
worldwide regulators and policymakers. First, bank M&As are activities that can 
bring default risk reduction for bidding banks. However, regulators and 
supervisors should still consider the costs and benefits of bank mergers carefully 
and impose appropriate control in order to enhance the stability of financial 
systems. On one side, mergers involving bidding banks with a higher level of 
profitability or product diversification should be encouraged as they reduce 
acquirers' default risk. On the other side, the presence of a significant and 
negative deal size effect leads to a policy implication that mega-mergers in the 
banking industry should be subject to higher regulatory scrutiny. History shows 
that large conglomerates utilise their political influence to deteriorate regulatory 
control and avoid constraints on activities (Carow & Kane, 2002) if they have a 
competitive disadvantage to their counterparts.  
Bank managers will also find this study beneficial because it assists them 
in making appropriate consolidation decisions. Specifically, they should consider 
a bank’s profitability position before deciding to merge, as it can alter their risk 
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profile. Furthermore, if a bank is subject to a high risk of default, bank managers 
can consider conducting activity-diversifying mergers in order to reduce their 
default risk, whereas, managers of high-risk banks should not involve in mega-




Chapter 6: The Effects Of M&As on Acquiring Banks’ 
Contribution To Systemic Risk 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The overall aim of this chapter is to deliver an empirical analysis regarding 
the effect of international bank M&As on acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. 
A crucial regulatory lesson gained from the 2007-09 global financial crisis has 
been the prerequisite to devote greater attention toward financial stability due to 
the systemic risk faced by banks. Dilemmas relating to portfolios of subprime 
mortgages developed into a systemic crisis, deteriorating financial firms and 
markets across the globe triggering a severe economic recession. Consequently, 
the development of improved protection against systemic risk has arisen as a 
regulatory priority, with the aim of strengthening the macroprudential orientation 
of financial stability frameworks. Sub-prime mortgage lending in the US, along 
with the 2007-09 global financial crisis, has also revived enthusiasm amongst 
academics on these issues. This has led to a generation of a wide range of 
papers focusing on systemic risk measurement and its threat to the stability of 
the banking sector (see Acharya et al., 2017; Black et al., 2016; Maria et al., 2016; 
Ellis et al., 2014). For instance, De Jonghe (2010) noticed substantial variety in 
banks' contributions to the overall stability of the banking industry. This finding is 
not surprising given the significant developments over the last three decades. 
Significant banking M&As, the abolition of the legal barriers to the unification of 
financial services, and technological advancement have all affected the 
organisational design of banking institutions. These developments result in the 
emergence of very large and complex banking firms (the TBTF) and financial 
conglomerates. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) and De Nicolo et al. (2004) argue 
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that consolidation and conglomeration activities that create giant financial firms 
are important factors, which increase systemic risk. Indeed, empirical studies that 
examine systemic risk issues related to bank or insurance M&As activities, either 
by looking at a firm's expected shortfall in an undercapitalized market or 
information on firm's stock and market index, indicate that systemic risk has 
increased in recent years. This is due to consolidation trends (Lim et al., 2015; 
Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Weiß et al., 2014). 
Extensive research about the effect of bank M&As on acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk leads to mixed findings due to using different 
samples, time frames, methodologies and the parameters employed. Before the 
financial crisis, the so-called "concentration-stability" hypothesis, which predicts 
that banking system concentration diminishes fragility, has received theoretical 
support from Diamond (1984), Allen & Gale (2000b, 2004a),  and empirically, 
from Beck et al., (2006). Based on this hypothesis, large banks with a high 
concentration are found to be less volatile because they might be more fruitful, 
easier to oversee, well diversified and, accordingly, less susceptible to market 
shocks. Promoters of this hypothesis also assert that bank M&As harmonise with 
a reduction in the bidders' default risk; hence systemic risk decreases, and the 
financial soundness of the whole banking system is enhanced. In contrast, 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) and  De Nicolo et al., (2004) defend the 
‘concentration-fragility’ hypothesis and regard bank M&As as a probable cause 
for the increase in systemic risk. This is because the hypothesis anticipates more 
volatility associated with a concentrated banking structure with several large 
corporations. These corporations might take excessive risks due to implicit TBTF 
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schemes or preferences, expected risk return trade-off (Berger, 2000; Mishkin, 
1999).  
After the global financial crisis, substantial evidence emerged with a 
significant increase in acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk as a result of 
M&A (Weiß et al., 2014). Similarly, Wagner (2010) asserts that diversification 
causes systemic crises, due to financial institutions becoming more co-
dependent as a result of similar business lines, common exposures and portfolios 
of investment following  mergers. Additionally, bank mergers may be motivated 
by regulatory incentives that aim to gain TBTF status, thus increasing the 
combined banks’ contribution to systemic risk (e.g., Berger, 2000).  
As noted in the study of Weiß et al., (2014), when their samples exclude 
mergers between bank and non-bank financial firms, such as securities firms and 
insurance firms, it leaves their analysis of probable new insights as large insurers, 
such as American International Group (A.I.G.) are at the centre of the global 
financial crisis 2007-09. Furthermore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no 
previous study has investigated the effects of bank mergers on acquiring banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk using samples containing both focusing and product-
diversifying mergers. Therefore, this chapter attempts to fill this gap. These above 
debates also serve as a motivation to investigate the effects of M&As on bidding 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Employing a global sample of 608 bank M&A 
deals from 1998 to 2015, this chapter applies two reliable, well-known and strong 
approaches Marginal Expected Shortfall from Acharya et al., (2017) and ∆CoVaR 
from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016),  to measure the contribution to the 
systemic risk of acquiring banks. Furthermore, it provides original evidence on 
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the determinants of merger-related changes in bidding banks’ contribution to 
systemic risk.  
This chapter provides three main contributions to M&As literature. First, 
the findings suggest that M&As, on average, do not impact on acquiring banks’ 
contribution to systemic risk. This result significantly contradicts  existing 
literature, which tends to find that mergers increase the bidder’s contribution to 
systemic risk (Molyneux et al., 2014; Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009). The first hypothesis of this chapter, which predicts that 
mergers generate systemic risk-reducing effect for acquiring banks, is therefore 
is rejected.   
Furthermore, this is the first study to shed light on the effects of product 
diversification on acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. Previous studies tend 
to investigate the influence of specific types of bank mergers on the bidder’s 
contribution to systemic risk, such as bank consolidation, as in Weiß et al., (2014) 
and insurance consolidation, as in Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015). By including 
mergers among banks and other non-bank institutions, such as insurance 
companies, securities, brokerages and credit institutions, this sample offers 
potentially large diversification benefits. These diversification benefits are further 
underpinned by many policy initiatives in many countries across the globe, and 
are aimed at promoting conglomerates which have substantially lowered the 
entry barriers for banks when engaging in product diversification (refer to section 
2.3, Chapter 2). This chapter hypothesises that product-diversifying mergers 
contribute more to the reduction in systemic risk than focusing on deals. This is 
due to the substantial, potential of risk diversification benefits. The results show 
that product-diversifying deals lead to a reduction in acquirers’ contribution to 
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systemic risk for non-US acquirers only. Thus, the second hypothesis of this 
chapter cannot be rejected.  
Finally, this chapter provides original evidence for the underlying factors 
that influence the changes in bidders’ contribution to systemic risk. Specifically, it 
predicts that a cash-financed merger has a more risk-increasing effect on a 
bank’s contribution to systemic risk than other payment methods. It transpires 
that with deals financed by cash only, the acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk 
increase. These results are in line with the perception that deals which are fully 
paid for in cash are expected to raise acquiring banks' default risk as acquirers 
replace safe liquid assets (cash) with riskier balance sheets of targets; thereby 
increasing acquirers' contributions to systemic risk (Furfine and Rosen, 2011). 
Hence, the third hypothesis of this chapter cannot be rejected. In addition, other 
controlled variables determining the reduction in acquirers’ contribution to 
systemic risk include a concentrated banking system (HHI) and a stable political 
environment. In contrast, the factors that contribute to the increase in systemic 
risk include private targets, a small relative deal size to acquirers’ value and TBTF 
motive. 
The remaining chapter will be organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses 
existing literature of the systemic risk implications of bank mergers, theoretically 
and empirically, paying particular attention to the concept of systemic risk, various 
models of systemic risk in the banking industry and two existing hypotheses 
regarding banking concentration and systemic risk. Section 6.3 describes various 
models that compute bidders’ contributions to systemic risk, including the two 
models used in this chapter. A detailed analysis of the results is included in 
section 6.4 followed by a conclusion and study implications in section 6.5.  
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6.2 Literature Review 
The current aim of this section is to examine the extant body of academic 
literature on systemic risk and bank M&As. The first part discusses about the 
definitions of systemic risk in addition to the financial fragility hypothesis. The 
second part reviews the different models of systemic risk in banking, followed by 
discussions of two hypotheses on bank concentration and systemic risk 
(‘concentration stability’ hypothesis and ‘concentration fragility’ hypothesis). 
Finally, a summary of the literature concerning the effects of bank M&As on 
systemic risk is presented, which at the same time sets the foundations for the 
hypotheses laid out in this chapter.  
6.2.1 The systemic risk concept 
6.2.1.1 Definitions of systemic risk 
The perception of systemic risk is fundamentally important in order to 
enhance the soundness and stability of the financial system. However, it is 
difficult to generally define systemic risk. An excellent discussion about the 
definition of systemic risk in DeBandt & Hartmann (2000, p.10) covers almost all 
definitions explicitly and implicitly. First, they define a systemic event in a narrow 
perception as an event, where the announcement of ‘bad news’ regarding a firm, 
or even its collapse, or the breakdown of financial market, results in substantial 
negative influences on one, or some, other firms or markets. for instance, their 
collapse or crash. Based on this, a systemic crisis can be defined as ‘a systemic 
event that strongly affects a considerable number of financial institutions or 
markets, thereby severely impairing the general well-functioning of an important 
part of the financial system.’ Therefore, ‘systemic risk can then be defined as the 
risk of experiencing systemic events in the strong sense.’ Fundamentally, the 
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range of systemic risk varies from single systemic events that influence only one 
firm or one market to the threat of having wide systemic events that influence 
many more firms and markets. Therefore, systemic risk's geographical extent can 
be regional, nation-wide or worldwide (DeBandt and Hartmann, 2000, p.10).   
The main component of this systemic risk' definition, the systemic event, 
comprises two significant components itself: shocks and spread mechanism. 
Based on financial theory, shocks can be idiosyncratic or systematic. 
Theoretically, idiosyncratic shocks are those that, initially, influence a single 
financial firm or the value of a single asset. For instance, the default of a single 
regional bank due to internal fraud can cause idiosyncratic shock to a financial 
system nationwide.  Systematic shocks, on the other hand, influence the entire 
economy or all financial firms simultaneously. Examples of these widespread 
shocks include an unexpected increase in the inflation rate or the crash of a stock 
market. Since investors can diversify their portfolios to protect themselves from 
idiosyncratic shocks, these shocks are insurable. In contrast, systematic shocks 
are non-diversifiable (DeBandt and Hartmann, 2000).  
The second main component of systemic events is the mechanism via 
which shocks spread from one financial firm or market to the other. This is 
regarded as the core of systemic risk concept. From a theoretical viewpoint, it is 
essential that the spread of shock is a natural part of the self-stabilising 
amendments of the market structure to a new equilibrium. Both the occurrence 
of shock, and its successive spread, are unpredictable. Therefore, the 
significance of systemic risk has two magnitudes: the harshness of systemic 
events and the probability that they occur. Systemic crises (strong systemic 
events) are low possibility incidents, which might cause researchers or regulators 
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to regard them with less concern. Nevertheless, when a systemic crisis arises, 
the costs can be incredibly enormous. 
More recently, Schwarcz (2008, p.204) attempts to encompass a number 
of existing definitions of systemic risk, defining that "the risk that (i) an economic 
shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or 
otherwise) either (x) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (y) a chain 
of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in substantial financial-
market price volatility (which price volatility may well reflect increases in the cost 
of capital or decreases in its availability)." Therefore, it is important that systemic 
risk must be differentiated from deteriorations that result from regular market 
fluctuations. Even these deteriorations are occasionally united with systemic risk; 
they are more accordingly classified as a systematic risk that is not diversifiable 
and thus, affect most market participants. Despite the fact that regulators urge 
the management of systemic risk, it is crucial not to restrain market freedom using 
methods that prevent systematic risk, since systematic risk promotes market 
equilibrium and hinders excessive interest rates or periods of inflation.  
6.2.1.2 The "financial fragility hypothesis." 
Worldwide researchers broadly agree that systemic risk has a non-linear 
domino effect that threatens the whole financial system (Ding et al., 2017). While, 
contagion might happen in other areas of the economy, its probability and 
harshness are usually considered as relatively higher within financial systems. A 
big systemic crisis in the financial system may have a strong detrimental effect 
on the health of the broad economy. Therefore, one of the most compelling 
questions regarding systemic risk, is why it is viewed as a more significant 
concern for banking institutions and the financial system compared to other 
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industries. The ‘financial fragility hypothesis’ is based on the following three inter-
related characteristics of banking and finance systems: (1) the operation of 
banks, (2) the interconnectedness of financial firms through direct exposures and 
settlement systems and (3) the intensity of information regarding financial 
contracts and related credibility issues.   
First, commercial banks conventionally take deposits which can be 
withdrawn entirely, at considerably short notice, and lent to industrial firms long-
term (Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Commonly, if the number of 
deposits is large, only small portions of assets need to be held in liquid reserves 
to meet deposit withdrawals. This portioned reserve holding can result in 
illiquidity, and even collapse, when abnormally high withdrawals occur, and long-
term loans cannot be liquidated, even though the banking firm may be solvent in 
the long term. Therefore, the well-being of a bank depends on many factors: its 
triumph in selecting profitable projects for lending, the depositors' confidence in 
the value of the loan book, and most significantly, their confidence that other 
depositors will not run the bank. Nowadays, deposit insurance schemes are 
implemented in most industrialised nations, protecting depositors. Therefore, it is 
less likely that confidence crises may arise. It is noted that this particular feature 
of banks does not apply to most other financial intermediaries, for instance, 
securities firms and insurance firms, because of different operational structures 
(see Goodhart et al., 1998). Nevertheless, in the financial conglomerate 
revolution, which allows banks and other intermediaries to operate under the 
same corporate umbrella, non-bank intermediaries’ issues may still cause a 
bank’s instability.  
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 Second, banks play a critical role in retail and wholesale payment and in 
settlement systems. Regarding the interconnectedness of financial firms, there is 
a complicated system of exposure among banking firms, and possibly other 
financial intermediaries, via the interbank money market, wholesale payments 
and security settlement systems (Folkerts-Landau, 1991). At specific times during 
business hours, these exposures can be extremely enormous; thus, if a bank fails 
to meet their payment obligations, this can result in instantaneous influence on 
the ability of other banks to meet their payment commitments. As such, several 
risk management measures are used, such as margin requirements and portfolio 
insurance in stock markets and derivatives markets, in order to reduce the 
potential for contagion within payment and settlement systems. These risk 
measurements can also account for substantial and immediate payments 
required by banks and other intermediaries.  
Finally, the third component is the information and control intensity of 
financial contracts (e.g. Stiglitz, 1993), whereby financial decisions are based on 
anticipating the future value of a respective asset or on whether the future cash 
flows expected in a financial contract are going to be met. Therefore, when 
ambiguity arises, or the credibility of a financial promise is challenged, the 
expectations of the market might change significantly within a short time, thereby 
resulting in investment and disinvestment decisions. 
These three characteristics act as the principal sources used to explain 
why the banking and finance industry are more vulnerable to systemic risk than 
other areas of the national economy. To understand the process of how systemic 
risk occurs within the banking system, the next section provides a more detailed 
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discussion regarding different bank run models and to the relationship between 
concentration and banking stability. 
6.2.2 Models of systemic risk in banking  
It has been witnessed several times in history that banks are vulnerable to 
runs without a safety net in the system because depositors lose confidence when 
uncertainty occurs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Sometimes, individual runs 
might affect other areas of the banking industry, conceivably resulting in panic 
throughout the whole sector. Although various well-developed models of 
individual runs had been seen, it was only towards the end of the 1990s that 
modern bank contagion models were developed, taking into consideration the 
systemic element. The next section begins with a survey of conventional bank 
run models, with a discussion of recent bank contagion literature within multiple 
banking systems.  
6.2.2.1 The bank run models 
The first class of individual bank run models, succeeding Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), were developed in order to capture the problems of individual 
banks' instability with portioned reserve holdings. Banks take short-term deposits 
and convert them into long-term investments, with a liquidity premium. In the 
meantime, a first-come-first-served rule is applied when depositors withdraw their 
money. A portion of depositors would like to withdraw their deposit early because 
they lose confidence in a bank’s investment portfolios, or because uncertainty 
arises within a bank’s liquidity position. A critical issue is the concern of early 
withdrawals by too many depositors, which might generate a run on the bank. 
Because of the hypothetical nature of early withdrawals in this model, bank runs 
are viewed as random phenomena.     
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For the second class of bank run models, runs are generated by new 
information announced regarding the feasibility of bank investments. For 
instance, Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) proposed that some depositors may 
be partially warned that a lower return may be yielded as a consequence of a 
high-risk investment made by the bank. Depositors may then accordingly 
withdraw their deposits (facing the first-come-first-served rule), forcing the bank 
to liquidate their assets prematurely.   
6.2.2.2 Extensions of the classical bank run models to multiple bank 
systems 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya's (1988) model, extended in DeBandt (1995), 
was applied to a multiple banking system15 in order to examine how aggregate 
and idiosyncratic shocks can influence a bank’s assets return. If depositors in a 
bank are first notified about the hardship facing their bank, depositors in other 
banks may lose confidence due to the possibility of shock, and consequently the 
return on their deposits. This generates a means for the spread of bank collapse.   
Temzelides (1997) also extends the model in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
where only a single bank was representative for the whole banking system, by 
introducing a multiple banking systems. In this model, depositors witness banking 
collapses in their area and might shift to the panic equilibrium for the next period. 
It is also observed that more concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable 
to idiosyncratic shocks and, accordingly, are less sensitive to contagious panics. 
This is consistent with the concentration stability hypothesis (discussed in section 
6.2.2.4 below).  
                                                 
15 a complex system of exposures among banking firms and other financial 
intermediaries through the interbank money market, security settlement systems 
and wholesale payment, see also 6.2.1.2 
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6.2.2.3 The modern bank contagion models 
In the bank contagion model of Allen and Gale (2000), the role of interbank 
lending is discussed, along with the emphasis on the physical exposures among 
banks in different regions and the real interconnections between regions. It is 
seen that the inter-regional contagion of bank defaults can happen, depending 
on how many liquid assets a bank in region A has access to, and on how much 
other banks in other regions have, that will be impacted if a bank in A wish to 
withdraw its interbank deposits. It is the parameter values which decide whether, 
and how much, diffusion happens. For instance, in an incomplete market where 
the lending structure is circular (region A lends to B, B to C, C to D and D back 
to A), the model proves that for specific parameter values, the unanticipated 
liquidity distress can result in the default of all banks in all regions. Furthermore, 
they assert that the system deems to be less fragile in a complete market where 
each bank has lending relationships with two other regions. 
Nevertheless, Boss et al. (2006) and Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) do 
not agree with Allen and Gale's (2000) work, arguing that the geography of the 
interbank market network alone could not suggest if a system is more or less 
stable than another. Rather, the likelihood distributions of initial liquidity shock, 
the extent of the losses incurred, and the correlation between levels of joint 
collapse, contribute to the crucial judgement of whether a financial system is 
stable or fragile. The divergence in the two models above is primarily because of 
the difference between the information analysed and the conceptual framework 
exploited.  Boss et al. (2006) did not build up the macro models related to the 
banks' individual balances to demonstrate the changes in the risk and macro 
variables factors. Whereas, Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) instead employ the 
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distribution of losses (market and credit) associated with individual banks and join 
them together to achieve a distribution of loss for the whole system. When the 
latter is obtained, they use it to measure how stable or fragile a financial scheme 
is. More recently, Ding et al. (2017) designed a banking network established from 
information on communication and credit connections through the balance sheets 
of banks, in order to measure the scheme of systemic risk. They also examine 
the dynamic mechanism of contagion for liquidity and default infection, as well as 
the determinants that influence the extent of the contagion. The findings suggest 
that the inflexibility of the banking sector increase because of asymmetric 
information interaction, which can result in a shortage of liquidity and the probable 
failure of the entire banking market. The drawback of systemic risk within the 
complex banking structure may be characterised by the partial discount element 
using illiquid assets in the information network. By improving the interlinkages of 
the information network, the spread of contagion can be partially slowed. 
In short, the complex and robust linkages among financial firms that cause 
idiosyncratic shock to individual banks, or to parts of the financial scheme, may 
transform into systemic shocks. First, banks are connected via interbank market 
and securities lending contracts, whereby each bank holds short-run deposits 
with their counterparts in the interbank money market to maintain their liquidity. 
Therefore, a bank suffering from idiosyncratic shock can lower the capability of 
that bank to pay back their short-run debt. Furthermore, it can lower the market 
value of the underlying interbank deposits held by that bank because they must 
liquidate the interbank deposits prematurely. The short-run wholesale funding 
market, thereby, produces a strong channel of systemic contagion that spreads 
negative shocks (see also López-espinosa et al., 2015).  
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6.2.2.4 “Concentration stability” and “concentration fragility” views 
The major concerns regarding very large bank failures, their effects on 
financial markets and the broad economy in light of the global financial crisis 
2007-09, are strengthened by theoretical debates and inconclusive empirical 
evidence regarding the connection between the banking structure and stability. 
The concentration stability view hypothesises that a more concentrated banking 
system is more stable, whereas the concentration fragility hypothesis supports 
the opposite view. With respect to concentration stability hypothesis, a theoretical 
inspiration for this view is demonstrated by Allen and Gale (2000, 2004), who 
suggest that in a concentrated-banking scheme, larger and monopolistic banking 
firms might increase profit and thus, produce higher capital buffers that can act 
as a cushion to safeguard them against external macroeconomic and liquidity 
shocks (see also Boyd et al., 2004). Second, larger banks have a tendency to 
undertake credit rationing16 because more qualitative credit investments can 
raise the income of the individual investment and thus promote financial stability 
(Boot and Thakor, 2000). Furthermore, those larger banks are deemed to have 
comparative advantages in providing credit monitoring services, perhaps due to 
the possession of localised informational advantages or to the bank serving 
borrowers' transaction account. Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2000) asserted that 
a more concentrated banking system with fewer larger banks might be easier to 
oversee. Therefore, the regulation and supervision of banking firms can be more 
effective, and the risk of contagion for the entire system should diminish.  
                                                 
16 Credit rationing refers to any situation in which lenders are not willing to provide 





Empirical evidence by Beck et al. (2006), and more recently Beck et al. 
(2013), confirm this concentration stability hypothesis by establishing that bank 
concentration at a national level tends to lower the probability that a country will 
experience a systemic crisis within their banking sector. This is because 
increased competition, which lowers banks’ pricing power, increases a bank’s 
risk-taking behaviour and is hence detrimental to financial stability. These 
findings hold firmly when controlling for various factors, such as regulation, 
employing different definitions of concentration and crises, along with breaking 
down various sub-samples of countries. Similarly, Berger et al. (2009) assert that 
the higher level of concentration caused by the 2007-09 global financial crisis, 
might lead to riskier loan portfolios. However, banks are more likely to hold higher 
capital buffers or to use other mechanisms in order to reduce risks associated 
with their portfolios. Therefore, the results are consistent with the traditional 
concentration stability view.  
Overall, in a more concentrated banking sector, few market participants 
are seen to hold higher capital buffers against external shocks, there is a higher 
return via credit rationing, and it is easier to monitor. These advantages can result 
in improved financial stability for each banking firm and indeed, for the entire 
banking system.  
Regarding the concentration fragility hypothesis, the first argument is that 
in a concentrated banking system, fewer large banks are likely to obtain a 
government's safety net or subsidies. The presence of these public guarantees 
can also result in moral hazard problems that stimulates the larger banks' 
managers to engage in high-risk investments which, in turn, may destabilise the 
whole banking system (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009 ). Indeed, Weiß et al., (2014) 
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examine several financial crises, including Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Long-
Term Capital Management (1998), Dotcom crash (2000), subprime crisis and the 
default of Lehman Brothers (2008) in order to study the determinants of systemic 
risk across the globe. Empirical evidence suggests that the chief determinant of 
systemic risk worldwide is attributed to the regulatory system; for instance, 
government-owned banks and explicit deposit insurance schemes. In addition, 
Caminal and Matutes (2002) assert that higher loan interest rates provided by 
monopolistic banks might urge borrowers to take excessive risks in investment to 
counterbalance the greater repayments. Consequently, the probability of 
borrowers’ default on their loans may increase, thereby generating a higher 
chance of bank collapses. Finally, bank size is blamed as a determinant for 
exposing banks to systemic risk within a concentrated banking system. This is 
because bank size is positively connected with organisational and procedural 
complexity (Beck et al., 2006). Increasing bank size permits banks to enlarge 
across numerous markets geographically, and in different lines of business in 
addition to employing complicated financial instruments; thereby resulting in 
reduced transparency. Indeed, Huang et al., (2012) explore systemic risk within 
a different financial structure from the eight nations in Asia and the Pacific, 
regarding bank size as a determinant for exposing banks to the slight increase of 
systemic risk. In the most recent study by Laeven et al. (2016), systemic risk is 
found to increase with bank size and this effect exists above and beyond the 
effect of bank size on standalone bank risk. 
Empirical studies on the connection between financial fragility and banking 
market concentration are intensive. Initially, De Nicolo et al. (2004) highlight the 
positive connection between banking sector vulnerability and market 
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concentration, employing the Z-core methodology in their sample of the 500 
largest banks and financial corporations globally in 90 countries. More 
specifically, larger and conglomerate corporations did not obtain substantially 
higher levels of profitability than smaller, more specialised companies. 
Furthermore, larger giant corporations with a broader range of financial activities 
were more leveraged and did not obtain lower return volatility compared with 
smaller and more specialised companies. Therefore, it proposes that the 
determinants creating the motivation for banks to take on more risk tend to 
outweigh the risk reductions expected from geographic and product 
diversification. Further empirical evidence by Schaeck et al. (2009) and Schaeck 
and Cihak (2012) also shows that more competitive banking systems are less 
exposed to systemic crises. These results indicate that banking supervisors and 
regulators should develop policies that enhance competition among banks to 
increase the stability of the whole financial system.   
In conclusion, a banking sector with a high degree of concentration often 
leads to moral hazard problems, organisational and procedural complexity and 
contagion, due to high interconnectedness among banks. All these factors may 
have a destabilising effect on the entire banking system.  
6.2.3 The effects of bank M&As on systemic risk 
In the previous section, the two opposing views on the relationship 
between concentration as a state of the system and financial stability have been 
discussed in general. Hence, this section aims to present, more specifically, all 
theoretical and empirical evidence to date regarding the effects of bank M&As on 
systemic risk.  
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M&As are one of the most distinguished characteristics of the modern 
financial landscape. The formation of various large and complex financial firms 
has caused regulatory concerns, as well as the revision of banking regulations 
and supervision. This is due to the level of systemic risk within the banking system 
which may have increased unexpectedly. The first question to consider is 
whether bank consolidation activity and systemic risk are related. De Nicolo and 
Kwast (2002) address this question by first studying financial firm inter-
dependencies, as measured by the correlation of stock returns, presented as an 
indicator of systemic risk potential for a sample of large and complex banking 
institutions in the U.S. between 1988 and 1999. They found a significant positive 
trend in stock return correlations, which suggests that the systemic risk potential 
in the banking sector seems to have increased during the period of study. 
Additionally, they link firms’ return correlations to their M&A activities by 
computing measures of the consolidation elasticity of correlation. The results 
revealed that M&A activities within the same sample has had a positive effect on 
the degree of inter-dependency. Furthermore, this effect appears to be stronger 
among different institutions. This means that bank consolidation is one of the 
critical factors associated with systemic risk. 
Moving onto the effect of bank mergers on systemic risk, on the one hand, 
it is generally believed that M&As broaden the scope of diversification in 
individual firms. Thus, M&As reduce each institution's idiosyncratic risk, which 
results in a reduction of the probability of default for individual firms and promotes 
financial soundness (De Nicolo and Kwast, 2002). Besides these advantages of 
functional diversification, Méon and Weill  (2005) argue that large banks, 
undertaking cross-border M&As, may gain more scale and scope economies via 
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the geographical diversification of risk. Furthermore, M&A activities causes banks 
to gain more market power, thereby increasing their franchise value. As franchise 
value presents intangible assets that will only be secured if banking firms stay in 
business. These banks experience high opportunity costs when they fail, thereby 
becoming more hesitant in conducting risky transactions. Moreover, these banks 
have a tendency to hold more capital, have less risky portfolios and initiate 
smaller loan portfolios (Berger et al., 2009). By behaving more prudently, banks 
reduce their chance of difficulties and hence increase the stability of the whole 
banking system. Finally, by merging with many targets, an acquirer can become 
significantly larger, possess a more complex business model and thus become 
increasingly interconnected with a more substantial number of counterparts in the 
banking system. Accordingly, banks have better coordination and higher 
motivation to provide liquidity to other troubled banks, hence lowering the risk of 
financial contagion within interbank markets and enhancing banking stability (see 
Allen and Gale, 2000). 
Empirical evidence from Berger et al. (2009) suggests that banks are more 
likely to hold higher capital buffers or to use other mechanisms to reduce risks in 
order to possess safer portfolios; thereby implying that bank M&As may produce 
safer banks overall. Chu (2015) investigates bank mergers and stability in 
Canada from the early period between 1867 and 1935, supporting the 
concentration-stability view. By employing numerous empirical methodology and 
procedures, they show that only one out of 27 bankruptcies during this period 
was the acquirer, while other acquiring banks grew significantly in market share 
and size. More specifically, geographic diversification is one of the leading factors 
that reducing risk for a bank and contributing to banking stability, as two-thirds of 
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33 consolidations were cross-province deals. Furthermore, other institutional 
factors, such as: barriers to entry produced by the legal requirements for banks' 
paid-up capital, the double-liability provision of bank shareholders and the 
absence of both central bank and an explicit deposit insurance scheme, are all 
factors that enhance the stability of the banking system. These determinants all 
operate collectively in order to encourage banks to protect their charter values by 
restricting them from excessive risk-taking, although how they interact and 
ensure banking stability still requires future research. The author, therefore, sees 
the merger waves in Canada as the emergence of a highly concentrated, but 
stable banking system. 
Conversely, bank M&As are one of the critical causes of an increase in 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, which is defended by a number of recent 
empirical studies (see, e.g., Campa and Hernando, 2008; Kane, 2000; Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009; Weiß et al., 2014). The first argument in support of this view 
is that a bank may pursue M&As to become TBTF and thereby, it is often more 
likely to obtain a government's safety net or subsidies. As discussed in the 
previous section, moral hazard problems may arise, which stimulate larger banks' 
managers to engage in high-risk investments which, in turn, may destabilise the 
whole banking system (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). Next, Cetorelli et al. (2007) 
point out that larger banks, via M&As with a higher level of diversification, might 
lead to lower managerial efficiency, less effective internal company monitoring 
and higher control problems concerning the customer base and increasing 
operational risk. These managerial failures may increase the likelihood of an 
individual bank’s collapse in addition to increasing the contribution to the systemic 
risk of acquirers. Under cross-border bank mergers, these problems are even 
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more severe, especially when it involves regulatory arbitrage. Banking firms can 
relocate their activities geographically, thereby shifting their poorly controlled risk 
to the taxpayers in other nations, which can destabilise the entire banking system 
(Weiß et al., 2014).  
Empirical studies looking into international bank mergers tend to confirm 
the increase of systemic risk as a result of bank mergers. To begin with, Weiß et 
al. (2014) find that bank M&As increase bidders’ contributions to systemic risk in 
their sample between 1991 and 2009. They support their hypotheses that the 
existence of banks owned by governments, the explicit deposit insurance, as well 
as the hubris of bank managements, are the primary determinants for the 
destabilising effect of bank M&As on the financial industry. Empirical evidence 
from European samples report the same consensus. Uhde and Heimeshoff 
(2009) study the consolidated balance sheet data over the EU-25 between 1997 
and 2005 in order to investigate the relationship between consolidation within 
banking and financial stability in Europe. The results show that consolidation 
poses an adverse effect on European financial stability, as estimated by the Z-
score method, while controlling for bank-specific, regulatory, institutional and 
macroeconomic factors. The negative connection between consolidation and 
stability is driven by the higher return volatility of larger banks in concentrated 
markets. Molyneux et al., (2014), on the other hand, study the systemic risk 
implications of banking institutions that are considered TBTF to capture safety 
net subsidy effects and evaluate their impact on systemic risk. Employing a 
sample of European bank mergers in 9 countries from 1997 to 2007, they reveal 
that safety net advantages obtained from merger activity have a significantly 
positive connection with governmental rescue probability, implying moral hazards 
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within banking systems. Besides this, substantial evidence is obtained confirming 
that merger premiums are paid to achieve safety net subsidies that have 
detrimental systemic risk implications. Lastly, they estimate traditional measures 
of systemic risk by investigating the connection between safety net subsidy 
effects and interdependency between TBTF banks post-merger. Unexpectedly, 
no significant connection has been found. This indicates that safety net subsidies 
are not associated with stock price return correlations for TBTF banks. This 
finding casts doubt on the competency of using stock-return correlations as an 
appropriate indicator of systemic risk within the banking industry. Furthermore, 
cross-border M&As within the EU may also complicate issues further, as 
uncertainties regarding the jurisdiction of national safety net arrangements and 
coordination problems between regulators may arise (Hagendorff et al., 2012). 
In conclusion, as economic theory and empirical evidence are inconclusive 
regarding the impact of bank mergers on banking stability, it motivates this 
chapter to contribute to the debates and offer relevant, up-to-date advice to 
banking regulators and supervisors regarding the implications of bank M&As on 
the stability of the whole banking system. 
6.2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Given the debate regarding the effects of M&As on systemic risk, this 
section develops hypotheses on whether bank mergers affect acquiring banks' 
contribution to systemic risk, and on which deal characteristics influence the level 
of contribution to systemic risk within banks. 
In Chapter 5 of this study, substantial evidence was found regarding the 
vital role of bank mergers in reducing bidding banks' default risk. The default risk-
reducing effects are widespread among merger deals as 65.3% of deals 
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experience default risk reduction as a result of M&As. The reduction of individual 
bank default risk can lead to the stability of the whole banking system and reduce 
banks' contribution to systemic risk. The reason for this is related to contagion. 
The complex and robust links between financial firms can cause individual banks’ 
failures to possibly transform into systemic shocks (for a more detailed 
discussion, see section 6.2.2.3). Indeed, empirical evidence from Fiordelisi and 
Marqués-Ibañez (2013) suggests that for listed banks, individual default risk 
contributes to increasing the systemic banking risk. Therefore, by reducing each 
bank's default risk through M&As, the systemic banking stability is enhanced. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis of this study is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 6.1 Mergers and acquisitions reduce acquiring banks’ contribution 
to systemic risk.  
Next, it is examined whether product diversification plays a role in the 
changes of acquiring banks' contribution to systemic risk post-merger. The 
potential for risk-reducing in mergers is specifically noticeable for product-
diversifying acquisitions, because this type of merger has the potential to 
significantly reduce the volatility of the profitability levels of bidding banks 
(Estrella, 2001; Boyd et al., 1993); it can achieve economies of scale and scope 
as well as employ costly and sophisticated risk management instruments in order 
to minimise their risk (Schaeck and Cihak, 2012). In addition, large 
conglomerates can conveniently invest in state-of-the-art technology as well as 
employ the best personnel and specialists; thereby minimising the risk that 
emerges from non-interest income activities, which may result in the reduction of 
banks’ failures and reduce a bank’s contribution to systemic risk (Köhler, 2014). 
Evidence from Chapter 5 also suggests that product diversification plays an 
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important role in reducing acquirers’ default risk. Taken all of this into 
consideration, the second hypothesis will follow accordingly. 
Hypothesis 6.2 Product-diversifying mergers can bring more systemic risk-
reducing effects for acquiring banks post-merger rather than in focusing deals. 
 The next hypothesis is about the method of payment for the merger. First, 
Furfine & Rosen (2011) propose that deals which are fully paid for in cash are 
expected to raise acquiring banks' default risk, as acquirers are replacing safe 
liquid assets (cash) with a riskier balance sheet of the target bank; therefore 
increasing a bank’s contribution to systemic risk. This is because the weaknesses 
in a portfolio of one bank can lead to the weaknesses of other banks' portfolios, 
due to the interbank market and the interconnected nature of banking firms. 
Therefore, high default risk is expected to contribute to an increased systemic 
risk. Second, from the bondholders’ viewpoint, the employment of cash as a 
means of exchange in cross-border bank consolidations is expected to diminish 
the liquidity of bank, which consequently raises a bank’s risk; this is indicated in 
a bank’s higher yield spread post-merger (Choi et al., 2010). Finally, cash 
payments in bank mergers are usually related to severe changes in the target 
bank's management (Dutta et al., 2013), which could be damaging to the 
integration process, thus raising the risk of the combined banks. Hence, it is 
hypothesised that deals financed by cash only will have a risk-increasing effect 
on systemic risk. 
Hypothesis 6.3 Cash-only payment has a higher risk-increasing effect on banks' 
contribution to systemic risk than other payment methods.  
To test these hypotheses, the next part proposes methodologies to 
measure the changes in acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk after 
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mergers alongside the determinants of the merger-related changes in acquirers’ 




6.3 Research Methodology 
The overall objective of this section is to discuss and justify two systemic 
risk measurement methodologies used in this chapter to test the above three 
hypotheses. Moreover, it proposes the model of the determinants of merger-
related changes in acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. Unlike other types of 
risk that banking firms face, systemic risk is much more noticeable for its effects 
rather than its causes. These features make it challenging to explain systemic 
risk distinctly. However, systemic risk can be recognised more easily when it 
appears. In other words, systemic risk is easier to measure ex post than ex ante. 
Researchers worldwide have attempted to measure, and to find, instruments to 
reduce it. Therefore, this section begins with a general discussion on different 
systemic risk measurement models proposed in the literature, followed by a 
detailed description of the concept, functions and estimation methods of the two 
models employed in this chapter.  
6.3.1 Systemic risk measurement models 
There are a comparable range of measurements and methodologies that 
focus on the different features of systemic risk. However, for categorising and 
examining them, it is suggested that there are two ways of measuring a bank's 
contribution to systemic risk. The first approach, or the Supervisory Approach, 
counts on firm-specific information, such as size, leverage, liquidity, 
interconnectedness, complexity and substitutability. This approach utilises data 
that banking firms provide to the regulators and policymakers who are solely 
responsible for enhancing financial stability every day. However, regulators and 
banking supervisors are obliged to keep this specific data confidential. For that 
reason, the most useful measures of systemic risk may be the ones that have yet 
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to be tested, as they involve private data that only banking supervisors and 
regulators can attain. Because such data is not made accessible to most 
academics, researchers must rely on the second approach with publicly available 
market data, for instance, stock returns, credit swap spreads (CDS) or option 
prices, as these can efficiently summarise all available information about the 
company. Among various examples of systemic risk measurements in the 
literature, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below demonstrate several well-known, regularly 
employed and strong systemic measures of a firm’s contribution to systemic risk 
regarding their methodology, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. A 
more detailed discussion regarding other significant systemic risk measurements 
in the literature as well as their merits and shortcomings can be found in Appendix 
F. 












































































































































Table 17: Systemic Risk Measurement Models (Advantages and 
Disadvantages) 
 Advantages Shortcomings 
1. MES 
Model 
 easy to calculate and 
implement as relied on 
observable market data and 
statistical techniques 
 can be used as a fundamental 
for a systemic tax because a 
measurement of MES is logically 
consistent, expressed in natural 
units 
 a good predictor of a firm’s 
contribution to systemic risk 
 this measure scales naturally 
with the size of the firm and is 
additive for mergers 
 
 does not capture the true tails 
of the return distribution as it 
is computed from the 
moderately bad days of the 
market and not the worst 
performance of the market 
during an actual financial 
crisis. 
 the data for this method is 
based on share returns only 
and exclude reference to a 
bank's size or its capital 
capacity which are 
considered as essential 







 the stress testing can be 
updated regularly  
 robust and additional 
forecasting ability in anticipating 
the changes in correlations of 
asset return, in relation to term 
structure variables and equity 
market 
 strong power to identify 
systemic important financial 
institutions 
 analyses the influence of 
general market changes on the 
  the accuracy of the model 
reduces when systemic 
losses are not sufficiently 
presented in the historical 
statistics. 
 is not a very useful early 
warning indicator of systemic 
risk because it 
underestimates systemic risk 
during a period of market 




performance of each bank, and 
simultaneously integrate the 
feedback effect from the banking 





 emphasize the contribution of 
each firm to overall system risk 
 general enough to study the 
risk spillovers from banks to 
banks throughout the entire 
financial system 
 have out-of-sample predictive 
power for realised correlation in 
tail events, so can oversee the 
build-up of systemic risk in a 
forward-looking mode and 
potentially be used in macro-
prudential policy applications 
 reduces the effect of the 
arbitrary selection of a single 
level of confidence on expected 
losses 
 
  provide individual measures 
that do not sum up to the total 
risk measure 
  is over-susceptible to 
estimation errors than VaR; to 
be precise, the accuracy of 
CoVaR relies broadly upon 
the tail modelling accuracy 
  unable to backtest the 
CoVaR model because the 
expected shortfall predictions 
cannot be validated via 








 capture interdependence and 
joint risk of distress in 
systemically important banks 
 provide early signal than 
conventional methods in the 
literature and other market-
based approaches. 
 provide at the same time 
signals that are long-run 
informative, undisturbed. Also, 
swift and accurate reaction to 
market shocks. 
 incorporate extra information 
via option prices regarding tail 
risk and correlation breaks 
 
 does not incorporate 
skewness and kurtosis, and 
stochastic volatility, which can 
account for implied volatility 
smiles of equity prices. 
 the presented valuation 
model is subject to varying 
degrees of estimation 
uncertainty and parametric 
assumptions, which need to 
be considered when drawing 
policy conclusions 
 could fail to capture some 
relevant economics that is 
needed to understand default 
risk fully, and, thus, could 





 delivers useful rankings of 
systemically risky firms at 
various stages of the financial 
crisis 
 a significant predictor of the 
capital injections performed by 
the Fed during the crisis 
 the constant liabilities of the 
bank around the crisis time is 
presumed 
 fails to measure the 
marginal contribution of a 
bank to simultaneous 
changes of both the 
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 the predictive ability of 
aggregate SRISK is stronger 
over longer horizons 
 
harshness of systemic risk 
and the dependence system 
over any combination of 
sample banks for any degree 
of statistical confidence and at 
any point in time because it 
does not employ multivariate 
density estimation does not 
employ multivariate density 
estimation 
 
For the purpose of this study, MES and ∆CoVaR are the best models to 
measure acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. Indeed, various empirical 
studies have shown that both models are reliable, well-known and strong 
predictors of a firm's contribution to systemic risk (in contrast to the Distressed 
Insurance Premium Model). On the one hand, what makes MES particularly 
suitable for this study is that it scales consistently with the size of the bank and is 
additive for M&As. Moreover, it is seen to be easy for banking regulators to 
compute, and is usable as a basis for a systemic tax (Acharya et al., 2017). On 
the other hand, ∆CoVaR can capture the contribution of each bank to overall 
systemic risk, whereas other traditional risk measures such as the SRISK model 
fail to compute the marginal contribution of a firm to systemic risk. Furthermore, 
∆CoVaR has the power to oversee the build-up of systemic risk in a forward-
looking mode that can potentially be used in macro-prudential policy applications. 
In this instance, ∆CoVaR outweighs the Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP) 
model in the sense that the DIP model depends on various degrees of parametric 
assumptions and assessment uncertainty, thereby limiting reliability when making 
important regulatory and political decisions based on the DIP model.   
           Using both models can enhance the robustness of the results and can 
overcome the weaknesses of relying on the outcomes using only one model. 
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Moreover, both models complement each other’s weaknesses as they are 
conceptually distinct. To be precise, the ∆CoVaR model investigates the system's 
stress, based on an individual bank's distress, meanwhile the MES model studies 
a bank's distress based on systemic stress. In the event of ranking individual 
banks' systemic risk, MES has the advantage in that the conditioning set (i.e. the 
presence of a financial crisis) is set constant for all banks, whereas, it is 
contrasting with ∆CoVaR (i.e. the conditioning set differs cross-sectionally based 
on a particular bank's stress) (Acharya et al., 2017). Still, these measures are 
likely to be refined and improved going forward, whilst other measures are still 
being developed. The methodology and estimation method of each model will be 
discussed in the next section.  
6.3.2 Marginal Expected Shortfall 
6.3.2.1. MES concept 
Acharya et al., (2017) assert that each banking firm's contribution to 
systemic risk can be calculated by its systemic expected shortfall (SES), i.e., its 
tendency to be undercapitalised when the entire system is undercapitalised. SES 
is a model built under a specific theoretical framework including three measures 
to proxy it: (1) the result of stress tests performed by regulators, (2) the reduction 
in equity valuations of large financial corporations during crisis and (3) the 
widening of the credit default swap spreads of large financial corporations. Given 
these proxies, the authors produce key indicators, which project a firm's SES. 
These main indicators are marginal expected shortfall (MES) and leverage. The 
first advantage of this method is that MES is an explicit economic model where 
systemic risk measurement relies on observable market data and statistical 
techniques; therefore, it is simple to calculate and easy for banking supervisors 
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to implement. Second, MES and leverage are good predictors of a firm’s 
contribution to a systemic crisis, unlike other standard measures of firm-level 
risks, such as VaR or volatility with no explanatory power or beta with modest 
explanatory power. Third, being model-based enhances the logical consistency 
of the measurement of MES and SES. Finally, this measures scales naturally with 
the size of the firm and is additive concerning mergers and spinoffs. These 
properties do not hold within many of the reduced form approaches. 
It should be noted, however, that the definition and estimation of the MES 
do not capture the true tails of the return distribution as it is computed from the 
moderately bad days of the market and not from the worst performance of the 
market during a true financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2017). Moreover, the data for 
this method is based on share returns only and excludes reference to a bank’s 
size or its capital capacity, which are considered important elements of systemic 
risk (Kupiec and Guntay, 2016). 
6.3.2.2 MES functions 
The SES and MES methods are used to identify systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs)17. Considering a financial system composed of n 
institutions, the financial system's global return (market return) is well-defined as 
the value-weighted average of all bank returns. 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  (6.1) 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 denotes the aggregate return of the financial system on day t 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the corresponding return of firm i on day t 
                                                 
17 The Financial Stability Board (2010) defines Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions as financial institutions ‘whose disorderly failure, because of their size, 
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption 
to the wider financial system and economic activity.’ 
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𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the weight of the ith firm in the financial system on day t 
These weights are measured by the comparative market capitalisation of 
the financial firms. Let us presume that the financial system’s cumulative risk is 
estimated by the conditional Expected Shortfall (ES). The ES is the expected 
market loss, based on the return being lower than the 𝛼𝛼 quantile, i.e. the VaR. 
Furthermore, it could be expanded to a more common case, where a threshold 
C defines the distress event. The conditional ES (with regards to past information) 
on day t is formally given by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = −𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) (6.2) 
Given the ES of the whole financial system, MES represents the marginal 
contribution of each firm to the risk of the financial system. It corresponds to the 
change in  ES𝑚𝑚 engendered by an rise in the weight of the ith firm within the 
financial system (see Appendix D.1 for the derivation of this expression) 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) =  𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶)𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) (6.3) 
A bivariate GARCH model is considered for the demeaned return processes, 
which corresponds to a simple market model (CAPM) with time-varying 
conditional betas  
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡1/2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 (6.4) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = (𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ′denotes the vector of market and firm returns and where the 
random vector 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = (𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )′ is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
shocks with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 matrix denotes the 
time-varying conditional variance-covariance matrix: 




where 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 denote the conditional standard deviations for the firm and the 
system 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 the time-varying conditional correlation.  
No particular assumptions are made regarding the bivariate distribution of the 
standardised innovations 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡, which is assumed to be unknown. It is only assumed 
that the time-varying conditional correlations 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 fully capture the dependence 
between firm and market returns. Formally, this assumption implies that the 
standardised innovations 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are independently distributed at time t.  
It is given that Equations (6.4) and (6.5), the MES can be expressed as a 
function of the firm's return volatility, its correlation with the market return, and the 
comovement of the tail of the distribution (See Appendix D.2 for the derivation of 
this expression): 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) =  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� +  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� (6.6) 
Therefore, MES is a non-linear combination of four elements: volatility, 
correlation, tails expectations and the weight of the firm. 
6.3.2.3 Estimation method 
To compute the MES for each financial institution, the estimation method 
of Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2015) will be implemented and the model defined 
in Equations (6.4) and (6.5) will be used. The steps followed in developing the 
model are listed below. 
Step 1: Also, conditional volatilities and standardised residuals for the 
market and each institution are obtained by modelling volatilities in a GJR- 
GARCH(1,1) framework (Glosten et al., 1993). The GJR- GARCH model 
equations for the volatility dynamics are: 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡




2 = ω𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚 + α𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−12 + γ𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−12 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1− + β𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑚𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−12  (6.8) 
With 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡− = 1 if {𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 0} and 𝐼𝐼𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡− = 1 if {𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 0} 
The time-varying correlations of each couple ‘market-firm’ are modelled 




� = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = � 1 ρ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ρ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 1 � = diag (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)−1/2𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 diag (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)−1/2 (6.9) 
In which χ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/σ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
χ𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡/σ𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the pseudo correlation matrix.  
The DCC model then indicate the dynamics of the pseudo-correlation 
matrix 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 as 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = �1 − α𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − β𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 + α𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 � χ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1χ𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1� � χ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1χ𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1�′ + β𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (6.10) 
Where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is the unconditional correlation matrix of the company and 
market-adjusted returns. The parameters from this model are estimated by Quasi 
Maximum Likelihood (QML). It is because it produces reliable and asymptotically 
customary estimators under minor uniformity conditions; and does not make any 
distributional assumptions regarding the innovations process. More broad details 
on this modelling approach and estimation are specified in Engle (2009).  
Step 2: Based on the i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed) 
property of the innovations, the next step proceeds to a non-parametric kernel 
estimation of the tail expectations 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� and 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� 
along the lines of (Scaillet, 2005): 
𝔼𝔼�𝑡𝑡−1(𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
∑ ∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
ℎ
)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  (6.11) 
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𝔼𝔼�𝑡𝑡−1(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∑ 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
∑ ∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
ℎ
)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  (6.12) 
 
where 𝑘𝑘 = 𝐶𝐶 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�  is the threshold 
 ∅(. ) representing the normal c.d.f. (Gaussian Kernel function) 
h is the bandwidth.  
In the empirical application, C is set to VaR (5%) of the system as in Scaillet 
(2005). For formal proof, see Appendix D.3.  
Step 3. the volatilities and correlations obtained in step 1 and tail 
expectations gained from step 2 will be applied back to equation (6.6) to calculate 
the Marginal Expected Shortfall of institution i at each day t. 
In this empirical study, a test is run to check whether the differences 
between the banks' post-merger and pre-merger marginal expected shortfalls 
are, on average, different from zero. Day t is defined as belonging to the pre-
merger period if it falls into the interval [–180; -11] relative to the merger 
announcement. Similarly, day t is considered to belong to the post-merger period 
if it falls into the interval [+11; +180] relative to the merger completion. To assess 
the proposition that the mean of the changes in the acquirers' MES are different 
from zero, a standard t-test is employed, using 5% as the risk level of the VaR. 
∆𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
5% = 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖;[+11;+180]5% − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖;[−11;−180]5%  (6.13) 
6.3.3 Conditional Value at Risk 
6.3.3.1 ∆CoVaR concept 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) advise measuring systemic risk via the 
conditional value-at-risk (∆CoVaR) of the financial system, conditional on 
institutions being in a state of distress. A firm’s contribution to systemic risk is 
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defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the firm being in distress and 
the CoVaR in the median state of the firm. The ∆CoVaR systemic risk measure 
can recognise the risk on the system by individually “systemically important” 
firms, which are so interconnected and large that they can cause negative risk 
spillover effects on others, as well as by smaller firms that are “systemic” when 
operating as part of a group. Moreover, ∆CoVaR is a measure that does not 
depend on contemporaneous price movements, and hence, can be used to 
predict systemic risk. The ∆CoVaR measure captures institutional externalities 
such as ‘too big to fail,’ “too interconnected to fail’ and crowded trade positions.  
There are several advantages associated with ∆CoVaR as a measure. 
First, while ∆CoVaR emphasises the contribution of each firm to overall system 
risk, conventional risk measures rely on the risk of individual firms. Banking 
regulations and policies based on the risk of firms in segregation may result in 
excessive risk-taking along with systemic risk measurements. Another benefit of 
this co-risk measure is that it is general enough to study the risk spillovers from 
bank to bank throughout the entire financial system. Furthermore, Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) establish that the ‘forward-∆CoVaRs’ have out-of-sample 
predictive power for realised correlation in tail events. The forward-∆CoVaR can 
be utilised to oversee the build-up of systemic risk in a forward-looking mode. 
This forward-looking measure can potentially be used in macro-prudential policy 
applications. Finally, it reduces the effect of the arbitrary selection of a single level 
of confidence on expected losses (Sum, 2016).  
 Nevertheless, a notable disadvantage of ∆CoVaR is that individual 
measures do not sum up the total risk measure (Li, 2015). In addition, it is more 
susceptible to estimation errors than VaR; to be precise, the accuracy of ∆CoVaR 
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relies broadly upon the tail modelling’s accuracy. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
backtest the ∆CoVaR model due to its expected shortfall concept. This is 
because the expected shortfall predictions cannot be validated via comparison 
with historical statistics (Sum, 2016). 
 6.3.3.2 ∆CoVaR functions 
This measure is based on the concept of Value-at-Risk, denoted VaR(α), 
which is the maximum loss within the α%-confidence interval (see Jorion, 2007). 
Here, the CoVaR corresponds to the VaR of the market return obtained 
conditionally on some event ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) observed for firm i. 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚|ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)�ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)� = α (6.14) 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 denotes the aggregate return of the financial system on day t 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the corresponding return of firm i. 
α is the confidence interval (%) 
threshold ℂ is the distress event 
The ∆CoVaR of firm i is then defined as the difference between the VaR 
of the financial system, based on this particular firm being in financial distress 
and the VaR of the financial system conditional on firm i being in its median state. 
To define the distress of a financial institution (a condition when a bank could not 
meet, or has difficulty paying back its financial obligations to its creditors, 
(normally due to illiquid assets or high fixed costs), various definitions of ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 
can be considered. 
A more general approach would consist of defining the financial distress of firm i 




∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡≤𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) - 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) (6.15) 
In this theoretical framework, it is also possible to express ∆CoVaR, 
defined for a conditioning event ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α), as a function of the 
conditional correlations, volatilities, and VaR. Given Equations (6.14) and (6.15), 
the following result is obtained (see Appendix E.1 for the derivation of this 
expression): 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) =𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡[𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) - 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(0.5)] (6.16) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡= 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and the risk level of the VaR, α=0.05. If the marginal 
distribution of the returns is symmetric around zero, ∆CoVaR is strictly 
proportional to VaR: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) =𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) (6.17) 
6.3.3.3 Estimation method 
The multivariate GARCH estimation of ∆CoVaR will be performed based 
on the following three-step procedure: 
Step 1: First, VaR of each institution i is computed by estimating the 
following univariate model: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = µ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (6.18), 
where µ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ω0 + ω1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ν𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 where ν𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of independently 
and identically distributed (i.i.d) shock with zero mean and unit variance and 
where the conditional variance has the standard GARCH (1,1) specification 
𝜎𝜎 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 (6.19) 
Given a distributional assumption for ν and, hence, the q-quantile of the 




Step 2: for each institution i, a bivariate GARCH model is estimated with 
Engle (2001) DCC specification for the returns of institution i and the financial 
system:  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = (𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)′ whose joint dynamics is given by 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = µ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (6.20) 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡1/2𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 (6.21) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
1/2 is the (2 x 2) conditional covariance matrix of the error term 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
and µ𝑡𝑡 is the (2 x 1) vector of conditional means. The standardised innovation 
vector 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−12(𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − µ𝑡𝑡) is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) with 
𝐸𝐸(𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡) = 0 and 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼2. Also, for each deal, the market used is the country’s 
market of acquiring bank.  
 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is defined to be the (2 x 2) diagonal matrix with the conditional variances 
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
2  and 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2  along the diagonal so that {𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚}𝑡𝑡 = {𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚}𝑡𝑡, {𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}𝑡𝑡 = {𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}𝑡𝑡 and {𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖}𝑡𝑡 = 0. The conditional variances are modelled as GARCH (1,1) 
𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2 = φ0𝑚𝑚 + φ1𝑚𝑚𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−12 + φ2𝑚𝑚𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−12 (6.22) 
𝜎𝜎 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 = φ0𝑖𝑖 + φ1𝑖𝑖 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 + φ2𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−12 (6.23) 
and the conditional covariance 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is  
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝜎𝜎 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡2 𝜎𝜎 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2   (6.24) 
Let 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1/2𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1/2 = {𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖}𝑡𝑡  be the (2 x 2) matrix of conditional correlations 
of 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡. Following Engle (2001) the conditional correlation matrix will be as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡)−1/2 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡)−1/2(6.25) 
𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿1 − 𝛿𝛿2)𝑄𝑄� + 𝛿𝛿1(λ𝑡𝑡−1λ𝑡𝑡−1′ ) + 𝛿𝛿2𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1 (6.26) 
where 𝑄𝑄� is the unconditional covariance matrix of λ𝑡𝑡 = {𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡/𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡}𝑚𝑚 and 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡) 
is the (2 x 2) matrix with the diagonal of  𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡on the diagonal and zeros off-diagonal. 
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Step 3: Once the bivariate density 𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)′ pair is estimated in step 2, 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) is obtained for each financial institution i and day t in equation (6.16). 
In this empirical study, a test is run to check whether the differences 
between the banks’ post and pre-merger ∆CoVaR are, on average, different from 
zero. As before, day t is defined as belonging to the pre-merger period if it falls 
into the interval [–180; -11] relative to the merger announcement. Similarly, day t 
is considered as belonging to the post-merger period if it falls into the interval 
[+11; +180] relative to the merger completion. To investigate the hypothesis that 
the mean of the changes in the acquirers’ ∆CoVaR is different from zero, a 
standard t-test is employed. 5% is considered the risk level of the VaR. 
∆(∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖5%) = ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖;[+11;+180]5% − ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖;[−11;−180]5%  (6.27) 
6.3.4 Model of the determinants of the changes in acquirers’ contribution 
to systemic risk 
This section attempts to address the concern of how merger-related 
changes in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk can be explained in the cross-
section by a group of bidders and deal characteristics, as well as variables on the 
acquiring banks’ macroeconomic environment. Thus, a multivariate analysis of 
the determinants driving the changes in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk 
will be performed. The model, estimated via OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistent Huber–White standard errors, assumes the following specifications: 
∆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊= 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏 + 𝜸𝜸′𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 +  𝜽𝜽
′
𝟏𝟏𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊 (6.24) 
where: 
∆𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊 is the merger-related change in marginal expected shortfall  
𝜸𝜸′𝟏𝟏𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊  is a (k x 1) vector of merger characteristics, and 
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𝜽𝜽′𝟏𝟏𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 is a (j x 1) vector of bidder characteristics at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of the deal 
Also, for ∆CoVaR, the model is expressed as follow: 
∆(∆𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂)𝒊𝒊= 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐 + 𝜸𝜸′𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 +  𝜽𝜽′𝟐𝟐𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏+ 𝜺𝜺′𝒊𝒊 (6.25) 
∆(∆𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂𝐂)𝒊𝒊 is the merger-related change in ∆CoVaR 
𝜸𝜸′𝟐𝟐𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 is a (k x 1) vector of merger characteristics, and 
𝜽𝜽′𝟐𝟐𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 is a (j x 1) vector of bidder characteristics at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of the deal. 
The vector of merger characteristics consists of the payment method, the 
status of target, deal size, relative size, cross-border dummy and product 
diversification. For the bidders' characteristics, measures of size and 
performance of acquirers (ROA), leverage, market to book, capital ratio, 
operating efficiency and high-risk banks before the acquisition, are taken into 
consideration. Regarding the acquirers' macroeconomic environment, the GDP 
real growth rate, the rule of law, political stability and the HHI is included in the 
model in order to evaluate the impact of country characteristics on the risk effects 
of acquisitions (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). For consistency, this chapter 
uses the same dependent, independent and control variables as in chapter 4, 
where each variable has been carefully defined and justified (see section 4.2.3 of 
Chapter 4).  
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6.4 Empirical Findings 
6.4.1 Bank merger and acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk 
It is well documented in literature that bank acquisitions generate 
opportunities to realise significant diversification benefits through risk pooling, 
provided that the asset returns of the merging banks are not perfectly correlated 
(Craig and Santos, 1997; Emmons et al., 2004). To the extent that bank merger 
enables enhanced profitability via increased market power and changes in the 
asset management of the merging firm, M&As may reduce acquirers' contribution 
to systemic risk even further. This part attempts to assess the effects of bank 
mergers on bidders' contribution to systemic risk in general, as well as for specific 
kinds of mergers, to test the chapter’s hypotheses. Table 6.3 below reports the 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and ∆CoVaR of acquiring banks before and 




Table 18: Merger-related Changes in MES and CoVaR 
Merger-induced changes in Marginal Expected Shortfall and ∆CoVaR. The table 
reports the pre- and post-merger value as well as changes in the bidding banks' 
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and ∆CoVaR for a full sample of 608 bank 
mergers and for regional sub-samples. MES and ∆CoVaR before the merger is 
computed as the average of the MES and ∆CoVaR over the period from -180 days 
to -11 days relative to the announcement date (a), while the MES and ∆CoVaR after 
the completion date is computed as the average MES and ∆CoVaR over the period 
from +11 days to +180 days after the completion date (c). The change in the MES 
and ∆CoVaR is the difference between the post-effective date and the pre-
announcement period, winsorised at the 1%-level. The statistical significance of the 
changes in the MES and ∆CoVaR is then tested by the use of a standard t-test. The 





















U.S. 452 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.000) (0.000) (0.206) 
Europe 65 0.007 *** 0.006 *** -0.001 0.004 *** 0.003 *** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.601) (0.000) (0.000) (0.126) 
Asia 53 0.003 ** 0.004 *** 0.002 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 
  (0.040) (0.000) (0.311) (0.000) (0.000) (0.939) 
Others 38 0.007 *** 0.005 *** -0.002 0.003 *** 0.002 *** -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.169) (0.000) (0.006) (0.063) 
Total 608 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.002*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.788) (0.000) (0.000) (0.927) 
**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10%  
*** Denotes significance at 1%  
 
To analyse whether mergers impact on the contribution to systemic risk of 
acquirers, the merger-related changes in MES and ∆CoVaR are tested to check 
if it is equal to zero. The findings of the full-sample analysis show that the changes 
in the bidding banks’ MES and ∆CoVaR are both approximately zero in addition 
to not being statistically significant. At the regional level, it is seen that the 
increase in the bidding banks’ MES is strongest for the mergers in the U.S. and 
Asia; nevertheless, the changes in MES of U.S. and Asian acquirers are not 
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statistically significant either. Moreover, the change in ∆CoVaR of acquirers from 
other countries is -0.001 and is statistically significant at 10% level. However, 
acquirers from other regions such as Africa, South America, Oceania and North 
America (excluding the U.S.) are not very liquid in the stock market as their share 
prices are often displayed in an irregular basis. Thus, it is very difficult to draw 
conclusion that acquirers from other regions experience systemic risk reduction 
as a result of M&As.  
Overall, these results show that mergers do not produce a reduction in the 
acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk in the whole sample. This finding 
contradicts with Weiß et al. (2014) as they found a significant increase in merging 
banks' contribution to systemic risk following mergers. The possible reason why 
their findings are not as optimistic as this finding is that their sample excludes 
mergers that involve insurance companies, loans or security bankers. Such a 
sample may not offer substantial diversification benefits or risk-reducing effects 
derived from product diversification. Moreover, our sample period extends 
beyond the 2007-09 global financial crisis; when banks may pursue M&As for 
healthy growth, expansion of business lines and locations or acquisitions of new 
customer bases; thereby increasing business profit and enhancing the stability of 
the banking system. Therefore, the first hypothesis that bank mergers coincide 
with a significant reduction in the bidding bank's contribution to systemic risk is 
rejected. Moreover, it is observed that the level of MES and ∆CoVaR of acquirers 
from the U.S. and Asia are lower in the pre-merger period than in the post-merger 
period. In contrast, for Europe and other regions, these figures are lower in the 
post-merger period compared to pre-merger. 
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For a more precise analysis, the sample is divided into nine sub-samples 
including deal value, different market types, geographic diversification, product 
diversification, relative size, payment method, total assets, ROA and acquirers' 
risk profile before the merger to analyse the changes in the bidding banks' 
contribution to systemic risk. Table 6.4 reports the investigation of the sub-
samples based on (A) deal characteristics and (B) acquirer characteristics.  
Table 19: Sub-sample Analysis 
Sub-sample analysis. The table presents the changes in systemic risk (MES 
and ∆CoVaR) for the different sub-samples of acquirers. The sub-samples are 
built using the dummy variables for deal value, cross-border mergers, activity-
diversifying mergers, relative size, payment method, acquirers' total assets and 
ROA as well as different markets and acquirers risk profile before merger. The 
statistical significance of the changes in the MES and ∆CoVaR are then tested 
by the use of a standard t-test. The p-values are denoted in parentheses 
 N ∆MES Change in 
∆CoVaR 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics    
Deal value    
High deal value 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.669) (0.294) 
Medium deal value 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.816) (0.704) 
Low deal value 202 0.001 0.000 
  (0.467) (0.448) 
Geographic diversification    
Cross-border merger 50 0.001 0.000 
  (0.624) (0.691) 
Domestic merger 558 0.000 0.000 
  (0.880) (0.849) 
Product diversification    
Activity-diversifying merger 58 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.459) (0.442) 
Focusing merger 543 0.000 0.000 
  (0.578) (0.841) 
Relative size    
Low relative size 202 0.001* 0.001 *** 
  (0.058) (0.005) 
Medium relative size 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.788) (0.107) 
High relative size 203 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.306) (0.233) 
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Markets    
Emerging markets 55 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.280) (0.142) 
Developed markets 539 0.000 0.000 
  (0.818) (0.650) 
Frontier markets 14 0.002 0.000 
  (0.499) (0.763) 
Payment method    
Cash only 157 0.002 ** 0.000 
  (0.045) (0.181) 
Others 451 0.000 0.000 
  (0.426) (0.401) 
Panel B: Acquirer characteristics    
Total asset    
High total assets 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.837) (0.314) 
Medium total assets 203 0.001 0.000 
  (0.161) (0.233) 
Low total assets 202 0.000 0.000 
  (0.560) (0.907) 
Acquirers risk profile before 
merger 
   
High risk profile before merger 203 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.233) (0.148) 
Medium risk profile before merger 203 0.001 0.000 
  (0.248) (0.609) 
Low risk profile before merger 202 0.001 0.000 
  (0.198) (0.140) 
ROA    
High ROA 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.457) (0.735) 
Medium ROA 203 0.000 0.000 
  (0.996) (0.746) 
Low ROA 202 0.000 0.000 
  (0.862) (0.702) 
**,* Denotes significance at 5%;10%  
*** Denotes significance at 1%    
 
 
Panel A of table 6.4 shows deal characteristics, differentiating first 
between high, medium, and low deal values. The results show that all the change 
in MES and ∆CoVaR for the bidding banks are statistically insignificant for all of 
the sub-samples based on the deal size. This finding interestingly contradicts 
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Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015) as they find that the larger the size of the merger, 
the more significant the incremental increase in the insurance acquirers’ 
contribution to the probability of a crash of the insurance industry will be. These 
differing results may be because the authors measure extreme systemic risk by 
using lower tail dependence methodology as opposed to MES. Furthermore, the 
nature of the acquirers’ markets is considered, differentiating between developing 
market, developed market and frontier market. As can be seen, bank M&As still 
do not produce any risk-reducing or risk-increasing effects for systemic risk.  
In the next section, cross-border mergers and domestic deals, and 
focusing and product diversifying deals, are distinguished from one another. The 
results offer evidence that neither of the two forms of geographic and product 
diversification influence acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. These results are 
rather similar to the outcomes of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) as they find 
that European bank consolidations do not affect an acquiring bank’s changes in 
default risk, regardless of the high potential for risk reduction displayed by 
product-diversifying or cross-border deals. This result raises doubt on the 
capability of bank consolidation, to make use of risk-decreasing and to stabilise 
effects on the banking sector.   
Next, the relative deal value is employed, differentiating between high, 
medium, and low relative size. The results show that for deals where the target 
size is small compared to acquirers’ market value, there is an increase in the 
MES and ∆CoVaR (statistically and economically significant at 10% level for MES 
and 1% level for ∆CoVaR). Specifically, the contribution to systemic risk of 
acquiring banks increases for deals with low relative size. To justify this finding, 
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) show in their theoretical setup that often, when 
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banks default, it is optimal for the regulator to bail out some or all of the banks in 
distress. However, when the number of failed banks is small, the failed banks will 
exit the market via the acquisition channel, making them the target of other 
predators. As a consequence, small banks are motivated to engage in M&As with 
larger banks to gain an implicit bailout guarantee, which in turn increases overall 
systemic risk. Moreover, similar to private targets, small banks are less 
transparent, thus creating an agency problem for the bidders.  
The last specification in panel A distinguishes between mergers financed 
by cash only and mergers financed by other methods (shares only, shares and 
cash). There is an increase in the MES for cash-only deals (statistically and 
economically significant at 5%); thereby such deals contribute to the increase in 
acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. This constitutes preliminary evidence for 
the third hypothesis of this chapter. Indeed, Furfine & Rosen (2011) propose that 
deals which are fully paid for in cash are expected to raise acquiring banks' 
default risk, due to acquirers replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a riskier 
balance sheet of the target, possibly leading to an increase in acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk. 
Panel B of Table 6.4 presents the results attained using acquirer 
characteristics. The first two specifications are based on the bidding banks’ total 
assets and ROA. As evidenced, all of the changes in the MES and ∆CoVaR are 
statistically insignificant. It indicates that mergers do not alter the level of 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, regardless of their size or pre-merger 
profitability performance. The last specification in this panel divides the pre-
merger default risk profile of acquirers into high risk, medium risk and low-risk 
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bidders. No statistically significant change in MES and ∆CoVaR are observed for 
this category in any of the sub-samples based on acquirers’ risk profile.  
Overall, results from the univariate test reveal that mergers and 
acquisitions do not influence the acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk, 
regardless of the increased potential for risk diversification exhibited by cross-
border and cross-industry bank mergers. However, for a group of deals, where 
target size is relatively small compared to acquirers’ market value and deals that 
are financed by cash-only, mergers increase acquirers’ contribution to systemic 
risk.  
6.4.2 The determinants of the merger-related changes in acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk 
To assess the robustness of the univariate tests above, this part examines 
whether certain types of deal, acquirer characteristics, and country 
characteristics influence acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. The results of 
the multiple regressions of systemic risk effects around bank mergers focus on 
the determinants of merger-related changes on acquirers’ MES presented in 




Table 20: Determinants of the Changes in MES 
Determinants of the changes in MES: deal characteristics, acquirer 
characteristics and acquirers' macroeconomic environment. The dependent 
variable is the change in MES. The model is estimated via OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors. Model (1) uses all 
acquirers, model (2) uses the same acquirers but without country controls, 
model (3) uses US acquirers and model (4) uses non-US acquirers. All sources 
of variables and data are defined in chapter 4. Statistically significant coefficients 
are highlighted in bold type. The P-values are denoted in parentheses. 
 (1) All 
banks  
 (2) All 
banks  








        
Product 
diversification  
-0.0017  -0.0019  0.0018  -0.0042 * 
 (0.2403)  (0.1984)  (0.3459)  (0.0630)  
Payment 
method 
0.0024 ** 0.0027 ** 0.0015  0.0053 *** 
 (0.0195)  (0.0121)  (0.2178)  (0.0068)  
Status of target 0.0032  0.0026  0.0012  0.0048  
 (0.1974)  (0.1540)  (0.3681)  (0.1960)  
Deal size 0.0715  0.1170  0.2000  1.2870  
 (0.9049)  (0.8442)  (0.5320)  (0.4055)  
Relative size -0.0014 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0029 ** -0.0014 ** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0050)  (0.0314)  (0.0232)  
Cross-border  0.0006  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0005  
 (0.7231)  (0.9305)  (0.9696)  (0.8557)  
ROA -0.0238  -0.0001  -0.0100  0.0428  
 (0.7905)  (0.9986)  (0.9061)  (0.7349)  
Market to book  0.0596  0.0797  0.0009  0.1568  
 (0.5175)  (0.3367)  (0.9919)  (0.4921)  
Leverage -0.0063  -0.0044  -0.0064  -0.0005  
 (0.3162)  (0.4929)  (0.5627)  (0.9507)  
Operating 
efficiency 
-0.0577  -0.0247  -0.0500  -0.0986  
 (0.3085)  (0.6427)  (0.4954)  (0.2717)  
Capital ratio -0.0037  -0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0334  
 (0.8295)  (0.9517)  (0.9930)  (0.2958)  
Acquirers’ total 
assets 
-0.0099  -0.0699  0.1000  -1.1680  
 (0.9882)  (0.9172)  (0.6920)  (0.4818)  
High-risk banks 0.0015  0.0013  0.0018 * 0.0035  
 (0.2216)  (0.2588)  (0.0856)  (0.1436)  
Country control         
GDP -0.0144      -0.0027  
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 (0.6250)      (0.9429)  
HHI -0.0086 *     -0.0038  
 (0.0907)      (0.4800)  
Political stability -0.0013      -0.0031  
 (0.2970)      (0.1940)  
Rule of Law -0.0015      -0.0008  
 (0.2850)      (0.7445)  
Constant 0.0019  -0.0029  -0.0008  0.0022  
 (0.7291)  (0.5362)  (0.8632)  (0.8785)  
R-squared 0.0436  0.0287  0.0261  0.1751  
         
Adj. R-squared 0.0159  0.0073  -0.0029  0.0735  
         
Number of 
observations 
608  608  452  156  
**, * Denotes significance at 5% and 10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1%       
 
Table 21: Determinants of the Changes in ∆CoVaR 
Determinants of the changes in △CoVaR: deal characteristics, acquirer 
characteristics and acquirers' macroeconomic environment. The dependent 
variable is the change in △CoVaR. The model is estimated via OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors. Model (1) uses all 
acquirers, model (2) uses the same acquirers but without country controls, model 
(3) uses US acquirers and model (4) uses non-US acquirers. All sources of 
variables and data are defined in chapter 4. Statistically significant coefficients are 
highlighted in bold type. The P-values are denoted in parentheses. 
 (1) All 
banks  
 (2) All 
banks  
 (3) US 
banks  





        
Product 
diversification  
-0.0005  -0.0006  0.0003  -0.0012  
 (0.3186)  (0.2187)  (0.6807)  (0.1270)  
Payment method 0.0007 * 0.0006 * 0.0001  0.0024 *** 
 (0.0861)  (0.0978)  (0.7557)  (0.0019)  
Status of target 0.0022 ** 0.0022 *** 0.0003  0.0022  
 (0.0251)  (0.0082)  (0.4651)  (0.1003)  
Deal size -0.0736  -0.1000  0.0728  0.4540  
 (0.7364)  (0.5679)  (0.5832)  (0.3927)  
Relative size -0.0004 ** -0.0004 ** -0.0008 * -0.0005 ** 
 (0.0241)  (0.0241)  (0.0857)  (0.0374)  
Cross-border  0.0008  0.0004  0.0017  0.0004  
 (0.2069)  (0.4714)  (0.1562)  (0.6481)  
ROA -0.0145  -0.0200  -0.0100  0.0004  
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 (0.6564)  (0.4149)  (0.6898)  (0.9940)  
Market to book 
ratio 
0.0010  0.0100  0.0090  -0.0430  
 (0.9756)  (0.6604)  (0.7803)  (0.5675)  
Leverage -0.0014  -0.0012  -0.0028  0.0023  
 (0.5639)  (0.6225)  (0.5257)  (0.4803)  
Operating 
efficiency 
-0.0003  0.0003  -0.0047  0.0012  
 (0.9904)  (0.9898)  (0.8854)  (0.9714)  
Capital ratio -0.0001  0.0005  0.0034  -0.0213  
 (0.9908)  (0.9421)  (0.7322)  (0.1220)  
Acquirers’ total 
assets 
0.0952  0.0940  0.1000  -0.4320  
 (0.6913)  (0.6972)  (0.1279)  (0.4189)  
High-risk banks 0.0006  0.0005  0.0005  0.0013  
 (0.1512)  (0.2233)  (0.2288)  (0.1555)  
Country control         
GDP -0.0016      0.0145  
 (0.8955)      (0.2747)  
HHI -0.0019      0.0003  
 (0.3732)      (0.8982)  
Political stability -0.0009 **     -0.0012  
 (0.0275)      (0.1518)  
Rule of Law 0.0008      0.0005  
 (0.1034)      (0.6098)  
Constant -0.0030  -0.0023  -0.0016  -0.0007  
 (0.1437)  (0.2144)  (0.3881)  (0.8636)  
R-squared 0.0343  0.0244  0.0194  0.1472  
         
Adj. R-squared 0.0063  0.0029  -0.0098  0.0421  
         
Number of 
observations 
608  608  452  156  
**, * Denotes significance at 5% and 10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1%       
 
As shown, the results from both tables are quite similar. Therefore, these 
will be discussed at the same time. Regression (1) of Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 
estimates the relationship between the changes in the acquirers' MES and 
∆CoVaR using acquirer and deal characteristics as well as acquirers' 
macroeconomic environment for the full sample of mergers. The independent 
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variable, payment method in MES and ∆CoVaR regressions has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients at 5% and 1% level respectively. This finding 
is consistent with the univariate test in the previous section where mergers 
financed by cash only increase acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. This is 
likewise in line with the hypothesis that when safe liquid assets (cash) is replaced 
by a riskier balance sheet of targets, the bidders' default risk may increase which, 
in turn increases the bidder’s contribution to systemic risk (Furfine and Rosen, 
2011). Therefore, hypothesis 6.3, which predicts that cash-only mergers increase 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, cannot be rejected. 
Other controlled variables, such as relative size, the status of target, HHI 
and political stability, also have significant coefficients. More specifically, relative 
size has negative and statistically significant coefficients (at 1% level in MES and 
5% in ∆CoVaR regression). This indicates that the smaller the deal value 
compared to acquirers' market value, the more likely mergers will increase 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. This is consistent with the univariate test 
in the previous section. This effect may be explained by the fact that small banks 
are motivated to engage in M&A with larger banks in order to gain an implicit 
bailout guarantee from the government, which in turn increases overall systemic 
risk (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). This result is somewhat consistent with the 
findings of Weiß et al. (2014) as they detect systemic risk increase, regardless of 
whether the relative size is small, medium or large. The status of target in 
regression (1) of Table 6.6 shows a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. This means that private target is a determinant of the increase in 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, as expected. Indeed, mergers involved in 
private targets are projected to produce a risk-increasing effect for acquirers 
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because private firms are subject to lower disclosure requirements. 
Consequently, this restricts the acquirers' capabilities to evaluate the risks 
associated with private targets by themselves in addition to making acquirers' due 
diligence ineffective. Therefore, the acquisitions of hidden risks from target firms 
may contribute to the increase in acquirers' default risk as well as to their 
contribution to systemic risk. In the same regression, political stability witnesses 
a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This means that a 
macroeconomic environment with high political stability will help to decrease 
acquirers' contribution to systemic risk, which is again consistent with Weiß et al., 
(2014). Also, the bank concentration index HHI has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (at 10% level) in regression (1) of Table 6.5. It implies that 
the more concentrated a banking system is, the more acquirers’ contribution to 
systemic risk will decrease, which is an initial signal of the ‘concentration-stability 
hypothesis’ as seen in Beck et al. (2006).  
Moving onto regression (2) of Tables 6.5 and 6.6, the motivation for this 
specification is that acquirers and deals characteristics can solely drive the cross-
sectional variation in the deal-related changes of acquiring banks' MES and 
∆CoVaR. It continues to observe the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of payment methods, affirming the findings in regression (1) of both 
tables. Results from regression (2) of both tables support the previous findings 
from regression (1) that other controlled variable such as the status of target and 
relative size are significant determinants of merger-related change in acquirers’ 
MES and ∆CoVaR.  
To understand what drives the baseline results, the sample is split 
between US and non-US deals. Results are presented in regressions (3) and (4) 
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respectively. As shown, statistically significant coefficients are observed for the 
independent variables, such as payment method and product diversification for 
non-US acquirers only. It indicates that the statistically significant coefficients of 
payment method from regression (1) and (2) for the whole sample of both tables 
are affected by the results of non-US acquirers. Furthermore, product 
diversification in regression (4) of Table 6.5 has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (at 10% level). This indicates that product-diversifying deals 
help to decrease non-US acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk following a 
merger. This is consistent with results from the previous chapter, that product 
diversification reduces acquirers’ default risk. However, it largely contradicts 
Mühlnickel and Weiß (2015) who find that diversification  destabilises the 
insurance industry. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this chapter, which 
projects that product-diversifying deals produce more systemic risk-reducing 
effect for acquirers than focusing deals, cannot be rejected. 
Conversely, in terms of controlled variables, the significant result for 
relative size, holds for both US and non-US acquirers, which is consistent to 
previous findings. Regression (3) of Table 6.5 also witnesses a positive and 
significant coefficient of TBTF motive (at 10% level). This finding indicates that in 
the U.S. the destabilising effect of bank mergers is caused by a bank’s desire to 
become TBTF. It is also in line with results from Weiß et al., (2014) who find that 
TBTF motive is one of the main factors causing an increase in acquiring banks' 
contribution to systemic risk among large banks using MES model. The 
motivation to become SIFIs to exploit government safety nets and bailouts, urges 
banks to pursue even risky M&As or value-destroying merger deals, which in turn 
increases a bank’s contribution to systemic risk.  
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Overall, the findings in all of the regressions support the results of the 
univariate analysis. First, for deals financed by cash only, the acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk is increasing. Whereas, mergers involved in product 
diversification contribute to the decrease in systemic risk for non-US acquirers. 
Other controlled variables, such as status of target, relative size, TBTF motive, 
political stability, and HHI, all affect the changes in acquirers’ contribution to 
systemic risk. As shown, the results of this study are consistent in both the 
univariate tests and in all specifications of regression using both systemic risk 
measures MES and ∆CoVaR. To further validate the robustness of the outcomes, 
a different estimation method of ∆CoVaR is conducted, based on the standard 
quantile regression as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). It finds that all 
conclusions remain unchanged.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The banking sector plays a substantial role in every economy and is a key 
segment for the stability of financial systems. Consequently, banking supervisors 
and regulators aim to strengthen the financial system and reduce the frequency 
and severity of future potential financial vulnerability. Trustworthy indicators of 
the banking system welfare are of great importance. In this paper, the acquiring 
banks’ contribution to systemic risk are assessed on a global sample of bank 
mergers from 1998 to 2015. Academic literature to date, has been debated with 
respect to the implications of bank mergers on acquirers’ contribution to systemic 
risk and the determinants of the changes in bidders’ systemic risk (see Bierth et 
al., 2015; Molyneux et al., 2014; Raffestin, 2014; Weiß et al., 2014). To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to extend the literature by examining the 
risk effects of product diversification on bidders’ contribution to systemic risk.  
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To measure systemic risk, this chapter employs two models, Marginal 
Expected Shortfall from Acharya et al., (2017) and ∆CoVaR from Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) as they are the best models to measure acquirers' 
contribution to systemic risk. Various empirical studies have shown that both 
models provide a reliable, well-known and strong predictor of a firm's contribution 
to systemic risk. Using both models can enhance the robustness of the results 
and can overcome the limitations of relying on outcomes that use only one model. 
Moreover, both models can complement each other’s weaknesses as they are 
conceptually distinct. 
Overall, findings from the univariate test suggest that M&As do not impact 
on the acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk, regardless of the increased 
potential for risk diversification exhibited by cross-border and cross-industry bank 
mergers. Therefore, the first hypothesis, which predicts that mergers generate 
systemic risk-reducing effect for acquiring banks, is rejected. When examining 
the influence of potential factors that are anticipated to have an impact on the 
change in bidding banks' contribution to systemic risk, payment method, product 
diversification, the status of target, relative size, TBTF motive, HHI and political 
stability, are all found to be significant determinants. In terms of independent 
variables, for deals financed by cash only, the acquirers’ contribution to systemic 
risk will increase. These results support the view that deals which are fully paid 
for in cash are expected to raise acquiring banks' default risk, as acquirers are 
replacing safe liquid assets (cash) with a riskier balance sheet of the target; 
thereby increasing acquirers' contribution to systemic risk (Furfine and Rosen, 
2011). Hypothesis three of this chapter therefore, cannot be rejected. 
Furthermore, product-diversifying deals decrease acquirers' contribution to 
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systemic risk for non-US acquirers. This largely contradicts Mühlnickel and Weiß 
(2015) who find that diversification destabilises the insurance industry. The 
second hypothesis of this chapter, thus, cannot be rejected. 
Among other controlled variables, private targets prevent acquirers from 
realising the systemic risk-reduction effect. Indeed, the literature supports the 
notion that merger deals involved in private targets are expected to generate risk-
increasing effect for acquirers because private firms are subject to lower 
disclosure requirements. Consequently, this limits the acquirers' capabilities to 
evaluate the risks associated with private targets themselves, in addition to 
causing bidders’ due diligence to become ineffective. Furthermore, the smaller 
the deal size in comparison with acquirers' market value, the more likely it is that 
mergers will increase acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. This effect may be 
explained as small banks are motivated to engage in M&A with larger banks in 
order to gain an implicit bailout guarantee from the government. This in turn 
increases overall systemic risk (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Further, TBTF 
is a motive for U.S. acquirers in exploiting safety net and government bailouts, 
which in turn increase acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. Regarding the 
macroeconomic environment of bidders, the more stable a political environment 
in an acquirer' country, the higher the reduction of bidders' contribution to 
systemic risk will be. Finally, a more-concentrated banking system may help 
acquirers' contribution toward decreasing systemic risk.  
The findings of this chapter lead to interesting implications and 
recommendations for banking supervisors and policymakers. Overall, the results 
convey a critical view of the risk-reduction potential of bank M&As. Bank mergers, 
on average, are risk neutral. Nevertheless, some deals such as cash-only 
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mergers, mergers involved in private targets, as well as mergers involved high- 
risk acquirers pre-merger, should undergo a stricter merger approval process by 
banking regulators as these deals are particularly prone to destabilising the 
banking sector. Therefore, it is necessary for banking supervisors to consider the 
aspect of financial stability as a further important criterion within the approval 
process for bank mergers. Moreover, bank size is often considered to be 
associated with negative externalities caused by TBTF institutions. The results 
from this chapter, however, suggest an opposing view. Specifically, the smaller 
the size of targets compared to bidders, the more the increase in acquirers’ 
contribution to systemic risk will be. This means that mergers that create very 
large banks are not associated with larger systemic risk. Rather, mergers 
involving smaller targets, which are usually not paid much attention by regulators, 




Chapter 7: How Default Risk Relates to Systematic 
Risk, Systemic Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk? An 
Investigation Under the Context of Bank Merger 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this chapter is to examine whether default risk is 
systematic, systemic and/or idiosyncratic in banking under the context of M&As. 
It is widely accepted within existing literature that M&A activities alter the risks of 
acquiring banks, particularly the risks of large banks whose credit or liquidity 
problems may affect many other institutions (Casu et al., 2015; Laeven et al., 
2016; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011; Weiß et al., 2014). When the risk of a 
merged bank is higher, this raises the probability that the bank will fail or become 
illiquid before settling all of its payment obligations. It also exposes other 
institutions directly to risks as payees, or indirectly through contributing to panic 
runs or securities market problems. On the one hand, the benefits of bank M&As 
include potential diversification gains and cross-selling opportunities, which can 
help to diversify profits by realising new revenue streams; thereby reducing a 
bank’s idiosyncratic risk and default risk (Emmons et al., 2004, Hughes et al., 
1999, van Lelyveld & Knot, 2009). On the other hand, default risk may increase 
during post-merger because of the acquisition of risks from bidders, e.g. 
idiosyncratic risk, liquidity risk (Billett et al., 2004); managerial compensation at 
the expense of risk increase (Harford and Li, 2007) or the increase in bidders’ 
leverage post mergers, both theoretically in Morellec & Zhdanov (2008) and 
empirically in Ghosh & Jain (2000). Furthermore, a possible downside is that 
merged banks, through becoming more similar to each other, now face common 
shocks, which raises the systematic and systemic risk of a bank (Wagner, 2010). 
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Therefore, it can be said that M&As not only affect an acquiring bank’s 
idiosyncratic risk and default risk, but also its contribution to systemic and 
systematic risk.   
This leads to the natural empirical question of how M&As affect the 
interactions between the following three pairs of risk: default risk versus 
idiosyncratic risk, default risk versus systemic risk and default risk versus 
systematic risk. The evidence from literature so far has been mixed with regards 
to whether default risk is systematic or idiosyncratic (for instance Asquith and 
Gertner, 1994; Campbell et al., 2008; Denis and Denis, 1995; Dichev, 1998; Lang 
and Stulz, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1994). Existing evidence on the relationship 
between default risk and systematic risk is frequently varied: Denis and Denis 
(1995), Lang and Stulz (1992) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) find that default risk 
is predominantly related to aggregate elements. It infers that default risk can be 
positively associated with systematic risk. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1992) 
confirm that when a company announces bankruptcy, this leads to competitive 
and contagion effects on other companies within the same industry. Furthermore, 
Denis and Denis (1995) find that post-recapitalised economic and regulatory 
developments (systematic risk) are a central cause of financial distress (default 
risk) in their sample firms. 
In contrast, Asquith and Gertner (1994), Dichev (1998) and Opler and 
Titman  (1994) assert that industries’ default risks are typically associated with  
idiosyncratic factors. For example, Asquith and Gertner (1994) observe that asset 
sales are one way for financially distressed firms to avoid bankruptcy. Meanwhile 
secured private debt and public debt increase the possibility for distressed firms 
to file for bankruptcy. This means that default risk is idiosyncratic (i.e. 
  
 234 
diversifiable). This mixed evidence is perhaps due to the variety of indicators used 
to measure default risk. Namely, default risk has been estimated using 
accounting models (Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002) in addition to 
information from bond (Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Hand et al., 1992) and equity 
markets (Campbell et al., 2008; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). Accordingly, the 
relative question of whether default risk is systematic or idiosyncratic has not 
been satisfactorily answered. In addition, this chapter builds on other studies that 
have investigated the relationship between default risk and systemic risk 
(Battiston et al., 2012; Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez, 2013; Souza et al., 2016). 
Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013) find that increases in indicators of bank 
default risk do have an effect on the banking industry (increasing its systemic 
risk). However, a remarkable body of empirical literature on stress-testing in 
financial systems debated that the default of an individual institution was typically 
unable to trigger a domino effect (see Elsinger et al., 2006; Furfine, 2003); 
therefore, default risk is not systemic in nature18. 
Overall, there are several gaps in the current literature regarding default 
risk and its relationship to other risks. Firstly, most of the earlier work on whether 
default risk is systematic, systemic or idiosyncratic did not distinguish between 
banking and non-banking firms (Campbell et al., 2008; Vassalou and Xing, 2004). 
This distinction is very important because systemic risk is found to be significantly 
larger in the banking sector. It is because common factors mainly drive 
interdependencies within the banking industry, while in other industries, they are 
generally driven by idiosyncratic factors. Secondly, the question of how the 
                                                 
18 For detailed discussions regarding why default risk can be systematic, systemic 
or idiosyncratic, see literature review 7.2.2.  
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change in default risk of acquirers following a merger affects the variations in their 
idiosyncratic risk, systemic risk and systematic risk remains unsolved in previous 
empirical studies. Answering these questions is very crucial in terms of the 
regulators’ point of view, given the fact that M&As have lately been granted 
additional incentive by the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Indeed, regulators 
have highlighted the role of M&As as a tool to avoid banking firms’ failures and 
costly bailouts for the TBTF (Group of Thirty, 2009). In an attempt to resolve the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, policy-makers have become committed to reducing 
over-competition among a number of banks in the market. One strategies is for 
regulators to seemingly favour bank mergers (Shih, 2003). For example, in 1998, 
the governor of the central bank of the Philippines stated, “The central bank 
favours mergers as a way to keep the number of bank failures to a minimum...” 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian government urged banks to merge into a total of only 
six banks (which later became 10). Soon after, Taiwan’s president announced 
the so-called ‘Second Phase of Financial Reform’ in an attempt to encourage 
banks to consolidate, or form strategic alliances, with foreign financial institutions. 
The objectives of bank mergers, to reduce bankruptcy risk, are the same across 
these countries. Hence, the number M&As was booming in Asia during this time 
(Shen and Lin, 2011). Nevertheless, the situation is in fact more complicated than 
this, assuming that consolidated banks might be safer after the merger. However, 
the literature is still inconclusive with regards to whether a reduction in default 
risk following a merger might result in a reduction in acquirers’ systemic risk or 
systematic risk. A recent study from Nijskens and Wagner (2011) shows that 
banks use credit risk transfer activities in order to reduce individual risk (lower 
idiosyncratic risk), but in turn, pose a greater systemic risk to the financial system 
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whilst at the same time increasing beta and return correlations across banking 
firms. This creates a challenge for financial regulations, which have typically 
focused on individual institutions. Therefore, if M&As do reduce an individual 
bank’s default risk (which has been proven in Chapter 5), but simultaneously 
increase the bank contribution to the volatility of the banking system, this will raise 
the question of whether bank mergers should or should not be encouraged by 
banking regulators and supervisors. 
Overall, the primary aim of this chapter is to analyse whether the changes 
in acquiring bank’s default risk as a result of M&As will influence acquirers' own 
idiosyncratic risk; or whether this extends to other banks (systemic risk) or all 
listed companies (systematic risk). Therefore, examining the risk profiles of banks 
during the pre-merger period (without M&As), and the change in risk profiles of 
acquirers between post-completion and pre-merger period (under the influence 
of M&As), enables this chapter to create an in-depth investigation into the 
relationship between default risk and the other risks of acquirers. As a result, it 
adds further insights into existing literature. However, the challenge associated 
with this research objective is that there is no previous study exploring these 
interactions between the changes in default risk and the other risks that acquirers 
may face as a result of M&As. Therefore, this chapter combines two separate 
works of literature regarding (1) whether default risk is systematic or idiosyncratic, 
and relationship between default risk and systemic risk and (2) the effects of bank 
mergers on these relationships.  
In line with these gaps in literature, the contribution of this chapter is 
fourfold. Unlike previous studies (Li and Zinna, 2014; Qi et al., 2014), to the best 
of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to examine the interactions 
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between acquiring bank’s default risk and their idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk 
as well as systemic risks within the banking sector, under the context of bank 
mergers, thereby recognizing the specific features of this industry. Second, it 
provides supporting evidence on these relationships in the pre-M&A period. 
Third, it offers broader results regarding the effects of acquirers’ characteristics 
and their home country’s macroeconomic factors on the changes in acquirers’ 
systematic risk, systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk post-merger, thereby 
unfolding the risk effects of bank mergers. Finally, it provides further evidence of 
the impact of bank size in addition to the level of income diversification on banking 
risks.  
The findings emerging from this study suggest that, in general, during a 
pre-merger period (without M&As), acquiring banks’ default risk influence their’ 
contribution to systemic risk (MES)19 and idiosyncratic risk. This result is 
particularly pronounced for non-US acquirers. It indicates that the risk of default 
on any individual bank does not only affect a bank’s stockholders but also extends 
to other banks within the banking system, causing the banking industry to 
become fragile and volatile. This is consistent with many studies, such as 
(Asquith and Gertner, 1994; Dichev, 1998; Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez, 2013; 
Opler and Titman, 1994). In contrast, no relationship is found between default 
risk and beta. Other factors such as income diversification, capitalisation, GDP 
and HHI, play important roles in explaining acquirers' pre-merger systematic risk, 
systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
                                                 




Next, with regards to the effect of bank mergers, no relationships were 
found between ∆default risk and ∆MES or between ∆default risk and ∆beta, which 
suggests that M&As do not affect these relationships in general. However, 
acquirers with the highest default risk before mergers witness their increase in 
MES as a result of M&As. This result is specifically pronounced for U.S. acquirers 
more than non-U.S. acquirers. Besides, the changes in acquiring bank’s default 
risk as a result of M&As have a positive direct impact on the change in their’ own 
idiosyncratic risk. It is however, of significant interest that bank mergers are 
proven to reduce the default risk of acquiring banks as shown in Chapter 5 of this 
study. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the reduction in acquirers’ default 
risk following a merger also results in the reduction of their idiosyncratic risk, 
which means that M&As lead to safer banks individually. Other variables, such 
as cost-income ratio, income diversification, capitalisation and GDP, are all 
important drivers of the change in acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk post-merger. 
 The remaining part of the chapter proceeds with a summary of the existing 
body of literature regarding the concept of systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk20, 
followed by a detailed discussion on the effects of default risk on systemic risk, 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. The research methodology is proposed in 
the third section and the cross-sectional analysis is provided in section four. The 
last section offers a concluding remark for the whole chapter.   
                                                 
20 The concepts and definitions of default risk and systemic risk are discussed in 
section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5 and section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6 respectively.  
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7.2 Literature Review 
The current section begins by discussing the concept of systematic risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. Next, it also examines critically the existing evidence on 
the paired relationships, between default risk and systematic risk; default risk and 
idiosyncratic risk; and default risk and systemic risk before proposing the 
research hypotheses of this chapter.  
7.2.1 The concept of systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk 
The fundamental ground of the CAPM is that the volatility of an asset can 
be split into two parts: a systematic risk and a firm-specific risk (idiosyncratic 
risk)21. The systematic risk is the risk of being affected by general market 
movements. For instance, an increase in interest rates will cause some new 
issued bonds to increase in value, whilst causing some company stocks to fall in 
price, as investors perceive executive teams to be cutting back on spending. It 
represents the part of a firm or an asset’s volatility that is precisely, positively or 
negatively correlated with the market. The specific risk, however, is specific to 
each asset or firm. It represents the remaining part of an asset's volatility that is 
not correlated to the market. When investors form portfolios, the systematic risk 
parts of individual assets are merely added up to give the systematic risk of the 
whole portfolio. This risk is non-diversifiable and will be present in all portfolios. 
The specific risk parts do not add up; however, they tend to compensate each 
other, mainly when the assets are considered as negatively correlated. This is 
the impact of diversification. Hence, in a well-diversified portfolio, each asset’s 
                                                 
21 The terms firm-specific risk and idiosyncratic risk will be used interchangeably 
in this chapter.   
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specific risk should be eliminated by diversification, to ensure that the total 
portfolio's specific risk becomes insignificant (Lhabitant, 2004).  
Systematic risk in the banking sector can arise from macroeconomic 
factors such as inflation, changes in interest rates, fluctuations in currencies, 
recessions and wars. For instance, when interest rates increase unexpectedly, a 
bank’s cost of funds may increase, and the value of its longer-term, illiquid assets 
may fall, leading to the reduction of both the bank’s profitability (net interest 
margin) and the market value of the bank’s equity. Examples of idiosyncratic risk 
within banking include: poor earnings, changes in cash flow position, strikes by 
employees, computer system failures and poor managerial expertise (Berger et 
al., 2015). 
7.2.2 The effect of default risk on systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and 
systemic risk 
7.2.2.1 Is default risk systematic or idiosyncratic?  
Literature on default risk modelling is vast and continues to grow (Agarwal 
and Taffler, 2008; Bellalah et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2015). Most of this 
literature focuses on credit risk management and the pricing of corporate debt 
and a variety of credit derivatives. Researchers tend to pay less attention to the 
relationships between default risk and systematic risk and between default risk 
and various idiosyncratic factors. In the banking industry, default risk can also 
become systematic when the failure of a single bank affects, not only that single 
company but spills over to other institutions, either financial or non-financial. This 
increase in overall financial risk, which cannot be diversified away from, is 
projected to lead to a greater premium charged by investors for enduring such a 
risk (Campbell et al., 2008). Compared to other sectors, there are theoretical 
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reasons to expect that the systematic component of default plays a particularly 
important role in the banking industry. First, the failure of either a large number 
of banks, or the failure of a small number of large banks, could set off a chain 
reaction that may undermine the stability of the financial system. Public 
information regarding the condition of individual banks is highly imperfect. 
Therefore, when many banks fail, it may be difficult to identify whether the cause 
is due to idiosyncratic shocks to individual banks or to a more widespread shock 
that threatens many other banks. Thus, the news that some banks have failed 
may create destructive panic runs by uninsured creditors on other solvents, but 
illiquid banks as these creditors might feel insecure on whether or not the shock 
might influence their banks. Moreover, as interbank transactions are significant, 
variable, and difficult for outsiders to monitor, interbank markets might be another 
means through which the shocks of one bank are spread speedily to other 
banking firms (Berger et al., 1995). 
 In contrast, idiosyncratic bank risk primarily affects a single banking firm, 
and therefore should be trivial in diversified bank portfolios. However, 
idiosyncratic risk is said to influence default risk, which may lead to contagion 
effects within the banking industry. Contagion effects often happen in the event 
of bankruptcy, when market participants are uncertain about the cause of failure 
or unsure of the effective exposures in asset portfolios across banks, or when 
bank assets or liabilities contain common elements. Overall, these relationships 
emphasise the importance of differentiating and analysing both systematic and 
idiosyncratic components of bank default risk (Bessler et al., 2015). 
However, as discussed in the introduction, empirical evidence in the 
literature is associated with the no consensus on whether default risk is 
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systematic or idiosyncratic. Some studies suggest that if default risk is correlated 
with systematic risk, it should have size effect and book-to-market effect. 
Moreover, there should be a positive relationship between risk and return. 
Therefore, the effects of firm size and market-to-book, are probably the two most 
potent predictors of stock returns and could be related to some firm default risk 
factors. For example, Chan and Chen (1991) discover that the small firm effect 
are sometimes driven by inefficient companies, with cash flow issues and high 
leverage. Fama and French (1992) estimate that the risk of bankruptcy can affect 
the market-to-book effect. Besides, Chan et al. (1985) show that a default 
element can be used to explain much of the size effect, estimated as the 
distinction between low-grade and high-grade bond returns. Meanwhile, Chen et 
al. (1986) and Fama and French (1992) find that a similarly defined default factor 
is significant in explaining stock returns. A study by Dichev (1998) presents more 
direct and comprehensive evidence regarding the relationship between default 
risk and systematic risk. His measures of default risk are derived from existing 
models of default prediction, (Z-index in Altman,1968 and Ohlson, 1980), which 
have been extensively employed in both practice and other research studies 
(Brown et al., 2015; Fu et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2015). His 
methodology entails classifying the USA stocks into ten portfolios, based on their 
default risk indicators and estimated returns. He finds that the portfolio with the 
highest default risk has the lowest returns. When default risk is not rewarded by 
higher returns, it is, therefore, not systematic. 
Likewise, in a sample of the Thailand market, Byström et al., (2005) do not 
uncover substantial confirmation that bankruptcy risk is associated with the book-
to-market ratio. Furthermore, market participants would believe that higher 
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default risk will be compensated by higher stock returns, should default risk is 
systematic. Nevertheless, in their sample, the level of default risk of a company 
is insufficient to justify for its successive realised returns either, before, during or 
after the 1996-98 Asian crisis. They, therefore, reject the hypothesis that default 
risk is systematic. In a similar vein, using the Chinese stock markets data from 
2000 to 2006 and the iteration approach, Lin and Chen (2008) estimate the 
default risk implied in stock price using the structure model and examine whether 
default risk is a systematic risk of the Chinese stock market. The univariate, 
bivariate and multivariate portfolio analysis, as well as regression analysis, show 
that the expected returns from stocks are not affected by the implied default risks. 
In addition, there is no significant difference between portfolios with a high default 
risk and low default risk, even when other factors, such as size and book-to-
market ratio are controlled. In summary, default risk is not a systematic risk factor 
of the Chinese stock market. 
Contrary to Dichev (1998), Vassalou and Xing (2004) employ the option 
pricing model (market-based model) to test the impact of implied default risk on 
asset returns. The empirical results show that default risks are strongly related to 
size and book-to-market. The returns from portfolios with high default risks are 
much higher than those with low default risks. Therefore, default risk is perceived 
to be systematic. Interestingly, however, Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) find that 
the bonds of the most distressed firms (defined as high-yielding bonds) earn 
lower than subsequent average returns, consistent with bankruptcy risk being 
negatively related to systematic risk. 
In one of the recent empirical studies, Qi et al., (2014) conduct a thorough 
analysis of the role played by the unobserved systematic risk factor in default 
  
 244 
prediction. Using a sample of firms covered by the Moody’s Corporate Default 
Risk Service database from 1979 to 2010, they found that, firm-level risk factors 
are the predominant drivers of default risk. This finding suggests that a default 
model, or a model used to derive the unobserved systematic risk factor, has to 
incorporate firm-level factors. As such, the unobserved systematic risk factors 
backed out by Koopman et al., (2011) may reflect the observed firm-level risk 
characteristics that were omitted from their model. Second, after controlling for 
firm-level risk characteristics, default risk appears to be more driven by the 
unobserved systematic risk factor than the observed systematic risk factors. 
Despite the observed systematic risk factors being statistically significant, 
incorporation of these factors cannot significantly improve the model's ability to 
rank ordering firms by default risk or noticeably boost default predictive accuracy. 
The unobserved systematic risk factor better captures the systematic risks in the 
default process, and furthermore, incorporating this latent factor improves the in-
sample default predictive accuracy. This outcome proposes that it might be 
beneficial to consider the unobserved systematic risk factor when simulating 
portfolio credit losses, in order to capture the incremental risk and comprehensive 
risk under the requirements of the new Basel market risk rules. 
One of the most exciting findings presented recently, is by Fiordelisi and 
Marqués-Ibañez (2013). Their study examines the impact of commonly used 
measures of individual bank default risk on systematic risks in 15 European 
countries (e.g. Austria, France, UK, Spain, Sweden). The focus on the banking 
sector is essential, due to the potential systemic nature of this industry. Their 
empirical sample builds on a unique dataset of listed banks, which includes 
commonly used measures of risk-based accounting bank data, as well as bond 
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and equity capital markets’ information. They also differentiate between 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk components. They find that, for listed banks, 
individual banks’ default risk (independent of how they measure) increases the 
banks’ idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. In summary, evidence shows that 
increases in indicators of bank default risk do affect a firm’s shareholders or the 
level of risk taken within the banking industry and the financial system as a whole. 
Their results are in line with findings presented by Asquith and Gertner (1994), 
Dichev (1998) and Opler and Titman (1994), who found that industry default risks 
are mostly due to idiosyncratic factors.  
In general, existing debates in the literature on whether default risk is 
systematic or idiosyncratic remain ambiguous. Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), 
Shumway (1996) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) found portfolio returns are 
strongly associated with default risk, suggesting that the risk of default is 
systematic. In contrast, Dichev (1998), Byström et al., (2005) and Lin and Chen 
(2008) do not observe any relationship between the expected returns from stocks 
and the implied default risks, thereby concluding that default risk is not 
systematic, but is somehow, due to idiosyncratic factors. This mixed evidence is 
perhaps due to the difference in choices of default risk measure. Namely, default 
risk has been estimated using accounting data and models (Dichev, 1998; Griffin 
and Lemmon, 2002) and information from bond markets (Dichev and Piotroski, 
2001; Hand et al., 1992) and equity markets (Campbell et al., 2008; Vassalou 
and Xing, 2004). This emphasises the necessity for further studies on how 
market-based default measures, such as Merton’s distance to default, are linked 
to systematic risks and to returns and other particularities (e.g. size, market-to-
book ratio) of individual firms.  
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7.2.2.2 Relationship between default risk and systemic risk 
As discussed in the introduction, the reason default risk can be systemic 
in banking is related to contagion or risk diversification practices among banks 
due, for instance, to securitisation. A conventional approach to measure 
contagion is by analysing the correlation coefficients across markets or asset 
returns, and contagion will be realised whenever there is an increase in 
correlation (Broto and Pérez-Quirós, 2014; Corsetti et al., 2005; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002). A recent study by Ballester et al. (2016) examine contagion  
among banks and banking firms in different nations and regions, throughout a 
phase of extended financial distress. They find supporting evidence of contagion 
in banking markets, which indicates an increase in co-movement in the Credit 
Default Swap returns. It also signifies that the default risk of an individual bank 
does positively affect its systemic risk. As mentioned previously, Fiordelisi and 
Marqués-Ibañez (2013) examine the relationship between the individual bank 
default risk and the systemic risk of a European banking sample. They confirm 
their study hypothesis that an increase in default risk of a single bank does 
increase the probability of widening systemic banking risks, suggesting that 
individual bank problems regularly affect the overall banking sector. This result 
holds robust, even under different measures of an individual bank’s default risk. 
Similarly, Huang et al., (2012) find that the throughout the financial crisis 2007-
09, the raise in systemic risk in the U.S. banking industry was firstly driven by 
increased default and liquidity risk premiums, and subsequently by the worsening 
in actual default risk. Moreover, a bank’s contribution to the systemic risk indicator 
appears to be linearly related to its default risk, but highly nonlinear for institution 
size and asset correlation.  
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In contrast, a remarkable body of empirical literature on stress-testing in 
financial systems confirmed that the default of an individual institution was 
typically not able to trigger contagion in the banking sector (Boss et al., 2006; 
Elsinger et al., 2006; Furfine, 2003). Thereby, it is concluded that default risk is 
not systemic. For instance, Elsinger et al. (2006) studied the contribution of 
contagion to systemic risk by decomposing insolvencies into cases that resulted 
from domino effects (contagious defaults) and cases that did not (fundamental 
defaults). From the results of their analysis, they found that between the two 
driving sources of systemic risk, the correlation in exposures is far more critical 
than financial linkages, and more specifically, that the correlated portfolio 
exposure of banks is the primary source of systemic risk and that domino effects 
occur only rarely. While they do not know the reason for the high correlation of 
the banks' asset portfolios, it may be the result of cumulative risk shifting, as 
theorised by Acharya et al., (2017). Moreover, if bankruptcy costs are low and an 
effective crisis resolution strategy is in place, a contagion of insolvencies is only 
a minor problem. Similarly, Furfine (2003) examines the degree to which the 
failure of one bank causes the succeeding breakdown of other banking firms. The 
author estimates the exposures of the magnitude of mutual federal fund, 
employing exclusive data on interbank payment flows. Through these exposures, 
the effects of numerous bankruptcy scenarios are simulated, and it is found that 
the risk of contagion is economically low. However, it stills delivers further 
evidence on the relation between systemic risk and default risk.  
7.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Given the above debates on the interactions between default risk and the 
three remaining risks, this section develops the original research hypotheses on 
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the relationships between these risks in the context of bank M&As. As a 
preliminary analysis of the sample, it is suggested to first check how these risk 
relationships hold in a normal, non-M&A setting. 
Previous studies show that the failure of numerous banks or the failure of 
a few large banks could set off a chain reaction that could destabilise the safety 
and soundness of the financial sector. Public information about the health of 
individual banking firms is imperfect. Therefore, when many banks fail, it can be 
challenging to identify whether the cause is due to idiosyncratic shocks to 
individual banks (e.g. due to fraud) or to a more widespread shock that threatens 
many other banks. Consequently, the news that some banks failed could 
generate devastating 'panic' runs on another solvent but illiquid banks by 
uninsured creditors who are uncertain whether the shock may distress their 
banks (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Interbank markets may be another 
channel via which the shocks of one bank are transmitted swiftly to other banks, 
since interbank transactions are large, flexible, and difficult for outsiders to control 
(Berger et al., 1995). Furthermore, the contagious default of banks may be due 
to the correlation in the banks’ exposures. The exposure of banks to 
macroeconomic risk (systematic risk) determines the risk potential concealed 
within the network of mutual credit exposures among banks (Elsinger et al., 
2006). Accordingly, it is reasonable to anticipate that a bank’s default risk directly 
influences their idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and systemic risk. Indeed, in 
the banking industry, the default risk can also become systemic and systematic 
when the failure of a single bank does not only affect that single bank alone, but 
spills over to other banking institutions and to the broader stock market, as proven 
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in Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013). Thus, the hypotheses of the preliminary 
analysis will be formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 7.1. An increase in the default risk of a single bank raises the 
probability of increasing banking systemic risk, indicating that individual bank 
troubles often influence the whole banking sector. 
Hypothesis 7.2. An increase in the default risk of a single bank augments the 
probability of increasing systematic risk, indicating that individual bank troubles 
regularly influence the overall economy. 
Hypothesis 7.3. An increase in bank default risk will raise the idiosyncratic risk 
of the bank. 
The next three hypotheses stipulate that M&As within the financial sector 
should strengthen these relationships. The literature shows that M&A activities 
alter the risk profiles (e.g. default risk, credit risk, idiosyncratic risk, systemic risk, 
liquidity risk) of acquirers (Méon and Weill, 2005; Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; 
Sakawa and Watanabel, 2016). Bank mergers can either decrease an acquiring 
bank’s default risk through the reduction of a bank’s idiosyncratic risk (see Furfine 
and Rosen, 2011; Koerniadi et al., 2015) or can increase an acquirer’s 
contribution to systemic risk when the acquiring bank’s level of default risk is high 
pre-merger (Weiß et al., 2014). Therefore, it is equitable to predict that when a 
merger impacts the default risk of the acquiring bank (whether up or down), it also 
impacts, in the same direction, the bank’s contribution to systemic risk, its 
systematic risk and its idiosyncratic risk. Hence our main hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 7.4. After a merger, an increase (decrease) in the acquirer’s default 
risk is associated with an increase (decrease) in its contribution to systemic risk. 
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Hypothesis 7.5. After a merger, an increase (decrease) in the acquirer’s default 
risk is associated with an increase (decrease) in its systematic risk. 
Hypothesis 7.6. After a merger, an increase (decrease) in the acquirer’s default 





7.3 Research Methodology 
7.3.1 Estimations of systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk 
To test this chapter’s research hypotheses, the dependent and 
independent variables are modelled. For the calculation of acquirers’ default risk, 
the Merton Distance-to-Default methodology, as in Vallascas and Hagendorff 
(2011), is used (see Chapter 5 for more details). For the estimation of systemic 
risk, a reliable, well-known and robust approach: Marginal Expected Shortfall as 
in Acharya et al., (2017), is applied (see Chapter 6 for more details) to compute 
acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk. 
For the acquirers’ systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, the single market 
model is estimated in equations 7.1 is proposed. The total firm return can be 
decomposed into a systematic and a firm-specific component: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7.1) 
Where 
α is the intercept 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the returns on the individual firm i at time t. 
𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 represents the returns on the market m at time t. 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a measure of the firm’s systematic risk (its market beta) for company i at 
time t 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a firm-specific shock of firm i at time t.  
Given that 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are orthogonal by construction, the total variance 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 of 
firm i at time t is given by: 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 = 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡2  (7.2) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡represents market volatility at time t. 
and 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡 represents firm-specific (idiosyncratic) volatility at time t. 
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Generally, this chapter studies systematic (or market) risks via the well-
known β (beta) coefficient. Beta has played a vital role since the introduction of 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for portfolio management by Sharpe 
(1964). Simply stated, the CAPM beta combines covariance and volatility, 
measuring the sensitivity of asset returns to market returns in addition to the 
correlated relative volatility (Tsai et al., 2014). The CAPM beta uses the following 
formula to estimate  
β𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 �𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,.𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 (𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡)  =𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 ∗ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 (7.3) 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 is the correlation between firm i and the market 
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡represents market volatility at time t. 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡represents firm i volatility at time t. 
Hence, it is suggested to substitute for β𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in Equation (7.2) by the 
estimation of β𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 in Equation (7.3) and solve for 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡2  to get: 
𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚2 ) (7.4) 
Therefore, the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡, will be estimated by 
𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀,𝑡𝑡=�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2  (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚2 ) (7.5) 
A fund that changes in harmony with the market is said to have a beta of 
1. Therefore, if the market goes up 10%, the fund is expected to go up 10%. If 
the beta of a fund is less than 1, it should move less in price than the market in 
general. Conversely, if a fund has a beta higher than 1, it should change more in 
price than the market in general. Therefore, beta estimates the risk of a fund by 
how much its market price moves in comparison to the moves in the overall stock 
market. A fund with a beta of less than 1 has a tendency to be less risky than the 
market, meanwhile a fund with a beta of more than 1 is riskier (Lhabitant, 2004). 
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7.3.2 Models of Cross-sectional Analysis 
In this section, first, the paired relationships between acquiring banks’ 
default risk and systemic risk, systematic risks and idiosyncratic risk pre-merger 
are investigated using OLS regression within a cross-sectional framework, with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber-White standard errors. The equations are 
formulated following the approach of Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013). 
Equation 7.6 is formulated in order to study whether a cross-sectional variation 
in bank default risk is statistically linked to a variation in the bank’s contribution to 
systemic risk, enabling to test Hypothesis 7.1 of this chapter. Equation 7.7 tests 
whether variations in bank default risk are statistically linked to variations in the 
sensitivity of the bank to the broad stock market (systematic risk), enabling to test 
Hypothesis 7.2. Equation 7.8 is run to test the third hypothesis 7.3 of this chapter 
that considers whether a variation in bank default risk will change the idiosyncratic 
risk of the bank, i.e. the firm-specific volatility of bank stock returns. Control 
variables (including cost-income ratio, income diversification, capitalisation, high-
risk banks, HHI and GDP growth) are added in all equations as they potentially 
impact these paired relationships. The variables used in this chapter are 
cautiously defined and justified in section 4.2.4 of Chapter 4. 
















Where 𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the average contribution to systemic risk of acquirers 
in the pre-merger period 
𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the average systematic risk of acquirers in the pre-merger 
period 
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the average default risk of acquirers in the pre-merger period 
𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the average idiosyncratic risk of acquirers in the pre-
merger period 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 include Cost–Income Ratio, Income diversification, 
Capitalization, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), GDP growth and high-risk 
banks dummy. 
Following this, the main hypotheses of this chapter are formulated, i.e. 
investigating the impact of bank mergers on the paired risk relationships. It is 
therefore proposed to look at the impact of a post-merger change in acquirer’s 
default risk on the post-merger change in each other type of risk, using OLS 
regression within a cross-sectional framework. The formulations of the following 
equations are the same as Equations 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 above, with heteroscedasticity-
consistent Huber-White standard errors: 
∆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
















Where ∆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the difference of average contribution to systemic risk 
of acquirers between post-completion and pre-merger period.  
∆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the difference of average systematic risk of acquirers 
between post-completion and pre-merger period. 
∆𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the difference of average default risk of acquirers between 
post-completion and pre-merger period. 
∆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is the difference of average idiosyncratic risk of acquirers 
between post-completion and pre-merger period. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 include Cost–Income Ratio, Income diversification, 
Capitalization, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), GDP growth and high-risk 
banks dummy. 
It should be noted that while 𝜔𝜔1,𝜔𝜔2 and 𝜔𝜔3 provide information regarding 
the relationship of acquirers’ default risk to the remaining risks in the period 
without M&As (pre-merger), λ1, λ2 and λ3 offer information about the relationships 
between the change in acquirers’ default risk and the change in the remaining 
risks in the period affected by the M&As activity.   
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7.4 Cross-sectional Analysis 
In this section, the analysis is presented on whether the default risk of 
acquiring banks has a direct impact on their idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and 
systemic risk surrounding a merger. In order to investigate these relationships, 
acquiring banks’ risks are divided into subsets: pre-merger period and the change 
in acquirers’ risks between post-completion and pre-merger periods. 
Furthermore, the sample is segmented into three subsamples: full sample of 
mergers, US acquirers and non-US acquirers.  
7.4.1 Analysis in the Context of No Mergers 
Table 7.1 below reports the results of the preliminary analysis, i.e. whether 
acquiring banks’ default risk is linked to their MES, beta and idiosyncratic risk 
(Hypotheses 7.1, 7.2, 7.3). 
Table 22: OLS regression pre-merger
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The OLS regressions model with heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors. The dependent variable is Pre-merger 
MES, Pre-merger systematic risk and Pre-merger idiosyncratic risk for the full sample, US acquirers and non-US acquirers. All variables, 
data sources and statistics are defined in Chapter 4. Statistically significant coefficients are highlighted in bold type. The P-values are 
denoted in parentheses. 


































Distance to default          
Pre-merger default 
risk 
0.0007** -0.0109 0.0043*** 0.0005 -0.0136 0.0044*** 0.0016*** 0.0192 0.0039*** 
 (0.0105) (0.3646) (0) (0.1668) (0.4074) (0) (0.0019) (0.2128) (0) 
Acquirers 
characteristics 
         
Cost-income ratio  0.0004 0.0248 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0362 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0278 0.0005 
 (0.2273) (0.1076) (0.4029) (0.1105) (0.1011) (0.1968) (0.3293) (0.1628) (0.1236) 
Income 
diversification  
-0.0002 -0.0275 0.0008** -0.0002 -0.0232 0.0008 0.0013 0.0509 4.04E-05 
 (0.7423) (0.2962) (0.0187) (0.7835) (0.6146) (0.1454) (0.2716) (0.1556) (0.9293) 
Capitalisation  0.001*** 0.0406*** 0.0002 0.0012*** 0.0615*** 0.0002 0.0008 0.0251 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2574) (0.0001) (0) (0.4771) (0.1777) (0.1468) (0.6689) 
Pre-merger high 
risk banks 
-0.0008 -0.0834**  0.0029*** 0.2472***  -0.0004 -0.0176  
 (0.3576) (0.0267)  (0.002) (0)  (0.8263) (0.7669)  
Country control          
GDP -0.0017*** -0.0745*** 0.0003***    -0.0008*** -0.0203** 0.0001 
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 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0039)    (0.0017) (0.0177) (0.3314) 
HHI 0.0049 0.0053 -0.0028    0.0109** 0.3265* -0.0042 
 (0.2618) (0.9810) (0.2830)    (0.0128) (0.0693) (0.1465) 
Constant 0.0063*** 0.1898** 0.0326*** -0.0021 -0.2641*** 0.0344*** 0.0059 0.1244 0.0324*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0273) (0) (0.3277) (0.008) (0) (0.1994) (0.348) (0) 
R-squared 0.1454 0.1382 0.5827 0.0625 0.1001 0.5866 0.1669 0.1087 0.5486 
          
Adj. R-squared 0.1354 0.1281 0.5785 0.052 0.09 0.5828 0.1277 0.0668 0.5306 
          
Number of 
observations 
608 608 608 452 452 452 156 156 156 


































**, * Denotes significance at 5% and 10% 
*** Denotes significance at 1%         






Regressions (1), (4) and (7) estimate the relationships between pre-
merger acquirers’ MES and their pre-merger default risk using acquirer 
characteristics in addition to acquirers’ relevant macroeconomic factors as 
controlled variables for the full sample of mergers, U.S. acquirers and non-US 
acquirers. The statistically positive coefficients of pre-merger default risk (at 5% 
level of confidence for the full sample and 1% for non-US acquirers) in 
regressions (1) and (7) respectively, indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between acquirers’ default risk and MES when M&As are not yet taken into 
consideration. In other words, banks with a higher default risk also exhibit a higher 
contribution to systemic risk, suggesting that individual bank problems regularly 
affect the overall banking sector. This is in line with banking theory as the banking 
sector has a systemic nature driven by the complicated system of exposures 
among banking firms, and possibly other financial intermediaries, via the 
interbank money market, wholesale payment and security settlement systems 
(Folkerts-Landau, 1991). Therefore, the complex and robust linkages among 
financial firms can cause the default risk of individual banks or other areas of the 
financial scheme to transform into systemic shocks, which could potentially cause 
the whole system to collapse (a more detailed discussion of systemic nature of 
the banking sector can be found in section 6.2.2 in Chapter 6). This finding is very 
much consistent with Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez (2013), as they found that 
the default of a single bank has a direct impact on European banking systemic 
risk, due to a substantial degree of interconnectedness among European banking 
institutions. 
Interestingly, default risk is not significant in regression (4), although ‘high 
risk banks’ witnesses a significant positive coefficient. This means that the strong 
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positive relationship between default risk and MES is only observed in pre-merger 
high-risk U.S. acquiring banks. This result provides a substantial contribution to 
the literature because, aside from this chapter, most of the earlier work (Campbell 
et al., 2008; Vassalou and Xing, 2004) has not distinguished between banking 
and non-banking firms and no previous study has ever looked at the relationship 
between default risk and systemic risk for acquiring banks in the U.S.  
Variable capitalisations in regressions (1) and (4) have significantly 
positive coefficients, suggesting that the more equity capital an acquiring bank 
holds, the higher contribution to systemic risk that bank may face. Indeed, the 
systemic consequence of the failures of larger players may be more severe, 
spreading problems to more counterparties, particularly for banks that are heavily 
involved in clearing and settlement functions. Larger banks may also tend to fund 
themselves in ways that increase their reliance on intraday credit, which could in 
turn increase the demand for intraday credit and increase systemic exposures. 
Similarly, Huang et al., (2012) explore systemic risk in a different financial 
structure from eight nations within Asia and the Pacific, and regard bank size as 
a determinant for exposing banks to the slight increase in systemic risk. In the 
most recent study by Laeven et al. (2016), systemic risk is found to increase with 
bank size and this effect exists above and beyond the effect of bank size on 
standalone bank risk. GDP as a proxy for business cycles in regressions (1) and 
(7) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (at 1% level), indicating 
that when the economy is growing, there will be more significant possibility of a 
reduction in acquirers' contribution to systemic risk. Furthermore, the pre-merger 
concentration in acquirers’ home countries, as proxied by the HHI, has a 
significant positive coefficient (at 1% confidence level). Expressly, as a banking 
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sector becomes more concentrated, the contribution of individual banks to 
systemic risk increases. This finding is consistent with the concentration-fragility 
hypothesis, which suggests that banks may pursue M&As in order to become ‘too 
big to fail’ and thereby, are often more likely to obtain a government's safety net 
or subsidies. The presence of these public guarantees can also result in moral 
hazard problems that stimulates larger banks' managers to engage in high-risk 
investments which, in turn, may destabilise the whole banking system (Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009; Weiß et al., 2014; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2012). 
Regressions (2), (5) and (8) of Table 7.1 estimate the relationships 
between default risk and beta, also using acquirer characteristics as well as 
acquirers’ countries as controlled variables for the full sample of mergers, U.S. 
acquirers and non-US acquirers respectively. Overall, the results from all of these 
specifications clarify that an increase or decrease in default risk of acquirers does 
not have any impact on their systematic risk. However, regressions (2) and (5) 
also reveal interesting relationships between acquirers with high pre-merger 
default risk and beta. Specifically, the negative relationship in regression (2) 
implies that the banks with the highest default risk pre-merger witness less 
systematic risk. In other words, high-risk banks bring less volatility to the overall 
markets widespread (including both financial and non-financial sectors). This is 
somewhat consistent with Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), who find that the bonds 
of the most distressed firms, defined as high-yielding bonds, earn lower than 
subsequent average returns, consistent with the default risk being negatively 
related to systematic risk. However, this relationship is observed to be positive 
under U.S. acquirers. The result provides evidence that U.S. banks with high 
default risk pre-announcement increase their systematic risk. This finding is 
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consistent with a number of studies in literature, which tend to find that the returns 
of the portfolios with high default risks are much higher than the portfolios with 
low default risks; thereby confirming that default risk is a systematic one 
(Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez, 2013; Shumway, 1996; Vassalou and Xing, 
2004).  
Other acquirers’ characteristics, such as capitalisation and GDP, are 
important drivers of acquirers’ beta. In regressions (2) and (5), capitalisation is 
positively related to pre-merger systematic risk, suggesting that larger acquiring 
banks contribute to the increase in their beta. This is in line with Casu et al. (2015) 
who find that the importance of bank size is noted as the primary contributor to 
systematic risk. This is because bank size is positively connected with 
organisational and procedural complexity (Beck et al., 2006). The growing bank 
size permits banks to enlarge across numerous markets geographically, and 
across different business lines whilst employing complicated financial 
instruments; thereby resulting in reduced transparency. 
In regressions (3), (6) and (9), significant positive relationships are found 
between acquirers’ default risk and idiosyncratic risk (at 1% level of confidence). 
This indicates that banks with a higher default risk also have a higher idiosyncratic 
risk, which is in line with results presented by Asquith and Gertner (1994), Dichev 
(1998) and Opler and Titman (1994). This finding is also consistent with Fiordelisi 
and Marqués-Ibañez (2013), as they show that increases in bank default risk 
across European listed banks are also associated with a greater likelihood of an 
increase in banks’ idiosyncratic risk. 
Regression (3) also shows that apart from acquiring banks’ default risk 
level, there are other drivers of acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk, including income 
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diversification and acquirers’ country GDP. The income diversification variable is 
statistically significant at 5% level with a positive coefficient. This indicates that 
the more proportion of non-interest income is, in comparison to operating income, 
the higher idiosyncratic risk banks will have to bear. This is consistent with claims 
that an overreliance on non-interest income can produce a risk-increasing effect 
for acquiring banks (Baele et al., 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Indeed, it is 
riskier for banks to have more non-interest income than traditional interest 
income. This is because, for instance, retail banks tend to be consistently less 
exposed to systemic risk as a high fraction of their total assets are made of core 
deposits and loans. 
To summarise, results from all specifications support the view that banks’ 
default risk has a direct impact on MES in the non-M&A period. This result is 
particularly pronounced for non-US acquirers. Similarly, default risk is also 
positively related to idiosyncratic risk. This indicates that the risk of default on any 
individual bank does not only affect this bank’s stockholders, but also extends to 
other banks in the banking system, causing the banking industry to become 
fragile and volatile. Therefore, hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 are supported. In contrast, 
no relationship is found between default risk and beta. Thus, hypothesis 2 is 
rejected. However, it is also revealed that banks with the highest default risk pre-
merger witness less systematic risk in general. Conversely, U.S. acquirers with 
high default risk pre-announcement, are associated with higher systematic risk, 
suggesting that high-risk banks’ distress affects the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Other factors, such as income diversification, capitalisation, GDP and HHI, play 




7.4.2 Analysis in the Context of Bank Mergers 
Table 7.2 below reports the results of tests carried out to show if acquiring 
banks’ ∆default risk is linked to their ∆MES, ∆beta and ∆idiosyncratic risk between 
post-completion and the pre-merger period (Hypotheses 7.4, 7.5, 7.6). 




The OLS regressions model with heteroskedasticity-consistent Huber–White standard errors. The dependent variable is ∆MES, 
∆systematic risk and ∆idiosyncratic risk for the full sample, US acquirers and non-US acquirers. All variables, data sources and 
statistics are defined in Chapter 4. Statistically significant coefficients are highlighted in bold type. The P-values are denoted in 
parentheses. 
 Full sample US only Non-US countries 




















         
∆default risk 0.002 -0.272 0.0336*** 0.0088 -0.0364 0.0469*** -0.0046 -0.4297 0.0154 
 (0.7847) (0.3156) (0.000) (0.2497) (0.8864) (0.000) (0.7176) (0.3083) (0.2037) 
Acquirers 
characteristics 
         
Cost-income 
ratio  
0.0003 0.0051 0.00056** 0.0002 0.0079 0.0005* 0.0006 -0.0133 0.0007 
 (0.3550) (0.6531) (0.0302) (0.6965) (0.5577) (0.0599) (0.3479) (0.5109) (0.317) 
Income 
diversification  
-0.0006 -0.0190 -0.0015*** -0.0005 -0.0294 -0.0017** -0.0008 0.0206 -0.0013* 
 (0.4161) (0.3699) (0.0007) (0.6422) (0.3753) (0.0124) (0.4849) (0.5319) (0.0557) 
Capitalisation  0.0002 -0.0053 0.0007** 0.0003 -0.0093 0.0011*** 0.0004 0.0241 5.52E-05 
 (0.5251) (0.6075) (0.0135) (0.5089) (0.463) (0.0008) (0.5628) (0.2431) (0.9226) 
Pre-merger high 
risk banks 
0.0012 0.0607  0.0019** -0.0035  0.0049* 0.1635*  
 (0.3883) (0.2404)  (0.0481) (0.9318)  (0.0908) (0.075)  
Country control          
GDP 0.0001 0.0018 0.0005**    0.0004 0.0153 0.0005* 
 (0.6930) (0.8423) (0.0117)    (0.1778) (0.1142) (0.0503) 
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HHI -0.0054 -0.1295 -0.0008    -0.0047 -0.0096 0.0021 
 (0.3203) (0.5425) (0.8351)    (0.43) (0.9662) (0.6383) 
Constant -0.0014 0.0508 -0.0034* -0.0014 0.1004 -0.0039* -0.0056 -0.3016* -0.0009 
 (0.5144) (0.5034) (0.0694) (0.5263) (0.2297) (0.0581) (0.3291) (0.0964) (0.8587) 
R-squared 0.0080 0.0065 0.0871 0.0098 0.0045 0.1327 0.0481 0.0446 0.0458 
          
Adj. R-squared -0.0036 -0.0050 0.0779 -0.0013 -0.0066 0.1249 0.0034 -0.0002 0.0076 
          
Number of 
observations 
608 608 608 452 452 452 156 156 156 
 Full sample US only Non-US countries 


















**, * Denotes significance at 5% and 10%        




Specifications (1), (4) and (7) constitute the baseline regression to 
examine the relationship between ∆default risk and ∆MES, using acquirer 
characteristics and acquirers’ countries as controlled variables for the full sample 
of mergers, U.S. acquirers and non-US acquirers. As can be seen, no 
relationships were found between ∆default risk and ∆MES, which suggests that 
M&As do not affect that relationship in general. Therefore, Hypothesis 7.4 is 
rejected. However, the coefficients of pre-merger high-risk banks in specifications 
(4) and (7) (at 5% and 10% level respectively) are positive and significant. It 
indicates that acquirers with the highest default risk before mergers, witness their 
increase in ∆MES as a result of M&A activity. The adjusted R-squared for models 
(1) and (4) is negative, suggesting that ∆default risk, other acquirers’ 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors possess no power for explaining 
∆MES under the M&A context.  
In regressions (2), (5) and (8), we observe that ∆default risk, acquirers’ 
characteristics and macroeconomic factors do not have any direct impact on 
∆beta. Hence, Hypothesis 7.5 is also rejected. However, regression (8) witnesses 
a positive coefficient of pre-merger high-risk banks at 10% level of confidence. 
This reveals that among non-US acquirers with high default risk profile before a 
merger, ∆beta tends to increase as a result of M&As. This result, nevertheless, 
is in contrast to that found by Casu et al., (2015), who indicate that for low-risk 
banks, a merger is positively associated with higher beta in Bank-Agency and 
Bank-Security deals. The adjusted R-squared for models (2) and (5) is negative 
and considered the lowest among the three, suggesting that ∆default risk, 
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acquirers characteristics and macroeconomic factors, possess no power for 
explaining ∆beta for the full sample and for the sample of U.S. acquirers. 
 Regressions (3), (6) and (9) demonstrate the relationship between 
∆default risk and ∆idiosyncratic risk. ∆default risk shows a positive and direct 
impact on ∆idiosyncratic risk (significant at 1% level) in regressions (3) and (6). 
This indicates that the changes in an acquiring bank’s default risk as a result of 
M&A activities have a direct impact on the change in an acquirer’s own 
idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that bank merger plays a vital role in this 
relationship. Thus, Hypothesis 7.6 of this chapter is verified. Apart from ∆default 
risk, other variables such as cost-income ratio, income diversification, 
capitalisation and GDP, all play an important role in explaining acquirers’ 
∆idiosyncratic risk post-merger. More specifically, the income diversification 
variables in regressions (3), (6) and (9) show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. This indicates that the more 
non-interest income to total operating income a bank possesses, the higher the 
probability is for them to reduce their idiosyncratic risk post-merger. Indeed, 
banking acquirers involved in non-interest income businesses (investment banks, 
insurance, securities) may have a lower volatility of profitability level compared to 
traditional banks with mainly interest income; thereby decreasing their level of 
idiosyncratic risk (Estrella, 2001; Boyd et al., 1993). The positive and significant 
coefficient of a cost-income ratio of specifications (3) and (6) indicates that 
inefficient banks (high cost-income ratio) are expected to have a lower franchise 
value, thus, resulting in the risk-increasing effect on acquiring banks post-merger. 
The capitalisation of acquirers in regressions (3) and (6) have significant 
positive coefficients, indicating that the more capital a bank holds before a 
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merger, the higher the probability is of their idiosyncratic risk increasing after a 
merger. This finding is consistent with previous literature (Berger et al., 1995; 
Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Boyd and De Nicoló, 2006) on bank capital 
regulation which suggests that higher capital levels may induce banks to increase 
asset portfolio risk; thereby increasing their idiosyncratic risk. An increase in 
asset portfolio risk may happen when equity is relatively expensive; risk-averse 
bank owners might elect to take part of their loss from a higher equity requirement 
by choosing a higher point on the risk-expected return frontier; thereby increasing 
risk. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of GDP (at 5% level of 
confidence) in regression (3) indicates that more the GDP growth rate of an 
acquirer’s country is before a merger, the larger the increase in an acquirer’s 
idiosyncratic risk will be, due to a merger. 
Overall, no relationships were found between ∆default risk and ∆MES or 
between ∆default risk and ∆beta, which suggests that M&As do not affect these 
relationships in general. Therefore, Hypothesis 7.4 and 7.5 are both rejected. 
Nevertheless, acquirers with the highest default risk before mergers witness their 
increase in MES post-merger, as a result of M&As. This result is specifically 
pronounced for U.S. acquirers. Moreover, it is found that for non-US acquirers 
with a high default risk profile before a merger, beta tends to increase post-
merger as a result of M&As. Additionally, the changes in acquiring bank’s default 
risk as a result of M&As have a positive direct impact on the change in their’ own 
idiosyncratic risk. Hence, Hypothesis 7.6 is approved. It is significantly interesting 
to note that bank mergers are proven to reduce the default risk of acquiring banks 
in Chapter 5 of this study. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the reduction 
in acquirers’ default risk following a merger also results in the reduction of their 
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idiosyncratic risk, but not in systematic risk or in their contribution to systemic risk, 





This chapter examines whether the changes in acquiring bank’s default 
risk as a result of M&As have an influence on acquirers' own idiosyncratic risk; or 
whether it extends to other banks (systemic risk) and all listed companies 
(systematic risk) on a global sample of bank mergers. It utilises direct measures 
of default risk: the Distance to Default proposed by Vallascas & Hagendorff 
(2011); systemic risk: Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), as in Acharya et al., 
(2017), and systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk: the single index model. 
Employing the most up to date, comprehensive global sample of bank M&As from 
1998 to 2015, this study provides new insight into the phenomenon, with findings 
that lead to various implications for policymakers and for broader academic 
literature. 
Academic literature has so far debated whether default risk is systematic 
or idiosyncratic, in addition to whether default risk is systemic. The findings from 
this study suggest that during a pre-merger period (without M&As), banks’ default 
risk positively and directly affects their MES and idiosyncratic risk. This result is 
particularly pronounced for non-US acquirers. It indicates that the risk of default 
on any individual bank does not only affect a bank’s stockholders but also extends 
to other banks within the banking system, causing the banking industry to 
become fragile and volatile. This is consistent with many studies, such as 
(Asquith and Gertner, 1994; Dichev, 1998; Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibañez, 2013; 
Opler and Titman, 1994). In contrast, no relationship is found between default 
risk and beta. Other factors such as income diversification, capitalisation, GDP 
and HHI, play important roles in explaining acquirers' pre-merger systematic risk, 
systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
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Next, with regards to the effect of bank mergers, no relationships were 
found between ∆default risk and ∆MES or between ∆default risk and ∆beta, which 
suggests that M&As do not affect these relationships in general. However, 
acquirers with the highest default risk before mergers witness their increase in 
MES as a result of M&As. This result is specifically pronounced for U.S. acquirers 
more than non-U.S. acquirers. Besides, the changes in acquiring bank’s default 
risk as a result of M&As have a positive direct impact on the change in their’ own 
idiosyncratic risk. It is however, of significant interest that bank mergers are 
proven to reduce the default risk of acquiring banks as shown in Chapter 5 of this 
study. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the reduction in acquirers’ default 
risk following a merger also results in the reduction of their idiosyncratic risk, 
which means that M&As lead to safer banks individually. Other variables, such 
as cost-income ratio, income diversification, capitalisation and GDP, are all 
important drivers of the change in acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk post-merger. 
The first prudential regulatory implication from the findings of this chapter 
is that M&A activities create safer banks individually; they reduce acquirers’ 
default risk and hence idiosyncratic risk, and should therefore, be encouraged. 
However, M&As do not play any role in enhancing the stability of the whole 
banking system, which is consistent with Chapter 6 of this study, or with the 
economy-wide system. Instead, during the period without M&As, the default risk 
of banks was positively related to their contribution to systemic risk. The reason 
behind this relationship is beyond this study and will be left for future research. 
Furthermore, acquiring banks with a high default risk profile before mergers are 
associated with a higher contribution to systemic risk post-merger. Therefore, it 
highlights the need for banking regulators and supervisors to strengthen the 
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support for macro-prudential regulations, for instance, by imposing more stringent 
regulatory requirements upon the merger approval process involved with high 
default risk banking firms, in order to enhance the stability of the whole banking 
system. 
Finally, this study reveals the presence of any significant and positive bank 
size effect in relation to acquirers’ systemic risk and systematic risk during a 
period without M&As. In literature, bank size is observed as one of the key 
contributors to systematic risk (Casu et al., 2015). Therefore, it leads to a policy 
implication where a high level of regulatory requirements should be imposed on 
larger banks, for example, in the form of enhanced risk-based capital, leverage 





Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 The ways in which banking corporations can operate has drastically 
changed over several decades, due to numerous causes. The prospect for 
greater profitability, provided by technological and financial advances and the 
growing popularity of capital markets, has led to a structural evolution in the 
conventionally fragmented functions of banking institutions. Following a chain of 
delayed reactions between regulations, circumvention and deregulation, the 
formation and consolidation of very big, multi-product financial institutions, 
operating internationally, are presently the norm rather than the exception. These 
significant banking M&As have resulted in the emergence of the TBTF and 
financial conglomerates. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) and De Nicolo, et al. (2004) 
argue that consolidation and conglomeration activities that create very large 
financial firms are vital determinants of the increase in systemic risk. Indeed, 
empirical studies that examine systemic risk issues related to bank or insurance 
M&A activities, either by looking at a firm’s expected short fall in an 
undercapitalized market or information on a firm’s stock and market index, 
indicate that systemic risk has increased in recent years due to consolidation 
trends (Lim et al., 2015; Mühlnickel and Weiß, 2015; Weiß et al., 2014). 
Additionally, the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2007-09 has resulted in 
revived attention on the degree of interconnectedness among banking firms, 
alongside inefficiency of the current supervisory system to hinder the systemic 
effects of what was initially a mere banking crisis.  
The extant literature on the effects of M&As on bidders’ risk in the banking 
industry revolves around theoretical contributions that consider the causes, 
benefits and concerns of this M&As trend. Furthermore, empirical investigations 
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have been conducted, in order to provide answers to the issues raised in former 
studies. Proponents of this trend cite numerous benefits of diversification on 
reducing bidders' risk, such as the reduction in idiosyncratic risk, diversification 
of loan portfolio, a bank's assets, and operations that result in higher capital 
buffers and lowered cash flow variability, thereby decreasing risk for acquiring 
banks. In contrast, opponents call for attention due to serious public policy issues 
as a result of M&As, such as increased systemic risk and default risk, 
monopolistic powers and mega-firms’ access to government subsidies. 
Moreover, empirical studies have examined the effects of M&As on various types 
of bidding banks’ risk, including default risk, systemic risk, systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and liquidity risk. Interestingly, the results in all cases are mixed, 
perhaps, due to sample or methodological differences. 
Therefore, the prolonged debates in literature, coupled with the mixed 
results on the effects of M&As on bank risks, serve as the motivation for this study 
to shed light on the effects of bank M&As on acquiring banks’ default risk and 
their contribution to systemic risk. In this respect, the current study extends the 
extant literature accordingly. First, the most comprehensive sample of global 
bank M&As is used, between the period of 1998 and 2015. This characterises 
the most active period with respect to financial conglomerates and bank-nonbank 
partnerships, and hence, contains the largest and most significant deals of these 
types. Second, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first to study 
various risk implications of bank mergers on a global sample which allows for 
experimentation with rich variation in the level of changes in bidders' risks, 
witnessed across deals within different countries; thereby extending literature. 
Third, it categorises deals between focusing and product-diversifying mergers 
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(product diversification) as well as deals between in-country and cross-border 
mergers (geographic diversification). This is to acknowledge the differentiation in 
the risk effects of M&As when banks merge with different types of targets and 
when banks engage in different geographical deals. Therefore, this study 
diverges from various studies in literature that do not make these significant 
distinctions. Fourth, this study provides original evidence on the determinants of 
these merger-related changes in acquiring banks’ default risk, systemic risk, 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Finally, this is the first time the coupled 
relationships surrounding a merger activity between default risk and systemic 
risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, are examined.   
In Chapter 5, with regards to the impact of bank M&As on bidders’ default 
risk; the findings show that bank mergers reduce the default risk of acquiring 
banks and supported Hypothesis 5.1. Furthermore, evidence from multivariate 
analysis indicates that not all forms of diversification exert an equal effect on the 
reduction of bidders' default risk. Product diversification is found to pose a 
positive effect on bidding banks' default risk (lower risk), which is in line with 
broader literature concerned with the diversification benefits of reducing bank 
default risk, as demonstrated by van Lelyveld & Knot, 2009 and Wall et al., 2007. 
Thereby, the second Hypothesis 5.2 is proven. Conversely, geographic 
diversification does not have a statistically significant relationship to the reduction 
in default risk for acquiring banks; therefore, the third Hypothesis 5.3 is rejected. 
Finally, the status of target, deal size, return on asset ratio (ROA), leverage and 
political stability, which are included as control variables, are all found to play 
different roles in explaining the changes in bidders’ default risk.  
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Chapter 6 examines the effects of bank M&As on acquirers’ contribution 
to systemic risk, predicting that mergers also produce the same risk-reducing 
effects. First, the findings suggest that M&As, on average, do not impact on 
acquiring banks’ contribution to systemic risk. The first Hypothesis 6.1 of this 
chapter, which predicts that mergers generate systemic risk-reducing effect for 
acquiring banks, is therefore rejected. In addition, payment method and product 
diversification are hypothesised as potential determinants that have impact on 
the changes in bidding banks' contribution to systemic risk. In fact, the results 
show that product-diversifying deals lead to a reduction in acquirers’ contribution 
to systemic risk for non-US acquirers only. Therefore, the second Hypothesis 6.2 
of this chapter, which projects that product diversification brings risk-reducing 
benefits for banks, cannot be rejected. It also transpires that with deals financed 
by cash only, the acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk will increase. Hence, the 
third Hypothesis 6.3 of this chapter cannot be rejected. In addition, other control 
variables determining the reduction in acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk 
include a concentrated banking system (HHI) and a stable political environment. 
In contrast, the factors that contribute to the increase in systemic risk include 
private targets, a small relative deal size to acquirers’ value and TBTF motive. 
Finally, Chapter 7 examines whether the changes in acquiring bank’s 
default risk as a result of M&As have an influence on their own idiosyncratic risk; 
or whether it extends to other banks (systemic risk) and all listed companies 
(systematic risk). The findings from this study suggest that, in general, during a 
pre-merger period (without M&As), acquiring banks’ default risk influence their’ 
contribution to systemic risk. This result is particularly pronounced for non-US 
acquirers. Similarly, acquirers’ pre-merger default risk is also positively related to 
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their pre-merger idiosyncratic risk. This indicates that the risk of default on any 
individual bank does not only affect this bank’s stockholders, but also extends to 
other banks within the banking system, causing the banking industry to become 
fragile and volatile. In contrast, no relationship is found between acquirers’ pre-
merger default risk and their pre-merger systematic risk. However, the results 
also show that banks with the highest default risk pre-merger witness less 
systematic risk in general. Therefore, Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.3 of this chapter are 
certified whereas Hypothesis 7.2 is rejected. 
This study also investigates the changes in acquirers’ default risk, 
acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk, acquirers’ idiosyncratic risk and acquirers’ 
systematic risk, between the pre and post-merger period. Overall, the results 
show no relationship between ∆default risk and ∆MES or between ∆default risk 
and ∆beta, which suggests that, in general, M&As do not affect these 
relationships. Nevertheless, acquirers with the highest default risk before 
mergers witness an increase in MES post-merger as a result of M&As. This result 
is specifically more pronounced for U.S. acquirers than non-U.S. Furthermore, 
there is weak, evidence that, as a result of M&As, beta tends to increase post-
merger for non-US acquirers who have a high default risk profile pre-merger. In 
addition, ∆default risk of acquirers has a direct positive impact on the change in 
their’ own idiosyncratic risk (∆idiosyncratic risk), suggesting that bank mergers 
play an important role in this relationship. It is significant to note that bank 
mergers are proven to reduce the default risk of acquiring banks in Chapter 5 of 
this study. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the reduction in acquirers’ 
default risk following a merger, also results in the reduction of their idiosyncratic 
risk, which means that M&As lead to safer banks in general. Other control 
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variables, such as cost-income ratio, income diversification, capitalisation and 
GDP, are found to be important drivers of ∆idiosyncratic risk. In short, Hypothesis 
7.6 of this chapter is approved meanwhile Hypotheses 7.4 and 7.5 are rejected. 
The outcomes of this study not only extend the body of literature but also 
have useful application in the banking industry and can be employed by bank 
managers, stockholders, bondholders, supervisors and policymakers at both 
corporate level and at country level. Specifically, bank mergers can be used as a 
mechanism to reduce risk exposures of institutions (reduction in idiosyncratic risk 
and default risk). However, regulators and banking supervisors should examine 
the characteristics of each deal, and acquirers, in order to determine whether or 
not to provide incentives for it. For instance, deals involving bidders with higher 
ROA pre-merger and product diversification should be motivated as they are 
associated with default risk reduction for the combined banks. However, deals 
involving private target and higher acquirers’ leverage compared to other peers 
in the industry should be approved with extra care as these types of mergers 
might increase default risk for acquirers. Furthermore, the presence of a 
significant and negative deal size effect leads to the policy implication that mega-
mergers in the banking industry should be subject to greater regulatory scrutiny, 
for instance, higher leverage and liquidity requirements, contingent capital 
requirements and resolution plans for the combined entity (Krainer, 2012). It is 
also necessary for banking supervisors to consider the aspect of financial stability 
as a further important criterion within the approval process for bank mergers, 
paying extra attention to deals that lead to systemic vulnerability, such as cash-
financing deals, deals that have a smaller deal size in comparison with acquirers’ 
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market value and also deals involved with private targets and high-risk bidders 
pre-merger.  
In conclusion, along with many studies in literature, there are some 
drawbacks regarding analysis and the results presented above. One potential 
limitation of this study is that it does not take into consideration the characteristics 
of targets. One can argue that when bidders acquire high-risk targets, their risk 
position might increase, thereby adding more determinants to the changes in 
acquirers’ risks. This remains an area for future research. Moreover, because the 
study sample is international, it is essential to include variables on banking 
regulations and supervisions in different countries of acquirers, as they are 
potentially the cause of the changes in bidders’ risk. However, since the data for 
worldwide surveys on bank regulations and supervision in Barth et al. (2013) are 
only available until 2012 from the World Bank website, a further study may 
examine the risk effects of bank mergers on bidding banks, taking the regulatory 
variables into account. 
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APPENDIX A: MERGER WAVES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
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APPENDIX B: THE U.S. BANK REGULATION 
 
The U.S. financial regulation from the 19th century restrained the 
opportunity of financial institutions to enlarge geographically to other states, along 
with their capability to consolidate with other kinds of financial institutions, such 
as security companies, insurance firms and investment banks. Due to these 
legislative obstacles, banking institutions in the U.S. could not benefit from 
merger-related advantages, such as product and geographical diversification, or 
economies of scale and scope. The primary legal obstacles amongst banks and 
non-banking businesses were imposed by Section 24 of the 1864 National 
Banking Act, whereby specific “incidental” powers were authorised, in order to 
allow operating subsidiaries of national banks to become involved in activities 
outside the limitations of the bank. Therefore, banks were forbidden to carry out 
activities deemed ‘non-incidental’.  
Later, the United States observed a severe economic downturn following 
the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Benston (1990 blamed banks for the utter 
confusion within the financial market, which at that time was due to the fact that 
they were involved in excessively risky activities via their security subsidiaries. 
This situation led to 40% of US banks either becoming bankrupt or falling under 
pressure to merge with one another. The Banking Act of 1933 was then enacted, 
in response to concerns that the transactions of commercial banks and payment 
schemes were suffering losses from the volatile stock exchange. Sections 16, 20, 
21 and 32 of the Act were labelled as the Glass-Steagall Act; hence the Banking 
Act of 1933 was also officially recognised as the Glass-Steagall Act. Section 20 
of the Act proposed stability and gained public confidence in the financial 
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structure by efficiently separating the activities between the investment banks 
that usually handled and underwrote securities and the commercial banks that 
received deposits and granted loans. The two different banks were prohibited 
from having connections or engaging with each other, such as in overlapping 
administrations or having shared control. The constraint on the combination of 
investment and commercial banks was done purposely in an attempt to diminish 
the conflicts of interest between them when functioned by a single organisation.  
However, the study of Ramirez (1999) supports the view that the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 fundamentally destroyed a functioning financial scheme, as 
it proposed ineffectual costs to the banking sector; hence negatively influencing 
its financial structure. Furthermore, while attempting to yield justification for the 
segregation between investment and commercial banks, the studies of Kroszner 
and Rajan (1994) and Puri (1994) demonstrate that the assumption that 
commercial banks were methodically deceiving shareholders into purchasing 
deficient quality stocks is rejected. They detect that the failure percentage of 
bonds placed by an investment bank was not in any way higher than that placed 
by a banking affiliate.  
During the 1950s, banks realised that they were able to form a bank 
holding company to circumvent the existing regulations created by, the National 
Banking Act (1864) and the Glass-Steagall Act (1933), in which only entirely 
owned banking subsidiaries were subject to comply with bank regulations. In 
other words, bank holding companies were not banned from holding insurance 
firms, investments or commercial banks. In an attempt to control the situation 
caused by policymakers, a bank holding company became specified as a 
company owning at least 25% of the voting security of bank subsidiary under the 
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Banking Holding Company Act of 1956. The Act was indeed designed to promote 
the prosperity of the bank holding company, while in the meantime still imposing 
restrictions on their activities by providing them legal status. The new scheme 
forbade a bank holding company to deal with activities not related to banking or 
certain other financial transactions, such as securities, although, it  was allowed 
to expand its activities into non-financial bank businesses, such as mortgages, 
investment consultancy and card operations (Heffernan, 2005). Later, 
policymakers announced the launch of a division called the Douglas Amendment 
in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which allowed bank holding 
companies to acquire banks out of states, but only if that state did not forbid it.   
However, while companies in other industries were involved in mergers 
and acquisitions at a velocious pace, the financial sector found itself vastly 
disintegrating and, as companies were unable to develop, they took advantage 
of consolidation activities. For the time being, the increasing fierce competitions 
caused financial services to call for drastic action on regulators, to remove the 
restrictions that were restraining them in the acquisition process. Policymakers 
progressively had to respond to these pressures by enforcing a new regulation, 
as described below.  
At the end of April 1987, three giant banks, J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust 
and Citicorp, were permitted by the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) to become 
involved in restricted underwriting and trading in a series of stocks, such as 
commercial papers, mortgage-related stocks and municipal revenue bonds. The 
Fed deemed that if subsidiaries received less than 5% of their gross revenues 
from forbidden underwriting and trading within two-years, they would not be 
primarily participating in underwriting activities. Over the years, the Fed made 
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several attempts to increase the cap on gross revenue to 10%, and finally 25%, 
whilst permitting bank holding companies to engage in corporate debt and equity 
underwriting. For the first time since the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933, banks were liberalised to take part in underwriting.    
One of the significant characteristics of the US banking industry during the 
1980s was the increasing number of bank failures.  It is estimated that 1,600 
banks either collapsed or accepted financial support from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 1980 to 1994. The cause of these failures 
could only be explained by specific factors, for example, large national elements, 
such as financial, economic, regulatory and legislative, that formed the 
prerequisite for the massive amount of bankruptcy. This could also be due to the 
sequence of a harsh sector and regional downturns that knocked banks within 
various banking markets. Finally, few banks within these markets took high risks 
while being inadequately monitored by supervisory authorities. When the banking 
crisis was almost over in 1994, the Congress was required to revise the overly 
painful regulations on the banking sector and hence introduced the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. This Act provided 
uniform branching and interstate consolidation requirements for all states, 
whereby banks were now allowed to expand into other states without restrictions 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).      
A significant milestone in the US financial regulatory history was the 
passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 (or the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). This deregulatory event was a result of the intense 
pressure and lobbying by the financial services sector. Indeed, the merger 
between Citicorp and Travelers was announced in 1998, despite the fact that the 
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remaining provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act still prohibited banks from 
consolidating with insurance underwriters. This merger somewhat challenged 
existing regulations and paved the way for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. 
Most of the regulatory obstacles dictated on the finance sectors by the National 
Banking Act of 1864, the Banking Act of 1933 and the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956, were eliminated under FSMA 1999. Explicitly, the Act voided the 
barriers on commercial and investment banks, consolidating with security 
companies and insurance firms, as written in sections 20 and 32 of Glass-
Steagall Act. It established a new financial holding firm in section 4 of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, which permitted involvement in securities and 
insurance underwrites and merchant bank transactions, but not in non-financial 
transactions of such holding firm, which was limited to 15% (US Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs).  
Following the banking crises in the 1980s and early 1990s, the financial 
crisis of 2007-09 could be considered as the most significant and most extreme 
financial incident since the economic depression of the 1930s that transformed 
the landscape of the global finance and banking sector. This financial crisis drove 
the global economies, banking sectors and financial market into severe disaster 
and took massively financed bailouts from taxpayers in order to bolster the sector. 
A courageous response from the U.S regulatory authorities, considering the 
immense damage caused by the financial crisis, was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Act intended to set up a sound 
economic foundation to boost employment, protect customers, control Wall Street 
and Big Bonuses, cease bailouts and the ‘too-big-to-fail,’, in order to avoid 
another financial crisis. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volcker Rule, finalised on 
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December 2013, aimed to minimise the risks incurred by US banking entities. It 
prohibited them from becoming involved in proprietary transactions, acquiring or 
holding partnerships, equitys, or other possessions in a hedge fund or private 




APPENDIX C: BANK RISKS 
 
Banks exist in order to take on the risks of their clientele. By providing risk 
management products and services to its customers; many risks are added with 
each operation. These products and services are priced accordingly, based on 
the estimation of the expenses of managing the risks inherent in each transaction. 
Indeed, banking organisations’ major expertise comes from their capability to 
measure and control the exposure of risk for the welfare of both themselves and 
their customers, either via the development of financial market products to shift 
risks, or via the absorption of their customers’ risk into their inventory of risk on 
the bank’s balance sheets. Since banks are risk intermediaries, they retain an 
inventory of risk that should be measured responsibly in order to guarantee that 
the risk exposure does not intimidate the bank’s solvency. The broad classes of 
financial risks exposed by banks: are credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and 
interest rate risk; these are divided into subclasses, relative to the specific events 
that trigger losses.  
First, banks are exposed to market risk, including interest rate risk and 
foreign exchange risk. Market risk is the risk of losses due to adverse market 
movements depressing the value of the positions held by market players. Foreign 
exchange risk, however, is the risk of incurring losses due to the fluctuation of 
exchange rates.  Interest rate risk is the risk of decline in net interest income, or 
interest revenues minus interest cost, due to the movement of interest rates 
(Bessis, 2015). One example of market risk is where the interest rates rise 
unpredictably, the banking firm’s cost of funds may rise, and the value of its 
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longer-run, illiquid assets may drop, resulting in the loss of both its profitability 
and market value of the bank’s equity.      
Second, banks are exposed to credit risk. In the bank’s balance sheet, the 
most significant asset classification consists of loans (whether to businesses, 
residential households, or even sovereign governments), banking firms confront 
the risk of failure or deterioration in a borrower’s credit quality. Since many 
subprime mortgages within the pools initiated between 2005 and 2006 started to 
demonstrate default one year or less after initiation, concerns were raised in the 
market regarding the default risk exposure of stocks, despite their AAA or AA 
credit ratings. In the simplest of terms, credit risk is defined as ‘the potential that 
a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with 
agreed terms’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999, p.1). As such, 
measuring credit risk relies upon the probability of the default of a company to 
fulfil its contractual obligation, and upon the extent of loss if a default occurs. In 
the event of default, the Basel Committee provides clear guidance that ‘a default 
is considered to have occurred with regards to a particular obligor when either or 
both of the two following events have taken place: (1) the bank considers that the 
obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full, without 
recourse by the bank to actions such as realising security (if held) and/or (2) the 
obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the 
banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the 
customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than 
current outstanding.’ Default risk is defined as a risk in which borrowers fail to 
comply with their debt obligations. Default triggers a total or partial loss of the 
amount lent to the counterparty (Bessis, 2015). As defined, Golin & Delhaise 
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(2013) suggest that credit risk and default risk are virtually synonymous; 
therefore, they will be used interchangeably in this paper. The Banking 
Supervision Basel Committee highlighted that because the exposure to credit risk 
continues to be the dominant source of problems within banking organisations 
globally, it is essential for banking firms and supervisory authorities to learn 
valuable lessons from several previous financial crises. Banking firms should 
address themselves to the need for identification and to estimate, monitor and 
oversee credit risk; whilst at the same time, ensuring that banks hold enough 
capital buffer against these risks and that they are sufficiently compensated for 
the risks incurred. Banking supervisors, on the other hand, should stimulate 
sound practices for managing credit risk at an international level. The effective 
credit risk management is a crucial element of a thorough approach to risk 
management and is vital to the long-run success of any banking firm (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999).  
Third, liquidity risk is another source of risk, reported in the context of the 
2007-2009 credit crisis. Liquidity risk is broadly defined as the risk of not being 
able to raise cash when needed (Bessis, 2015). Banking firms alter short-run, 
liquid liabilities (e.g. demand deposits) into longer-run, illiquid assets (e.g. loans). 
If the demand for liquidity unexpectedly increases, it is impossible for banks to 
satisfy all withdrawal calls, as selling an illiquid portfolio at firesale prices is very 
costly.  Liquidity risks consist of market liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. The 
funding liquidity risk is driven by the probability that over a particular horizon the 
banking institution will be no longer able to settle their payment duties 
immediately. Market liquidity risk, on the other hand, is the loss incurred when 
a bank wants to perform a trade or to liquidate a position instantly meanwhile the 
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best price cannot be reached. Normally, funding liquidity risk leads to market 
liquidity risk. 
As far as this is concerned, banks are also exposed to operational risks. 
Operational risks include the malfunction of information systems, of reporting 
systems, of internal risk monitoring rules and of procedures designed to take 
corrective actions on a timely basis (Bessis, 2015). Banks engage in clearing and 
custodial transactions on behalf of their clients. For example, to protect their 
reputation banks may be responsible for compensating their customers’ losses 
in the case of mismanagement, fraud, human error or computer failure.  
The last source of risk in the broad terms of financial risk, is solvency risk. 
Solvency risk is the risk of being unable to absorb losses with the available 
capital. Based on the principle of capital adequacy promoted by regulators, a 
minimum capital base is required to absorb unexpected losses potentially arising 
from the current risks of a firm. Solvency issues arise when the unexpected 
losses exceed the capital level, as happened during the 2008 financial crisis for 
several firms. This capital buffer sets the default probability of the bank; the 
probability that potential losses exceed the capital base.  
Given the impact of the recent global financial crisis 2007-08 on the world 
economy, discussed so far, is the area of banks and their contributions to 
systemic risk. The perception of systemic risk is fundamentally essential to 
enhance the soundness and stability of the financial system (for a detailed 
discussion, see 6.2.3). However, it is difficult to arrive at an accepted definition of 
systemic risk. There is an excellent discussion about the definition of systemic 
risk in DeBandt & Hartmann (2000, p.10,11) which covers almost all other 
definitions explicitly and implicitly provided to date. First, they define a systemic 
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event in a narrow perception as an event where the announcement of ‘bad news’ 
regards a firm, or its collapse, or the breakdown of financial market results in 
substantial negative influences on one or more firms or markets, for instance, 
their collapse or crash. Based on this wording, a systemic crisis (in a narrow or 
broad perception) can be defined as ‘a systemic event that affects a considerable 
number of financial institutions or markets in a strong sense, thereby severely 
impairing the general well-functioning (of an important part) of the financial 
system.’ Therefore, ‘systemic risk (in the narrow and broad sense) can then be 
defined as the risk of experiencing systemic events in the strong sense.’ In a more 
up-to-date version, Schwarcz (2008, p.198) attempts to encompass a number of 
existing definitions of systemic risk and arrives at a general systemic risk 
definition: ‘the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (x) the failure of a chain of 
markets or institutions or (y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, 
(ii) resulting in substantial financial-market price volatility (which price volatility 
may well reflect increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability).’ 
This brief survey of risk exposures emphasises the significance of 
continuous measurement of the level of risk within a bank’s risk inventory. 
Therefore, risk measurement is a crucial part of risk management. One of the 
most vital and influential economic theories regarding finance and investment is 
the modern portfolio theory by  Markowitz, (1952). This investment theory builds 
on the idea that risk-averse investors can form portfolios to enhance or amplify 
expected return, based on a given level of market risk, highlighting that risk is an 
inherent component of higher return. Modern portfolio theory measures the 
advantages of diversification, also known as ‘not putting all eggs into one basket.’ 
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In essence, information on expected returns, standard deviations of returns and 
correlations between returns, for every probable pair of financial shares, are 
needed to measure the efficient frontier in a mean-variance world.    
Later, Sharpe (1963) as well as Mossin (1968) adopted a simplified 
assumption for the portfolio theory and it became a model regularly applied in 
financial risk management practice. Specifically, total risk can be split into two 
components: systematic (market risk) and idiosyncratic risk (the residual, 
company-specific risk). Systematic risk represents the effect of unexpected 
changes in macroeconomic and financial market conditions on the performance 
of borrowers. Borrowers may differ in their degree of sensitivity to systematic risk, 
but few firms are entirely indifferent to the broader economic conditions in which 
they operate. Therefore, the systematic component of portfolio risk is unavoidable 
and only partly diversifiable. Meanwhile, idiosyncratic risk (company-specific risk) 
represents the effects of risks that are particular to individual borrowers. As a 
portfolio becomes more fine-grained, in the sense that the most significant 
individual exposures account for a smaller share of total portfolio exposure, 
idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level (Lutkebohmert, 2009). 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model stems from the hypothesised assumption 
that only undiversifiable market risk is significant for share pricing, only the market 
risk measurement β is essential, therefore substantially decreasing the necessary 
statistics inputs. Nevertheless, β is problematically evidenced as being weakly 
connected to actual stock returns, thus raising concerns on β’s description as the 
right risk management. In search of market practitioners for a replacement risk 
measure that was both accurate and somewhat economical to estimate, Value at 
Risk (VAR) has been widely adopted. One of the compelling reasons for the 
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adoption of VAR, was the determination of J.P. Morgan to produce a transparent 
VAR measurement model, RiskMetrics.’ An openly available databank, 
comprising the crucial data input to compute the model, was created to support 
RiskMetrics. Another reason for the adoption of VAR was that in 1998, the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) introduced the international bank capital 
requirements, which permit comparatively sophisticated banks to compute their 
capital requirements via internal models such as VAR. The VAR model can be 
used to measure market risk, credit risk and operational risk (Allen and Saunders, 
2015). 
Besides VAR, there are many other risk measurement models that have 
been adopted and developed in order to measure bank’s contribution to systemic 
risk, such as Marginal Expected Shortfall and Lower Tail dependence (Weiß et 
al., 2014), to measure default risk such as Distance to Default (Gropp et al., 2006; 
Hillegeist et al., 2004; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011), Expected Default 
Frequency (Furfine and Rosen, 2011) and Z-score (Craig and Santos, 1997). 
These methodologies will be discussed in more detailed in the empirical Chapters 
5 and 6 respectively, regarding the effects of M&As on acquiring banks’ default 
risk and acquirers’ contribution to systemic risk.   
In conclusion, the crisis of 2007-09 demonstrates that there is still much to 
learn about risk measurement and risk management. However, no system will be 
efficient if financial institutions ignore the warning signals flashed by their risk 
measurement models, in their rush to compete in the latest market frenzy, 
whether it be subprime mortgage-backed securities or high-tech. Risk 
measurement and management requires a steady eye and a firm hand, as well 
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APPENDIX D: MARGINAL EXPECTED SHORTFALL 
 
D1. Derivation of Equation 6.3 in section 6.3.2.2 
Following Scaillet (2005), it start with the expression for the expected loss of the 
financial system at time t 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = −𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) (D1.1) 
Following Scaillet (2005), it is shown that the first order derivative for the weight 
associated with the ith asset, i.e. MES, is given by 
𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
= 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) (D1.2) 
Then  ?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  is defined as as the return for the financial system except for the 
contribution of the ith asset, where ?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = ?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
(D1.3) 
Besides, the threshold C is not restricted to be a scalar. It is assumed to 
depend on the distribution of the market returns and hence on the weights and 
the specified probability to be in the tail of the distribution p, as in the case of the 
VaR (Gourieroux et al., 2000), thus providing a general proof for equation (D1.2). 
It follows that: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1�?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝)� = 1𝑝𝑝 ∫ (∫ (𝑟𝑟�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝)−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−∞∞−∞
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    (D1.4) 
where 𝑝𝑝(?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) stands for the joint probability density function of the two series 





∫ (∫ (𝑟𝑟�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−∞∞−∞ 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1𝑝𝑝 ∫ �𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −∞−∞
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� 𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝) −𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (D1.5) 
However, the probability of being in the left tail of the distribution of the 
market return is constant, i.e. Pr(?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) = 𝑝𝑝 
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A direct implication of this fact is that the first order derivative of this 
probability is null. To put it differently, using simple calculus rules for cumulative 
distribution functions, it can be shown that �𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
− 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� 𝑝𝑝(𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝) −
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 0 (D1.6) 





∫ (∫ (𝑟𝑟�𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑝𝑝(?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)−𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−∞∞−∞ 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =
𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�?̆?𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝)� = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) (D1.7) 
which completes the proof. 
D2. Derivation of Equation 6.6 in section 6.3.2.2 
Let consider the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻: 
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
1/2 = � 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 0
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2� (D2.1) 
Given Equation (6.4) in section 6.3.2.2, the market and firm returns can be 
expressed as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 (D2.2) 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (D2.3) 
For any conditioning event C: 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� +
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� (D2.4) 
which completes the proof.  
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D3. Tail expectations in section 6.3.2.3 
The tail expectations 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� and 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� can be easily 
estimated in a non-parametric kernel framework by elaborating on (Scaillet, 
2005). 
For ease of notation, let denote the systemic risk event 𝐶𝐶
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
 by k. The tail 
expectation on the market returns 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1 �𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝐶𝐶𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� becomes 
𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘). (D3.1) 
Using the definition of the conditional mean, (D3.1) is rewritten as a 
function of the probability density function f 
𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡−1(𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∫ 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝(𝑢𝑢|𝑢𝑢 < 𝑘𝑘)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘−∞  (D3.2) 
where the conditional density 𝑝𝑝(𝑢𝑢|𝑢𝑢 < 𝑘𝑘) can be stated as 
𝑓𝑓(𝑢𝑢)
Pr (𝑢𝑢<𝑘𝑘) (D3.3) 
To complete the proof, the numerator and denominator in (D3.3) are 
computed. For this, the standard kernel density estimator of the density f at point 
u was given by  
𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = 1𝑇𝑇ℎ�∅(𝑢𝑢 − 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝐴𝐴
1
 
where h stands for the bandwidth parameter, and A is the sample size (Silverman, 
1986). 
Second, the probability of being in the tail of the distribution can be defined 
as the integral of the probability density function over the domain of definition of 
the variable u, i.e. 𝑝𝑝 = Pr(𝑢𝑢 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∫ 𝑝𝑝(𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘−∞ . Consequently, by replacing 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 










The expectation in (D3.1) hence takes the form 
𝔼𝔼�𝑡𝑡−1(𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
∑ ∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
ℎ
)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  (D3.4) 
Similarly, it can be shown that 
𝔼𝔼�𝑡𝑡−1(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 < 𝑘𝑘) = ∑ 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ )𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
∑ ∅(𝑘𝑘−𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
ℎ




APPENDIX E: CoVaR 
 
E1. Derivation of equation 6.16 in section 6.3.3.2 
Considering two cases: a general case with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≠ 0 and a special case 
with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡= 0. Given Equations (6.14) and (6.15), 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≠ 0 then the market return can 
be expressed as: 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (E1.1) 
For each conditioning event form ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶, CoVaR is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟�𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡








𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝐶𝐶)�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶� = 1 − α (E1.3) 
In the special case where the conditional mean function of 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is linear in 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, the first two conditional moments of 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  given 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶 can be expressed as: 
𝔼𝔼(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶) = 𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 ∗  𝐶𝐶 =𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 ∗ 𝐶𝐶 = �1−𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶 (E1.4) 
𝕍𝕍(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝕍𝕍(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) − 𝕍𝕍(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)[ 𝔼𝔼(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)] = 𝕍𝕍(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) ∗ �1 − �𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 �2 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2� = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 (E1.5) 
Consider G(.) the conditional (location-scale) demeaned and standardized 














∗ 𝐶𝐶� �𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶� = 1 (E1.7) 











∗ 𝐶𝐶� = 𝐺𝐺−1(1 − α) (E1.8) 




𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝐶𝐶 = −𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝐺𝐺−1(1 − α) + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶 (E1.9) 
The CoVaR defined for the conditioning event  
ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) has a similar expression: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = −𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2𝐺𝐺−1(1 − α) + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷−1(0.5) (E1.10) 
where F (:) denotes the marginal cdf of the firm return. Then, for each conditioning 
event form ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶, the ∆CoVaR is defined as: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝐶𝐶 - 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ [𝐶𝐶 −
𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)](E1.11) 
=𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ [𝐶𝐶 −𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)] (E1.12) 
where 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡= 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 denotes the time-varying linear projection coefficient of the 
market return on the firm return. If the marginal distribution of 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is symmetric 
around zero, then 𝐷𝐷−1(0.5) = 0, and we have: 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶) = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐶 (E1.13) 
As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), ∆CoVaR denoted ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) and 
defined for a conditioning event ℂ (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡): 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) is:  
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡[𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) - 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(0.5)] (E1.14) 
or 
∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) (E1.15) 
if the marginal distribution of the firm return is symmetric around zero.  
Considering the case where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0 and the bivariate process becomes: 
𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(E1.16) 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡(E1.17) (𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝜉𝜉𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)~𝐷𝐷(E1.18) 
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where 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = (𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝜉𝜉𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡)′ satisfies 𝔼𝔼(𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡) = 0 and 𝔼𝔼(𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡′) = 𝐼𝐼2 and D denotes the 
bivariate distribution of the standardized innovations. It is straightforward to show 
that: 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡
𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α)�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α)� = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α)� =
α (E1.19) 
Hence, we have 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) = 𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚−1(α) and ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(α) = 0 where 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚(. ) 




APPENDIX F: SYSTEMIC RISK MEASUREMENT 
MODELS 
 
F1. Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP) Model 
The Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP) model is perceived as an ex-
ante systemic risk metric by Huang et al. (2009). It represents a hypothetical 
insurance premium against systemic financial distress, defined as total losses 
that exceed a given threshold of, for example, 15%, of total bank liabilities. This 
methodology is general and can be applied to any pre-selected group of firms 
with publicly tradeable equity and CDS contracts. Each institution's marginal 
contribution to systemic risk is a function of its size, probability of default (PD) 
and asset correlation. The last two components need to be estimated from market 
data. The framework includes the following primary mechanisms. First, Huang et 
al. (2009) estimate the probability of default and the asset return correlation, in 
order to determine the risk profile of a portfolio. Second, they construct the price 
of insurance against significant losses of the banking sector, which is an indicator 
of the systemic financial risk, based on the forward-looking PDs and correlations 
for the next period. Third, for stress testing purposes they examine the dynamic 
linkages between default risk factors and many macro-financial factors. An 
integrated micro-macro model framework enables them to investigate the two-
way linkages between the banking sector and the macroeconomy. Lastly, they 
define stress testing scenarios and explore their implications for the stability of 
the banking system.   
This method shows several benefits compared to other methods. First, 
both the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, and the equity prices of individual 
banks are available daily, in real time; therefore the stress testing can be updated 
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regularly. This approach does not rely on the balance sheet or accounting 
information that may be available only quarterly or on a longer time-frequency, 
with a significant reporting lag. In addition, the new indicator reflects the various 
degrees of importance of different banks contributions to systemic risk, in that 
banks are treated differently based on their relative size, thus enhancing the 
power to identify systemically important financial institutions. More importantly, 
they find that realised correlations in the short-term horizon provide strong and 
additional predicting power in forecasting the movement in asset return 
correlations, relative to equity market and term structure variables. Finally, the 
adopted integrated micro-macro model does not only examine the impact of 
general market developments on the performance of individual banks, but 
simultaneously incorporates the feedback effect from the banking system to the 
rest of the economy.   
Regarding the model's shortcomings, its current method uses the size of 
losses around the period when many banks are distressed at the same time. 
Even though this method might appear to capture systemic risk, it only works 
when systemic losses are sufficiently presented in historical statistics. However, 
around the stage of rapid financial innovation, newly interconnected segments of 
the financial structure may not witness simultaneous losses, despite the fact that 
systemic risk is often associated with interconnectedness among banks. For 
instance, before the global financial crisis 2007-09, great losses among mono-
line insurance firms did not correspond with similar losses among hedge funds 
invested in mortgage-backed securities, as both fields had only recently been 
connected via insurance contracts on collateralised debt commitments; hence it 
reduces Distressed Insurance Premium model accuracy in measuring systemic 
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risk. Second, the model is not a very useful early warning indicator of systemic 
risk because the probability-based model regularly relies upon market volatility, 
and around the times of market growth and boom, volatility is usually less than in 
the stage of distress. It indicates under-estimation of systemic risk until volatility 
fierce happens (Billio et al., 2012).       
F2. Aggregated Distance-to-Default 
Based on contingent claims analysis, Saldías (2013) develops a method 
to monitor systemic risk in the European banking system. In his study, aggregated 
Distance-to-Default series are generated using option priced information from 
systemically important banks (SIBs) and the STOXX Europe 600 Bank's Index. 
Contingent claims analysis (CCA) is a framework that combines market-based 
and balance sheet information to obtain a comprehensive set of company 
financial risk indicators, for instance: Distance-to-Default, probabilities of default, 
risk-neutral credit risk premia and expected losses on senior debt. Based on the 
Merton (1974) approach to default risk, CCA has three principles: (1) the 
economic value of liabilities is derived and equals the economic value of assets 
(which reflect the present value of future income); (2) liabilities in the balance 
sheet have different priorities (i.e. senior and junior claims) and associated risk); 
and (3) the company assets distribution follows a stochastic process. 
These indicators provide methodological advantages in monitoring 
vulnerabilities within the banking system over time. First, they capture 
interdependence and joint risk of distress in SIBs. Besides this, heir forward-
looking features endow them with early signalling properties, compared to 
traditional approaches within literature and other market-based indicators. 
Moreover, they produce simultaneously smooth and informative long-term 
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signals and quick and precise reactions to market distress. Lastly, they 
incorporate additional information through option prices about tail risk and 
correlation breaks, in line with recent findings in the literature. 
One of the main weaknesses of this model is that this specification of 
option price-based expected losses does not incorporate skewness and kurtosis, 
and stochastic volatility, which can account for implied volatility smiles of equity 
prices. It is also important to note that the presented valuation model is subject 
to varying degrees of estimation uncertainty and parametric assumptions, which 
need to be taken into account when drawing policy conclusions. The option 
pricing model (given its specific distributional assumptions, the derivation of both 
implied assets and asset volatility, and assumptions about the default barrier) 
could fail to capture some relevant economics, which are needed to understand 
default risk thoroughly, and, thus, could generate biased estimators of expected 
losses (Jobst, 2014).  
F3. SRISK Model 
One of the most recent systemic risk measurements is the SRISK index, 
introduced in (Brownlees and Engle, 2017), to measure the systemic risk 
contribution of a financial firm. The index associates systemic risk to the capital 
shortfall a financial institution is expected to experience based on a severe 
market decline. SRISK is a function of the firm’s size, its degree of leverage and 
its expected equity loss based on a market downturn. The sum of SRISK across 
all firms is used to measure the degree of undercapitalization of the whole 
financial system. 
One of the most important benefits of SRISK is that SRISK delivers useful 
rankings of systemically risky firms at various stages of the financial crisis. 
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Moreover, regression results show that SRISK is a significant predictor of the 
capital injections performed by the Fed during the crisis. Also, outcomes 
demonstrate that an increase in SRISK predicts future declines in industrial 
production and increases in the unemployment rate, and that the predictive ability 
of aggregate SRISK is stronger over longer horizons. Finally, the empirical 
analysis shows that SRISK has significantly higher predictive power than SES 
(Brownlees and Engle, 2017). 
The main drawback of SRISK is that it incorporates considerable 
frequency market information (market capitalisation and daily share prices) and 
low-frequency statistics from the balance sheet (leverage). Therefore, it is forced 
to presume the constant liabilities of the bank around the crisis time (Banulescu 
and Dumitrescu, 2015). Moreover, this model fails to measure the marginal 
contribution of a bank to simultaneous changes of both the harshness of systemic 
risk and the dependence system, over any combination of sample banks, for any 
degree of statistical confidence, and at any point in time, because it does not 










The returns produced by a given stock or portfolio across a 





Where acquirer is a bank and target can be non-bank 
financial firm such as insurance company, securities 
company, financial services company 
Agency motive Under the agency motive, Jensen (1986) proposes the 
agency costs of free cash flow theory which, among many 
theories, can relevantly explain M&As. The free cash flow 
theory anticipates that mergers and acquisitions are more 
likely to demolish, rather than to create value. As such, the 




Referred to as information failure, is present whenever one 
party to an economic transaction possesses greater 
material knowledge than the other party 
Banking 
Concentration 
A few largest banks control the whole economy of a country 
(opposite to banking competition) 
Banking crisis Banking crisis indicates the crisis of liquidity and insolvency 
of more banking firms in the financial system 
Bidder/acquirer The firm purchasing another firm for a specific price 
Capital buffer Compulsory capital that financial firms are obliged to hold 
along with other minimum capital requirements 
Coefficient A number in front of a variable  
Conglomerate A combination of two and more firms operating in wholly 
different industries under one corporate umbrella 
Consolidation The action or process of merging numerous things into a 
single more efficient whole. 
Contagion The spread of market changes from one market to others 
Correlations 
between returns 
A statistical measure that computes the strength of 
relationship between the comparative movements of the two 
variables 
Credit ratings An evaluation of the capability of a person or firm to meet their 
commitments, established on previous transactions 
Credit rationing Refers to any situation in which lenders are not willing to 











A measure executed in many nations to protect bank 
depositors, in full or in part, from losses caused by a bank's 
failure to pay its obligations when due 




Involves contract between parties whose value is based on 
an agreed-upon underlying financial assets (securities, 
bonds, commodities, interest rates currencies, market 
indexes) 
Diversification The process of a company expanding or diverging its variety 
of products or field of operation. 
Domestic 
merger 
M&A deal that acquirer and target are in the same country 
Dummy variable Take the value of 0 or 1 to show the absence or presence of 








A proportional saving obtained by producing two or more 
different products, when the cost of doing so is smaller than 
that of producing each good individually. 
Focusing 
merger 
Where acquirer and target are both banks 
Geographic 
diversification 
Firms expand their activities geographically 
Globalisation The process by which firms develop global influence or begin 
operating on an international scale. 
Housing bubble A run-up in housing prices fueled by demand, assumption 
and enthusiasm 
Hubris The theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986) suggests that 
managers may have good intentions in increasing their firm’s 
value but, being overconfident, they overestimate their 
abilities to create synergies. 
Interbank 
market 
Exclusive financial market where banks borrow short-run 
funds from other banks having surplus liquidity. 
Interconnectedn
ess 
Banks can be connected to each other in numerous ways. 
Higher interconnectedness means shocks can spread more 
swiftly and extensively over the financial sector.  
Liquidity Liquidity is a measure of the capacity and easiness with 





The policies or actions to avoid risks affecting the whole or 
substantial parts of the financial system rather than individual 
financial firms, or becoming systemic 
Mega-merger A term used to describe the joining of two very large firms, 
usually involving a transaction value worth billions of dollars 
Merger and 
acquisition 
The buying and selling of firms 
Moral hazard Lack of motivation to protect against risk where one is 
protected from its consequences 
Multicollinearity A stage of very high intercorrelations among the independent 
variables, hence it is a kind of disturbance in the data which 




Merger between bank and bank 
Price volatility Used to describe price fluctuations of a commodity 
Privatisation The transfer of a business, sector, or service from public to 
private ownership and monitor. 
Product 
diversification 
Firms add new products/services to their range or new 
products in new markets 
Safety net 
subsidies 
The subsidy provided by government's desire to prevent 
financial crises  
Simulation Simulation approaches allowed researchers to evaluate the 
effects of banking institutions’ expansion within these banned 
activities. The assumptions of such a hypothetical acquisition 
approach are relatively simple. The authors presume that the 
combined entity is the sum of two single companies. The 




Standard deviation is applied to the annual rate of return of 
an investment to measure the investment's volatility 
Sub-prime 
mortgage 
A kind of loan approved to people with poor credit scores, 
who, due to their unsatisfactory credit histories, cannot obtain 
a traditional mortgage 
Synergy In M&As context, synergy explains the capability of a 
combined entity to be more profitable than the single parts of 
the two corporations that were merged. 
Target The firm who is purchased by another firm 
Universal 
banking  
A banking system in which banks provide a variety of financial 
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